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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 133844
Last updated: 3 September 2020
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Type:Silhouette image of generic MIMU model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Midget Mustang M-1
Owner/operator:Oran P. Boyett
Registration: N9516
C/n / msn: 432
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 1
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Location:Mesquite, TX -   United States of America
Phase: Take off
Departure airport:HQZ
Destination airport:
Investigating agency: NTSB
On May 10, 1996, at 1307 central daylight time, a Bowers Midget Mustang M-1, N9516, operated by a private owner as a Title 14 CFR Part 91 flight, collided with terrain following a loss of control during a forced landing near Mesquite, Texas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local personal flight and a flight plan was not filed. The commercial pilot received minor injuries and the airplane was destroyed.

During an interview, conducted by the investigator-in-charge, and on the Pilot/Operator report, the pilot reported the information in this paragraph. Following the preflight, taxi, and runup, the takeoff was initiated on runway 17 at the Phil L. Hudson Municipal Airport, Mesquite, Texas. During the takeoff roll, "acceleration was OK." At a climb airspeed of 90 mph and an altitude of 250 to 300 feet above the ground, there was an airplane "vibration and shudder followed by a loud cracking sound." The pilot observed "an object depart the propeller area and travel to the left side." The pilot changed the airplane pitch for 80 mph, for landing in a field south of the airport, and at 150 feet above the ground, full flaps (30 degrees) were extended. Within 2 to 3 seconds the airplane rolled left and full right aileron did not stop the left roll. The airplane impacted the ground nose low with the left bank increasing. The airplane "cartwheeled on its' wing tips and came apart." Once the airplane stopped, the pilot turned off the airplane battery switch, released the seat belt and shoulder harness, and exited forward where the instrument panel and engine had separated from the airframe.

A pilot/witness, located approximately 7,000 feet from the accident site, observed the airplane depart runway 17 and begin a 10 degree banking right turn. The bank increased to 30 to 45 degrees as the airplane "appeared to be attempting to make the runway." The witness further observed that after "tightening his turn the aircraft appeared to stall and roll to a 90 degree bank [with the] wing's perpendicular to the ground."

During a telephone interview, conducted by the investigator-in-charge, the pilot reported that the witness was a flight instructor. The pilot also stated that the witness was too far away to confirm a stall and that he experienced a loss of control while maneuvering for the landing; however, "he did not stall the airplane."

After purchasing the airplane, the pilot flew the airplane 14 hours, prior to changing the propeller manufactured by Ivoprop. This was the first flight following the pilot's installation of the composite propeller. Instructions for installing the propeller were shipped by the manufacturer and the pilot reported following the instructions.

The composite propeller components did not include the spinner. The pilot installed the previous composite spinner. The pilot stated that the spinner extended forward about 14 inches and did not have a forward support plate installed. Following the accident, the spinner backing plate remained attached to the engine; however, the rest of the spinner was not recovered. Twelve screws, that attached the spinner to the backing plate, were found in place. An FAA inspector suggested that the addition of a forward support plate might reduce the vibration of the composite spinner.

During a previous inspection, the pilot had observed wear on the rear spar in the area of the flap rods. The Pilot/Operator report stated a "possible asymmetrical flap deployment" contributed to the loss of control. Flap continuity was confirmed during examination on June 7, 1996, by a Board investigator.

The old propeller flange required 8 bolts; however, the composite propeller installation required 6 bolts. Ivoprop sent the pilot a modified adapter flange for the 6 bolt propeller. The investigator found that the 6 bolts securing the propeller to the adapter did not extend through the self-locking nuts. The investigator also found that the 8 bolts securing the adapter to the engine crankshaft did not extend t


NTSB id 20001208X05760

Revision history:

21-Dec-2016 19:26 ASN Update Bot Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency]

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