Statuts: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Date: | mardi 27 décembre 2016 |
Heure: | 05:03 |
Type/Sous-type: | Boeing 737-85R (WL) |
Compagnie: | Jet Airways |
Immatriculation: | VT-JBG |
Numéro de série: | 35083/2535 |
Année de Fabrication: | 2008-02-27 (8 years 10 months) |
Heures de vol: | 36256 |
Cycles: | 15997 |
Moteurs: | 2 CFMI CFM56-7B26 |
Equipage: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 7 |
Passagers: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 154 |
Total: | victimes: 0 / Ã bord: 161 |
Dégats de l'appareil: | Substantiels |
Conséquences: | Repaired |
Lieu de l'accident: | Goa-Dabolim Airport (GOI) ( Inde)
|
Phase de vol: | Au décollage (TOF) |
Nature: | Transport de Passagers Nat. |
Aéroport de départ: | Goa-Dabolim Airport (GOI/VAGO), Inde |
Aéroport de destination: | Mumbai-Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport (BOM/VABB), Inde |
Numéro de vol: | 9W2374 |
Détails:Jet Airways flight 2374, a Boeing 737-85R (WL), suffered a runway excursion at Goa-Dabolim Airport (GOI) in India.
The flight crew requested ATC for a pushback clearance at 04:52 local time. ATC cleared the flight to line up on runway 26 by entering Taxiway N1 and backtracking. The crew requested for an intersection departure, but this was not allowed by ATC. The starboard engine was started followed by start of port engine at 04:53.
At 05:01, as the aircraft was taxiing down th runway, ATC gave a departure clearance to the aircraft. It was cleared to Mumbai at FL220. The aircraft thereafter lined up on runway 26 after making a 180° turn at the turn pad. At 05:03, flight 2374 was cleared for take-off.
The crew completed the before take-off checklist and at 05:03 pushed the thrust levers to increase the thrust. After the Throttle Lever Angle (TLA) had passed 40%, the pilot in command pressed the TOGA button for takeoff.
As soon as TOGA was pressed, the aircraft started drifting towards the right. Within 10 to 12 seconds the aircraft went off the runway, onto the grass. The crew tried to apply brakes, rudder and use nosewheel steering to steer the aircraft. Due to heavy bumps they could not apply control effectively.
The aircraft stopped at a distance of 219 m from the runway edge and just short of perimeter road. In the process it had hit PAPI lights. The engine had hit a vertical pillar of 2.3 m in height, located at 92 m abeam the center line of runway 26. The pillar also damaged the left bottom portion of the fuselage.
The aircraft was evacuated after coming to rest. Sixteen passengers suffered minor injuries during the evacuation.
Probable Cause:
Probable cause of the Accident: "The PIC pressed TOGA when the thrust on no.1 engine was 40% and no.2 engine was 28% in deviation from SOP, which caused the No.1 engine thrust to increase at a faster rate than no.2 resulting in aircraft yawing towards right. In the absence of timely desired corrective actions including reject takeoff, the aircraft veered off the runway and continued to move in a semicircular arc on the undulated ground resulting in substantial damages to the aircraft."
Accident investigation:

|
Investigating agency: | AAIB India |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 11 months | Accident number: | final report | Download report: | Final report
|
|
Sources:
» ABPlive
»
Flightradar24
METAR Weather report:
23:30 UTC / 05:00 local time:
VOGO 262330Z VRB03KT 4000 BR NSC 21/20 Q1010 BECMG 3000 HZ/BR
Opérations de secours
AAIB India issued 7 Safety Recommendations
Issued: -- | To: Jet Airways | VT-JBG(1) |
The operator must reiterate the importance of all briefings to flight crew especially emergency briefings. First officers to be more assertive with regards to adherence to standard operating procedures.? |
Issued: -- | To: Jet Airways | VT-JBG(2) |
Stabilized callout by the PM may be introduced after the initial thrust application of 40% prior to application of TOGA. This callout should imply that both thrust setting are practically identical.? |
Issued: -- | To: Jet Airways | VT-JBG(3) |
The training department of the operator to incorporate defined failures for unstabilised thrust, uneven spool up of engines during low speed for reject and their corrective actions thereof.? |
Issued: -- | To: Jet Airways | VT-JBG(4) |
The importance of following the correct actions regarding evacuation and briefing for the same during all simulator training sessions be emphasized. |
Issued: -- | To: DGCA India | VT-JBG(5) |
DGCA in co-ordination with the Defence authorities should make the standard „Aerodrome Emergency Plan? for all the Defence Airfield where scheduled civil flights operate as per the latest framework of Safety Management System. AAI which is the custodian of the Civil Enclaves and apron area at these airports, now licensed by DGCA, should have a direct role to play in the procedures of contingency actions in case of an accident. |
Issued: -- | To: DGCA India | VT-JBG(6) |
As a onetime exercise, DGCA should check the practical implementation of the ERP of all airlines and ensure that it is rigidly integrated with the AEP of the aerodromes for better handling of the situation & passenger facilitation.? |
Issued: -- | To: AAIB India | VT-JBG(7) |
AAIB India must reiterate all the aspects of requirements of detailed Medical Examination of the Flight Crew whenever there is a serious incident or accident by clearly defining the responsibility of individuals involved in the process.? |
Show all...
Photos
accident date:
27-12-2016type: Boeing 737-85R (WL)
registration: VT-JBG
accident date:
27-12-2016type: Boeing 737-85R (WL)
registration: VT-JBG
accident date:
27-12-2016type: Boeing 737-85R (WL)
registration: VT-JBG
accident date:
27-12-2016type: Boeing 737-85R (WL)
registration: VT-JBG
accident date:
27-12-2016type: Boeing 737-85R (WL)
registration: VT-JBG
accident date:
27-12-2016type: Boeing 737-85R (WL)
registration: VT-JBG
Video, social media
Plan
Ce plan montre l'aéroport de départ ainsi que la supposée destination du vol. La ligne fixe reliant les deux aéroports n'est pas le plan de vol exact.
La distance entre Goa-Dabolim Airport et Mumbai-Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport est de 422 km (264 miles).
Les informations ci-dessus ne représentent pas l'opinion de la 'Flight Safety Foundation' ou de 'Aviation Safety Network' sur les causes de l'accident. Ces informations prélimimaires sont basées sur les faits tel qu'ils sont connus à ce jour.