Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Thursday 13 June 2013 |
Time: | 13:50 |
Type: |  Saab 340B |
Operator: | SkyBahamas Airlines |
Registration: | C6-SBJ |
MSN: | 340B-316 |
First flight: | 1992-09-10 (20 years 9 months) |
Total airframe hrs: | 49097 |
Engines: | 2 General Electric CT7-9B |
Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 3 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 21 |
Total: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 24 |
Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
Aircraft fate: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
Location: | Marsh Harbour International Airport (MHH) ( Bahamas)
|
Phase: | Landing (LDG) |
Nature: | International Scheduled Passenger |
Departure airport: | Fort Lauderdale International Airport, FL (FLL/KFLL), United States of America |
Destination airport: | Marsh Harbour International Airport (MHH/MYAM), Bahamas |
Flightnumber: | Q79561 |
Narrative:SkyBahamas Airlines flight Q7-9561, a Saab 340B, sustained substantial damage in a landing accident at Marsh Harbour International Airport (MHH), Bahamas.
The flight crew received weather information and IFR route clearance from the controller at Fort Lauderdale International Airport, Florida, USA. Departure time was 13:06 hours local time. From the cockpit voice recorder it was evident that the flight crew failed to brief or discuss the weather for departure or enroute. Additionally, they failed to complete several important checklists as required and did not observe sterile cockpit procedures during startup, run-up, taxi and takeoff.
The enroute and approach checklists were not conducted prior to arriving near their destination of Marsh Harbour Airport, Bahamas. The crew was aware of the weather conditions at Marsh Harbor, which included heavy rainshowers; however, they never formulated a plan for diversion if the weather was bad at their time of arrival.
As the approach continued there were constant disagreements between both pilots as to who had the runway in sight. Due to the weather conditions, visibility of the runway was intermittent, yet the crew continued descending visually in an attempt to land the aircraft on a runway that was not in sight and not served by an instrument landing system (ILS).
The crew flew a non-stabilized approach and speed was not constant as they kept increasing and decreasing speed throughout the final approach. The captain, who initially was the non-flying pilot, while on final approach and below 500 feet AGL, assumed control of the aircraft from the flying pilot (first officer). At some point the captain lost use of his windshield wiper as it went over-center and was stuck. During the final moments of the approach. The copilot again assumed control of the aircraft and seconds before touch down, the captain (despite having no visual contact with the runway due to the intense downpour of rain and the non-use of his windshield wiper), again took control of the aircraft from the first officer.
By the time the aircraft touched the runway, there were several control wheel exchanges between both pilots while neither had a visual of the runway.
The aircraft initially touched down at 17:49:02 with a recorded vertical load factor of +2.16G, approximately 14 seconds after crossing the threshold of runway 09. Upon initial landing however, the aircraft bounced and became airborne, reaching a calculated maximum height of approximately 15 feet AGL.
The aircraft bounced a second time at 17:49:07 with a recorded vertical load factor of +3.19G. During this second bounce, the pitch attitude was 1.8 degrees nose down, heading 102 degrees magnetic and airspeed 106 KIAS.
The aircraft made consecutive contact with the runway approximately three times. The third and final bounce occurred at 17:49:14 with a recorded vertical load factor of +3.66G. During the third bounce, the pitch attitude was 2.2 degrees nose down, heading 099 degrees magnetic and airspeed 98 KIAS.
As a result of the hard touchdown, damage was sustained to the right wing and right hand engine/propeller. The right hand engine parameters recorded a rapid loss of power with decreasing engine speed and torque, and subsequent propeller stoppage. The aircraft veered off to the right at approximate time of 17:49:20 on a heading of 131 degrees magnetic at a point approximately 6,044 feet from the threshold of runway 09.
The recorded airspeed was 44 KIAS with the left hand engine torque at 26 % and the right hand engine torque at 0%. The aircraft came to a full stop at approximate time 17:49:25 on a heading of 231 degrees magnetic. When the aircraft came to a stop, the flight and cabin crew and 21 passengers evacuated the aircraft. The evacuation was uneventful using the main entrance door.
Probable Cause:
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:
- Inexperienced and undisciplined crew.
- Lack of crew resource management training.
- Failure to follow company standard operating procedures.
- Condition known as "get-home-itis" where attempt is made to continue a flight at any cost, even if it means putting aircraft and persons at risk in order to do so.
- Failure to retrieve, observe and respect weather conditions.
- Thunderstorms at the airfield.
