Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Datum: | Donnerstag 4 Dezember 2014 |
Zeit: | 08:02 |
Flugzeugtyp: |  ATR 72-202 |
Operator: | Avanti Air |
On behalf of: | Darwin Airline |
Kennzeichen: | D-ANFE |
Werknummer: | 272 |
Baujahr: | 1992-11-25 (22 years ) |
Triebwerk: | 2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PW124B |
Besatzung: | Todesopfer: 0 / Insassen: 4 |
Fluggäste: | Todesopfer: 0 / Insassen: 26 |
Gesamt: | Todesopfer: 0 / Insassen: 30 |
Sachschaden: | schwer beschädigt |
Konsequenzen: | Repaired |
Unfallort: | Zürich-Kloten Airport (ZRH) ( Schweiz)
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Flugphase: | Landung (LDG) |
Betriebsart: | Internationaler Linienflug |
Flug von: | Dresden Airport (DRS/EDDC), Deutschland |
Flug nach: | Zürich-Kloten Airport (ZRH/LSZH), Schweiz |
Flugnummer: | F7286 |
Unfallbericht:At 06:33 local time on 4 December 2014, an ATR 72-202, registration D-ANFE, took off from Dresden Airport, Germany on a scheduled flight to Zurich, Switzerland (LSZH).
As the result of a fault, during the cruising flight the air conditioning system unit 1 had to be reset once; thereafter it functioned normally for the remainder of the flight.
After an uneventful descent and approach, D-ANFE touched down normally at 08:02 on runway 14 at Zurich Airport in a light northerly wind. According to the flight crew's statements, the touchdown of the main landing gear and the nose landing gear occurred normally.
After the nose landing gear wheels had come into contact with the runway approximately 1050 m after the runway threshold, the tyre of the right nose landing gear wheel separated from the nose landing gear during landing roll. The nose landing gear continued to slide on the wheel rims approximately 470 m after nosewheel touchdown. The commander later stated that shortly before reaching intersection H1 he had noticed that the steering was not functioning correctly.
At 08:04:12 the copilot then reported the following to the air traffic controller (ATCO) in the aerodrome control tower (TWR): "Darwin two eight six uh we have a problem, we're on the runway trying to vacate." He also requested the ATCO to summon the fire brigade because he suspected hot brakes.
Steering was then performed by the flight crew by means of asymmetrical power setting of the two engines and by asymmetrical braking of the main landing gear wheels. The ATCO then instructed the crew to vacate the runway, if possible via intersection H1. This was also the flight crew's intention, since the vibrations increased during landing roll.
The two flight attendants later stated that after touchdown the aircraft had deviated somewhat to the right and the landing roll-out felt as if the runway was very bumpy.
The aircraft was brought to a standstill shortly afterwards at the Category (CAT) 1 stop bar on taxiway (TWY) H1. The fire-brigade arrived shortly afterwards at the aircraft and examined the brakes for overheating.
Once the aircraft had come to a standstill, the copilot asked the ATCO for a runway inspection of runway 14 to be performed, since he suspected there had been problems with the tyres and consequently damage to the runway. The runway inspection was undertaken immediately; a tyre from the nose landing gear of D-ANFE was found on the centre line of runway 14 approximately 2080 m from the runway threshold. In addition, abrasion marks were found; however, these were not assessed as restrictive for the continued operation of runway 14.
Probable Cause:
Ursachen
Der Unfall ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass während der Landung das Bugfahrwerk nicht zentriert war und somit die beiden Bugräder nicht frei drehen konnten. In der Folge war die Kontrolle über die Steuerung des Bugfahrwerkes, das erheblich beschädigt wurde, nicht mehr gegeben.
Das Zusammenwirken der folgenden Faktoren wurde als wahrscheinlichste Ursache für den Unfall ermittelt:
* ein am Bugfahrwerk um 180° verdreht angeschlossener Eingabehebel (valve input lever) des Differentialsteuerventils;
- mangelhafte Instandhaltung des Bugfahrwerkes.
Die Möglichkeit, den Eingabehebel (valve input lever) aufgrund seiner baulichen Auslegung (design) um 180° verkehrt anschliessen zu können, wurde als beitragender Faktor ermittelt.
Die im Rahmen einiger Stunden später durchgeführten Pistenkontrolle (runway inspection) vorgefundenen Kleinteile des Flugzeuges auf der Piste haben die Entstehung und den Verlauf des Unfalls zwar nicht beeinflusst, stellen aber dennoch ein Sicherheitsrisiko (factor to risk) dar.
Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: | STSB Switzerland  |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 2 years and 5 months | Accident number: | No. 2303 | Download report: | Final report
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METAR Weather report:
06:50 UTC / 07:50 local time:
LSZH 040650Z VRB02KT 7000 BKN006 03/02 Q1013 NOSIG 07:20 UTC / 08:20 local time:
LSZH 040720Z VRB02KT 7000 BKN006 03/02 Q1013 NOSIG
Sicherheitsempfehlungen
STSB issued 1 Safety Recommendation
Issued: 09-MAY-2017 | To: EASA | 529 |
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), together with the aircraft manufacturer, should ensure that it is no longer possible to attach the valve input lever of the hydraulic differential control selector valve (DCSV) incorrectly. |
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Fotos
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does
not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Dresden Airport to Zürich-Kloten Airport as the crow flies is 552 km (345 miles).
Accident location: Approximate; accuracy within a few kilometers.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.