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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 169202
Last updated: 7 May 2020
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Date:08-MAY-2010
Time:15:50 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic KA27 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Kamov Ka-32A
Owner/operator:HeliKorea Co. Ltd.
Registration: HL9406
C/n / msn:
Fatalities:Fatalities: / Occupants: 2
Aircraft damage: Minor
Location:Buk-ri, Girin-myeon, Inje-gun, Gangwon-do -   South Korea
Phase: Unknown
Nature:Cargo
Departure airport:
Destination airport:
Narrative:
Emergency landing after a main gear box chip warning light came on during takeoff while airlifting ready-mixed concrete from a lifting site to a construction site where high-voltage power lines were being built between Inje and Yangyang in Gangwon-do, and subsequently, damage was found as a result of the aircraft inspection.

The Korea Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board (hereinafter referred to as "the ARAIB") determines that the probable causes of the incident were (1) the main gear box roller bearing was damaged because its parts deteriorated due to the fatigue flaking caused by considerable off-design vibro-dynamic axial and radial load from the fan drive shaft direction, and this load was caused by the destruction of Main Rotor brake parts; and (2) the Main Rotor brake was damaged due to a sudden growth of vibro-dynamic load in the system caused by the imbalance in the 「brake shoe A」, and this imbalance was caused when the 「brake shoe A」s return spring was uncoupled from the bracket mounting pin (5.00.1540.0015.000).

Contributing to the incident were (1) the failure to tighten a bolt in accordance with the Technical Specification requirements when combining the fan drive flange with the flexible coupling; and (2) the failure to meet the Technical Specification requirements when jointing the brake shoe return spring pin (5.00.1540.0015.000) with the bracket (5.00.1540.0011.000) mounting hole, ∅ 6mm in diameter the actual gap was 0.05mm, whereas the max. gap permitted is 0.017mm.

Sources:

http://araib.molit.go.kr/LCMS/DWN.jsp?fold=/eaib0401/&fileName=Helikorea+HL9406+Incident+Report_Final.pdf


Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
26-Aug-2014 12:31 Aerossurance Added
09-Mar-2019 14:32 TB Updated [Aircraft type, Narrative]

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