Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | Sunday 29 September 2013 |
Time: | 21:01 |
Type: |  Airbus A320-216 |
Operator: | Alitalia |
Registration: | EI-EIB |
MSN: | 4249 |
First flight: | 2010-03-16 (3 years 7 months) |
Total airframe hrs: | 7974 |
Cycles: | 6010 |
Engines: | 2 CFMI CFM56-5B6/3 |
Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 6 |
Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 151 |
Total: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 157 |
Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
Aircraft fate: | Repaired |
Location: | Roma-Fiumicino Airport (FCO) ( Italy)
|
Phase: | Landing (LDG) |
Nature: | International Scheduled Passenger |
Departure airport: | Madrid-Barajas Airport (MAD/LEMD), Spain |
Destination airport: | Roma-Fiumicino Airport (FCO/LIRF), Italy |
Flightnumber: | AZ063 |
Narrative:An Airbus A320-216 operated by Alitalia suffered substantial damage in a landing accident at Roma-Fiumicino Airport (FCO), Italy. Flight 063 departed Madrid, Spain on a regular passenger flight to Rome-Fiumicino.
While on approach to runway 16L at Rome-Fiumicino Airport at 20:10 the crew attempted to lower the undercarriage. A Master Warning sounded and the ECAM showed a message "L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED". The crew carried out a missed approach procedure and entered a holding pattern at the Campagnano VOR. A g-force manoeuvre was carried out with the landing gear lever down. This resulted in a maximum value of 1.75g, according to DFDR data. When this attempt failed, they tried to recycle the landing gear and later again a gravity extension, but all measures were unsuccessful.
Consequently, the crew requested an emergency landing at Rome-Fiumicino Airport.
The aircraft touched down on runway 16L at 21.01with the right landing gear only partially extended. The flight crew shut down both engines just before touchdown. The subsequent evacuation was uneventful and there were no injuries.
Probable Cause:
CAUSES (translated from Italian):
The cause of the event is attributable to the failure of the right hand undercarriage actuator. In the same, there was a hydraulic block caused by multiple debris found within the actuator itself (as well as in the hydraulic fluid), presumably in the restrictor zone. The origin of this debris was identified in the material from the two elements called "spirolox ring" and "damping rings" found missing from their design position.
This failure seems to result in a defect in the design of the "spirolox ring", the effect of which has resulted in premature deterioration and subsequent fall of the same element, resulting in internal damage found during the actuator analysis.
Accident investigation:
|
Investigating agency: | ANSV  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 3 years | Accident number: | EI-EIB | Download report: | Final report
|
|
Classification:
Gear-up landing
Forced landing on runway
Sources:
» ANSV
Follow-up / safety actions
ANSV issued 5 Safety Recommendations
EASA issued 1 Airworthiness Directive
Issued: -- | To: EASA | ANSV-12/2385-13/5/A/16 |
lANSV raccomanda di introdurre un requisito che assicuri il funzionamento dei registratori di volo (FDR/CVR) anche nel caso di power failure e, relativamente allA320 family, nel caso di velocità insufficiente al funzionamento della RAT. |
Issued: 04-DEC-2013 | To: EASA | ANSV-13/2385-13/1/A/13 |
The required PFR check cannot be considered a valid method or safety net for the preliminary identification of an incoming failure on the main landing gear door actuators. This kind of maintenance check has been revealed as ineffective on both the last two events. On the other hand the analysis post accident on the components, revealed on all the three cases mentioned, that a X-Ray analysis is able at 100% to identify the failed conditions of the actuator. The damages showed during these X-Ray analysis have been found at a level that is reasonable to state that it should be possible to identify a failure many cycles before the actuator will become stuck. ANSV
recommends to take into consideration the possibility to add X-Ray analysis (to be performed through portable tools for example) to the checks prescribed on the main landing gear door actuators. |
Issued: 04-DEC-2013 | To: EASA | ANSV-14/2385-13/2/A/13 |
The installation of the std-14 is considered a terminating action for the checks prescribed by AD 2011-0069R1 (same as about the PAD 13-125R2). With reference to the lack of reliability data coming from the A320 family fleet operations on the new modified actuators std-14, ANSV recommends to avoid to completely delete the prescribed checks and inspections in the first part of the substitution campaign of the std-14 on the A320 family fleet. |
Issued: 04-DEC-2013 | To: EASA | ANSV-15/2385-13/3/A/13 |
Recurrence of the event within such a very short period suggested ANSV to strongly recommends to launch a substitution campaign of the std-12 actuator in the shortest way possible. |
Issued: 04-DEC-2013 | To: EASA | ANSV-16/2385-13/4/A/13 |
ANSV recommends to take into consideration that the debris coming from a failed actuator have been found inside the actuators "not failed" on both accidents occurred on 2013. With reference to the maintenance actions required by the AD 2011-0069R1 (same as about the PAD 13-125R2), if a faulty actuator is found, the required corrective action is to remove it and to install a new one. No actions required about the hydraulic system that has been found contaminated during both the investigations. ANSV strongly recommends to ask for the proper technical actions to be carried out on the hydraulic system of the landing gear doors to be sure that contamination is not present in case of a landing gear door actuator removal in consequence of the actions prescribed to identify an internal damage (ref AD 2011-0069R1 and PAD 13-125R2). |
Issued: 06-DEC-2013 | To: Airbus A318, A319, A320, A321 | AD 2013-0288 |
This AD retains the requirements of EASA AD 2011-0069R1 and AD 2013-0132-E, which are superseded, but with reduced inspection intervals, and requires replacement or modification, as applicable, of the affected MLG door actuators as terminating action for the monitoring, repetitive checks and inspections. |
Show all...
Photos
Video, social media
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Madrid-Barajas Airport to Roma-Fiumicino Airport as the crow flies is 1321 km (826 miles).
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.