Accident investigation:
|
Investigating agency: | AAID Bahamas  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 3 years and 11 months | Accident number: | A13-02444 | Download report: | Final report
|
|
Classification:
Non-adherence to procedures
Bounced on landing
Runway excursion (veer-off)
Follow-up / safety actions
AAID Bahamas issued 12 Safety Recommendations
Issued: 30-APR-2017 | To: CAA Bahamas | C6-SBJ(1) |
The Flight Standards Inspectorate mandated with oversight of AOC holders should reevaluate the SOPs in use by SkyBahamas Airlines to verify action taken by this particular flight crew is isolated and not consistent with current company training procedures. |
Issued: 30-APR-2017 | To: CAA Bahamas | C6-SBJ(10) |
The Flight Standards Inspectorate should require SkyBahamas Airlines and all other operators with this aircraft fleet be required to do a complete download of the CVR and FDR at prescribed intervals (at least twice a year), to ensure they are operating as per manufacturers recommendations or regulatory requirement. |
Issued: 30-APR-2017 | To: SkyBahamas Airlines | C6-SBJ(11) |
Company should be required to institute a flight data-monitoring program. |
Issued: 30-APR-2017 | To: CAA Bahamas | C6-SBJ(12) |
It is also recommended that Flight Standards Inspectorate ensure that the crew of this aircraft be removed from active line duty and re-examined for their fitness to hold type rating on this aircraft type. Training should also be given to this crew in the following deficient areas.
- Aeronautical Decision Making
- Adverse weather flying
- Crew Resource Management
- Aircraft Systems
- Civil Aviation Regulations and
- Company Standard Operating Procedures |
Issued: 30-APR-2017 | To: CAA Bahamas | C6-SBJ(2) |
It is recommended that the Flight Standards Inspectorate increase surveillance of AOC holders with emphasis on the actions of flight crew and their adherence to SOPs by conducting more frequent flight deck observation. |
Issued: 30-APR-2017 | To: CAA Bahamas | C6-SBJ(3) |
The Flight Standards Inspectorate must observe on an increased basis, the training and checks being delivered to crewmembers of SkyBahamas Airlines. |
Issued: 30-APR-2017 | To: SkyBahamas Airlines | C6-SBJ(4) |
SkyBahamas Airlines should be required to examine its policies and a cultural change may need to be investigated and implemented to ensure crew are conducting themselves as professionals, despite their familiarity with each other during required duties. |
Issued: 30-APR-2017 | To: SkyBahamas Airlines | C6-SBJ(5) |
Company should examine all its aircraft to verify area microphone and panel match, this can also eliminate or reduce the loud noise heard on the CVR. |
Issued: 30-APR-2017 | To: | C6-SBJ(6) |
Cockpit Voice Recorder Manufacturer should be petitioned to have high quality separate channel for 2 hours, as pilot channel could not be heard when cabin attendant is talking, as cabin attendant channel overrode pilot channel. This override of channel prevented a lot of the flight crew conversations, which are vital; to not be heard during the time the cabin attendant is conducting announcements. |
Issued: 30-APR-2017 | To: CAA Bahamas | C6-SBJ(7) |
The Flight Standards Inspectorate should ensure that all AOC holders operating this type of aircraft are required to ensure all recorders in its fleet are outfitted with the solid-state type of recorders as data is better preserved on this type of equipment. |
Issued: 30-APR-2017 | To: CAA Bahamas | C6-SBJ(8) |
The Flight Standards Inspectorate should ensure that SkyBahamas Airlines and all other operators of this type of equipment, ensure its maintenance personnel check setting on all remaining aircrafts FDAU to ensure time and date are correct (procedures in maintenance on how to accomplish this task) as the information for time and date on this particular aircraft was incorrect. |
Issued: 30-APR-2017 | To: | C6-SBJ(9) |
Transducers on left hand elevator and rudder position were found unreliable. The Flight Standards Inspectorate as part of their oversight functions should ensure that SkyBahamas Airlines and all other operators of this type of aircraft check all transducer on its aircraft fleet (procedures in maintenance manual on how to accomplish this task) to ensure their reliability. |
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Photos

accident date:
13-06-2013type: Saab 340B
registration: C6-SBJ

accident date:
13-06-2013type: Saab 340B
registration: N676PA
Video, social media
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Fort Lauderdale International Airport, FL to Marsh Harbour International Airport as the crow flies is 308 km (192 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.