ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 133693
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Date: | Tuesday 7 July 1998 |
Time: | 06:15 |
Type: | Hiller UH-12E |
Owner/operator: | Jack Gillette Flying Service |
Registration: | N5360V |
MSN: | 2113 |
Total airframe hrs: | 8600 hours |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 1 |
Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
Category: | Accident |
Location: | Eltopia, WA -
United States of America
|
Phase: | Take off |
Nature: | Agricultural |
Departure airport: | |
Destination airport: | |
Investigating agency: | NTSB |
Confidence Rating: | Information is only available from news, social media or unofficial sources |
Narrative:HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On July 7, 1998, approximately 0615 Pacific daylight time, a Hiller UH-12E agricultural helicopter, N5360V, registered to and being operated by Jack Gillette Flying Service, and being flown by a commercial pilot, was destroyed during a collision with terrain in a corn field immediately following takeoff near Eltopia, Washington. Following the ground impact, the helicopter was consumed by a post-crash fire. The pilot sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions existed, and no flight plan had been filed. The flight, which was to have been conducted for the purpose of dispensing an insecticide, was to have been operated under 14CFR137.
The pilot reported that he had just taken off to the south. About 30 seconds into the flight, a control paddle departed the helicopter, and control was lost. The helicopter impacted the ground and rolled inverted, after which the pilot exited (refer to photograph 1 and DIAGRAM I).
HELICOPTER INFORMATION
An inspector from the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Spokane Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) examined the helicopter's logs and records, and also conducted a post-crash examination of the helicopter at the accident site. He reported that the helicopter's total time in service was 8,600.2 hours, and 69.1 hours of service had accumulated since following the last inspection.
A review of the helicopter's logbook revealed that an annual inspection had been accomplished on March 11, 1998, at a total airframe time of 8,531.1 hours. The annual inspection signoff contained an entry stating in part "-C/W AD 97-10-16 DYE CHK CUFF & SPAR TUBE AS PER PAR A & SB 36-1 REV 3-" (refer to ATTACHMENT L-I). The most recent inspection in the logbook which immediately preceded the March 11, 1998, inspection, was recorded as an annual on March 4, 1997, at a total time of 8,305.6 hours. Additionally, a register of Airworthiness Directive (AD) compliancy notes was maintained with the helicopter's log records. One page of this listing showed that AD 97-10-16 had been complied with on 2/3/98, at a total time of 8,531.1, and again at a total time of 8,631.1 hours. This entry was signed off, as in the helicopter's logbook, with an Inspection Authorization (IA) identification number of IA1982827 (refer to ATTACHMENT ADL-I).
Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-10-16 (effective date 6/26/97) states in part: "To prevent separation of the control rotor blade assembly and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:
(a) Within the next 100 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of the AD, unless previously accomplished within the last 100 hours TIS, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours TIS from the date of the last inspection, or at the next annual inspection, whichever occurs first, inspect the blade spar tube and cuff for corrosion or cracks, or elongation, corrosion, burrs, pitting or fretting of the bolt holes, and repair, as necessary, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Hiller Aviation Service Bulletin No. 36-1, Revision 3, dated October 24, 1979," (refer to ATTACHMENT AD-I).
Hiller Aviation Service Bulletin (SB) No. 36-1, Revision 3, (dated October 24, 1979), provides specific procedures and corrective actions for the inspection of the retention bolt holes and control rotor cuffs (refer to ATTACHMENT SB-I). Among the procedures outlined, the SB specifically addresses the following procedures:
"A. Remove the two bolts attaching the control rotor blade spar to the cuff and withdraw the blade from the cuff." "B. Inspect for corrosion on the exterior and interior of the spar tube as well as-" "C. Remove rust spots by-" "D. Dye-penetrant inspect the spar area which fits inside the control rotor cuff, paying particular attention to-" "E. Inspect spar tube retention bolt holes for elongation, corrosion, burrs,-" "F. If burrs are found, deburr bolt holes, paying particular attention to-" "G. Dye-penetrant inspect the outer seven (7) inch
Sources:
NTSB id 20001211X10706
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
21-Dec-2016 19:26 |
ASN Update Bot |
Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency] |
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