Crash-aerien 26 DEC 2016 d'un Avro RJ100 SE-DST - København-Kastrup Airport (CPH)
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Statuts:Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Date:lundi 26 décembre 2016
Heure:16:09
Type/Sous-type:Silhouette image of generic RJ1H model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Avro RJ100
Compagnie:BRA - Braathens Regional Airlines
Immatriculation: SE-DST
Numéro de série: E3247
Année de Fabrication: 1994-06-17 (22 years 7 months)
Moteurs: 4 Lycoming LF507-1F
Equipage:victimes: 0 / à bord: 5
Passagers:victimes: 0 / à bord: 0
Total:victimes: 0 / à bord: 5
Dégats de l'appareil: Substantiels
Conséquences: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Lieu de l'accident:København-Kastrup Airport (CPH) (   Danemark)
Phase de vol: En attente (STD)
Nature:Convoyage
Aéroport de départ:Göteborg-Landvetter Airport (GOT/ESGG), Suède
Aéroport de destination:København-Kastrup Airport (CPH/EKCH), Danemark
Numéro de vol:TF9078
Détails:
An Airbus A340-313, OY-KBC operated by SAS, and an Avro RJ100, SE-DST operated by BRA - Braathens Regional Airlines, were both damaged in a ground collision accident at Copenhagen's Kastrup Airport in Denmark.
BRA flight 9078 landed at 15:51 hours following a repositioning flight from Göteborg, Sweden.
Arriving at aircraft stand E77 at 15:57 hours, the flight crew of SE-DST noticed that the ground handling personnel had not yet arrived at the aircraft stand. They attempted to contact their handling agent several times.
The flight crew of SE-DST was concerned that aircraft wing clearance to obstacles outside of the marked aircraft manoeuvring area of aircraft stand E77 was insufficient for moving the aircraft onto the stand and insufficient for the coming departure. For that reason, the flight crew decided to move the aircraft onto the stand guided by the yellow centre line, and the flight crew then stopped the aircraft approximately 14 metres in front of the stopping mark.
While waiting for the ground handling personnel to arrive and waiting for entry guidance, the aircraft engines were running.
At 16:06 hours, a towbarless tractor driver contacted Kastrup Apron by radio and requested towing instructions for towing OY-KBC from hangar 5 to an aircraft stand.
At that point, it was the perception of the apron controller at Kastrup Apron that SE-DST had fully parked at aircraft stand E77.
At 16:07 hours, Kastrup Apron instructed the driver to tow OY-KBC to aircraft stand C29 via taxiway T, taxiway V and to hold short of taxiway S. The driver read back the towing instructions.
An onboard flight deck operator in OY-KBC handled the aircraft auxiliary power unit and the aircraft external lights. No radio communication between the driver and the onboard flight deck operator was established.
When entering taxiway T, the driver observed and perceived SE-DST as standing (aircraft anticollision light on) within the marked demarcation of aircraft stand E77. It was the perception of the driver that SE-DST was outgoing traffic but awaiting taxi instructions and therefore in sequence behind the towed OY-KBC.
The onboard flight deck operator in OY-KBC did not notice the presence of SE-DST, until the right winglet of OY-KBC collided with the tail section of SE-DST.
The driver stopped the truck and reported to Kastrup Apron that the towed OY-KBC had collided with an aircraft at aircraft stand E77 and that no one had suffered any injuries.
The right winglet of OY-KBC suffered minor damages and the aircraft was back in service two days later. The horizontal stabilizer, the elevator and the rudder of SE-DST suffered substantial damages.

Probable Cause:

CONCLUSION:
A TBL towed OY-KBC on taxiway T, and the winglet of OY-KBC collided with the tail section of SE-DST, which had not fully parked at aircraft stand E77.
Independent expectations led to three diverging mental realities affecting the sequence of events:
1. The TBL driver perceived SE-DST as standing within the marked demarcation of aircraft stand E77 and expected that SE-DST was outgoing traffic but in sequence behind OY-KBC under tow
2. The flight crew of SE-DST awaited and expected aircraft stand entry guidance and stopped the aircraft approximately 14 meters in front of the aircraft stand stopping mark at aircraft stand E77
3. Kastrup Apron expected that SE-DST had fully parked given that approximately nine minutes had passed since the arrival of SE-DST at aircraft stand E77

Accident investigation:

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Investigating agency: HCLJ Denmark
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 87 days (3 months)
Accident number: HCLJ510-2016-322
Download report: Final report


Photos

photo of Avro-RJ100-SE-DST
accident date: 26-12-2016
type: Avro RJ100
registration: SE-DST
 

Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Göteborg-Landvetter Airport et København-Kastrup Airport est de 227 km (142 miles).

Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.
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