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Last updated: 25 March 2019
Status:Preliminary - official
Date:Monday 29 October 2018
Time: 06:31
Type:Silhouette image of generic B38M model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Boeing 737 MAX 8
Operator:Lion Air
Registration: PK-LQP
C/n / msn: 43000/7058
First flight: 2018-07-30 (3 months)
Total airframe hrs:895
Cycles:443
Engines: 2 CFMI LEAP-1B25
Crew:Fatalities: 8 / Occupants: 8
Passengers:Fatalities: 181 / Occupants: 181
Total:Fatalities: 189 / Occupants: 189
Aircraft damage: Destroyed
Aircraft fate: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Location:15 km (9.4 mls) N off Tanjung Bungin (   Indonesia)
Phase: En route (ENR)
Nature:Domestic Scheduled Passenger
Departure airport:Jakarta-Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (CGK/WIII), Indonesia
Destination airport:Pangkal Pinang Airport (PGK/WIKK), Indonesia
Flightnumber:JT610
Narrative:
Lion Air flight 610, a Boeing 737 MAX 8, crashed into the sea shortly after takeoff from Jakarta-Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, Indonesia, killing all 189 on board.
The aircraft, registration PK-LQP, had entered service with Lion Air on August 18, 2018. The Aircraft Flight Maintenance Log (AFML) recorded that since October 26, 2018 until the occurrence date several problems occurred related to airspeed and altitude flags that appeared on the captain's (left) Primary Flight Display (PFD) on three occasions, SPEED TRIM FAIL light illumination and MACH TRIM FAIL light illumination that occurred twice.
Several attempts were made by engineers to rectify these issues. The day before the accident the Angle of Attack (AoA) sensor was replaced by engineers at Denpasar Airport.
The flight from Denpasar to Jakarta (JT43) was the flight prior to JT610. During rotation of flight JT43, the stick shaker activated and an IAS DISAGREE warning showed on the captain's PFD at 400 feet. The flight was handled by the copilot as it was determined that the captain's PFD was unreliable. The flight crew moved the STAB TRIM (stabilizer trim) switch to CUT OUT due to three automatic nosedown trim occurrences. The crew worked checklists and continued the flight to CGK.
Based on the crew's entry in the AFML, the engineer at Jakarta flushed the left Pitot Air Data Module (ADM) and static ADM to rectify the reported IAS and ALT disagree and cleaned the electrical connector plug of the elevator feel computer. The aircraft was subsequently released to carry out flight JT610.
During takeoff from Jakarta, the DFDR recorded a difference between left and right Angle of Attack of about 20° which continued until the end of the recording. During rotation of the aircraft, the left control column stick shaker activated and continued for most of the flight.
After the flaps were retracted, the FDR recorded automatic aircraft nose down (AND) trim for 10 seconds followed by flight crew commanded aircraft nose up (ANU) trim. Automatic AND trim briefly stopped when the flaps were temporarily extended to 5.
In their communications with air traffic control, the flight crew asked the controller to confirm the altitude of the aircraft and later also asked the speed as shown on the controller radar display. The copilot reported experiencing a "flight control problem" and that they were flying the aircraft manually.
Last radio contact was at 06:31 local time when the captain requested the arrival controller to block altitude 3,000 feet above and below for traffic avoidance. The controller asked what altitude the pilot wanted, to which the captain responded "five thou". The controller approved the pilot request. The FDR stopped recording within twenty seconds of the pilot's response.
The aircraft impacted the sea some 15 km north off Tanjung Bungin. All 189 persons on board died in the accident.
Search and rescue personnel recovered the flight data recorder (FDR) and other debris on November 1, at 30-35 m below the water surface.

In the initial stages of the investigation, it was found that there is a potential for repeated automatic nose-down trim commands of the horizontal stabilizer when the flight control system on a Boeing 737 MAX aircraft receives an erroneously high single AOA sensor input. Such a specific condition could among others potentially result in the stick shaker activating on the affected side and IAS, ALT and/or AOA DISAGREE alerts.
The logic behind the automatic nosedown trim lies in the aircraft's MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) that was introduced by Boeing on the MAX series aircraft. This feature was added to prevent the aircraft from entering a stall under specific conditions.
On November 6, 2018, Boeing issued an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) directing operators to existing flight crew procedures to address circumstances where there is erroneous input from an AOA sensor.
On November 7, the FAA issued an emergency Airworthiness Directive requiring "revising certificate limitations and operating procedures of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to provide the flight crew with runaway horizontal stabilizer trim procedures to follow under certain conditions."

Classification:
Loss of control

Sources:
» FAA Emergency AD 2018-23-51 (pubished 7 November 2018)
» Ministry of Transportation Indonesia - statement
» NTSC Preliminary report

METAR Weather report:
23:00 UTC / 06:00 local time:
WIII 282300Z VRB02KT 8000 BKN022 26/25 Q1009 NOSIG

23:30 UTC / 06:30 local time:
WIII 282330Z 16003KT 8000 SCT020 27/25 Q1010 NOSIG


Follow-up / safety actions

FAA issued 1 Emergency Airworthiness Directive

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Photos

photo of Boeing 737 MAX 8 PK-LQP
photo of Boeing 737 MAX 8 PK-LQP
photo of Boeing 737 MAX 8 PK-LQP
photo of Boeing 737 MAX 8 PK-LQP
photo of Boeing 737 MAX 8 PK-LQP
photo of Boeing 737 MAX 8 PK-LQP
photo of Boeing 737 MAX 8 PK-LQP
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Aircraft history
date registration operator remarks
30 July 2018 N1786B Boeing first flight
13 August 2018 PK-LQP Lion Air delivery flight BFI-HNL-GUM-CGK
18 August 2018 PK-LQP Lion Air first commercial flight JT324 CGK-BDJ

Map
This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports does not display the exact flight path.
Distance from Jakarta-Soekarno-Hatta International Airport to Pangkal Pinang Airport as the crow flies is 442 km (277 miles).
Accident location: Exact; as reported in the official accident report.

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Network’s opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.
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