Narrative:
The two airline-transport pilots and two passengers departed on a cross-country flight in the chartered airplane. Preflight planning had noted the destination airport's runway conditions as "good." As the flight neared the destination airport and the crew conducted the approach checklist, the captain stated, "light snow ... maybe slippery." When the crew checked the airports automated terminal information service, the broadcast included "light freezing rain." The flight was transferred to the tower controller, who told the crew that the airport operations crew was on the runway about 20 minutes earlier and advised that it was starting to pick up traces of ice. The captain acknowledged the transmission and, after conducting a missed approach to runway 6L, requested to land on runway 24R. During the approach to runway 24R, the tower controller reported wind at 020° at 25 knots and also at 010° at 25 knots. The crewmembers reported that, after touchdown, they applied maximum braking; however, the airplane did not slow and skidded off the end of the runway into the engineered material arresting system (EMAS), which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and a collapsed nose gear.
The crew stated that the runway grooves had been "smoothed out" by ice accumulations. A first responder reported that the ramp and taxiways were very icy, adding that the end of the runway and EMAS had a sheet of ice. A review of the airport's snow and ice control plan noted that the airport did not have pavement surface sensors and that operations personnel would monitor the airfield as conditions dictated. An airport operations log entry for a runway and field inspection, recorded about 24 minutes before the accident, noted a temperature of 31°F and a braking coefficient of 40 , with runways and taxiways wet. A log entry for a runway and field inspection recorded about 6 minutes after the accident noted a braking coefficient of 30-35, with runways and taxiways wet.
The Runway Condition Assessment Matrix contained in Advisory Circular 150/5200-30D states that a braking coefficient of 40 or higher is the equivalent of a pilot-reported braking action of "good," while a braking coefficient of 30-35 would be medium to poor. The field conditions noted during the pilots preflight planning indicated "good" braking conditions; however, the captain's statement of "light snow ... maybe slippery," along with the tower controller's report that the runway was starting to pick up traces of ice, indicated that the crew was aware of the potential for braking conditions that were less than good, which would decrease braking action and increase the stopping distance.
Further, the crews selection of runway 24R, which led to the presence of a tailwind, also would decrease braking action.
Probable Cause: The airplane's reduced braking performance due to an ice-covered runway, which resulted in a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the crew's selection of a runway with a tailwind.
| Status: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
| Date: | Sunday 4 February 2018 |
| Time: | 19:24 |
| Type: |  Raytheon Beechjet 400A |
| Operator: | Travel Management, Inc |
| Registration: | N570TM |
| MSN: | RK-292 |
| First flight: | 2000 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 9332 |
| Engines: | 2 Williams International FJ44 |
| Crew: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 |
| Passengers: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 |
| Total: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 4 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Aircraft fate: | Written off (damaged beyond repair) |
| Location: | Cleveland-Burke Lakefront Airport, OH (BKL) ( United States of America)
|
| Phase: | Landing (LDG) |
| Nature: | Passenger |
| Departure airport: | Teterboro Airport, NJ (TEB/KTEB), United States of America |
| Cleveland-Burke Lakefront Airport, OH (BKL/KBKL), United States of America |
The two airline-transport pilots and two passengers departed on a cross-country flight in the chartered airplane. Preflight planning had noted the destination airport's runway conditions as "good." As the flight neared the destination airport and the crew conducted the approach checklist, the captain stated, "light snow ... maybe slippery." When the crew checked the airports automated terminal information service, the broadcast included "light freezing rain." The flight was transferred to the tower controller, who told the crew that the airport operations crew was on the runway about 20 minutes earlier and advised that it was starting to pick up traces of ice. The captain acknowledged the transmission and, after conducting a missed approach to runway 6L, requested to land on runway 24R. During the approach to runway 24R, the tower controller reported wind at 020° at 25 knots and also at 010° at 25 knots. The crewmembers reported that, after touchdown, they applied maximum braking; however, the airplane did not slow and skidded off the end of the runway into the engineered material arresting system (EMAS), which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and a collapsed nose gear.
The crew stated that the runway grooves had been "smoothed out" by ice accumulations. A first responder reported that the ramp and taxiways were very icy, adding that the end of the runway and EMAS had a sheet of ice. A review of the airport's snow and ice control plan noted that the airport did not have pavement surface sensors and that operations personnel would monitor the airfield as conditions dictated. An airport operations log entry for a runway and field inspection, recorded about 24 minutes before the accident, noted a temperature of 31°F and a braking coefficient of 40 , with runways and taxiways wet. A log entry for a runway and field inspection recorded about 6 minutes after the accident noted a braking coefficient of 30-35, with runways and taxiways wet.
The Runway Condition Assessment Matrix contained in Advisory Circular 150/5200-30D states that a braking coefficient of 40 or higher is the equivalent of a pilot-reported braking action of "good," while a braking coefficient of 30-35 would be medium to poor. The field conditions noted during the pilots preflight planning indicated "good" braking conditions; however, the captain's statement of "light snow ... maybe slippery," along with the tower controller's report that the runway was starting to pick up traces of ice, indicated that the crew was aware of the potential for braking conditions that were less than good, which would decrease braking action and increase the stopping distance.
Further, the crews selection of runway 24R, which led to the presence of a tailwind, also would decrease braking action.
Probable Cause:
Probable Cause: The airplane's reduced braking performance due to an ice-covered runway, which resulted in a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the crew's selection of a runway with a tailwind.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Classification:
Runway excursion (overrun)
Photos
Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Teterboro Airport, NJ to Cleveland-Burke Lakefront Airport, OH as the crow flies is 638 km (398 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
Distance from Teterboro Airport, NJ to Cleveland-Burke Lakefront Airport, OH as the crow flies is 638 km (398 miles).
Accident location: Exact; deduced from official accident report.
This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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