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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 174511
Last updated: 16 June 2020
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Time:06:00 UTC
Type:Silhouette image of generic S92 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Sikorsky S-92A
Owner/operator:CHC Denmark
Registration: OY-HKC
C/n / msn: 920060
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants:
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Location:offshore installation, Denmark -   Denmark
Phase: Landing
Nature:Non Scheduled Passenger
Departure airport:Esbjerg, Denmark
Destination airport:offshore installation, Denmark
The incident occurred during a an offshore flight. The landing on the involved platform was the first out of multiple landings that day. The helicopter approached the platform on a right hand visual pattern to align the helicopter on final approach into the wind of 320°. The landing was a planned landing by the commander from the right hand seat. On downwind leg and approximately two minutes before landing the flight crew called the platform on 123.450 MHz to request deck clearance from the Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO). The platform radio operator answered the request with the message that the HLO was not yet ready but would shortly be at his position.

The commander decided to continue the approach in the belief that deck clearance would be given on final. On final, the flight crew noticed that the starboard crane was out of its stowed position. On short final, the HLO gave the helicopter a deck clearance as he was exiting the helideck to position himself in a safe area at the bottom of the stairs leading up to the helideck.

At approximately 50 feet over the helideck, the commander noticed the arm of the starboard crane moving out of its protected area and into the 210° flying sector over the helideck. The commander performed an evasive left hand turn away from the helideck and initiated a go around.

The incident occurred as a chain of events that consequently lead to the inadvertently lack of situational awareness of the CO and the HLO. Human factors such as time pressure due to an early arrival of the helicopter and the late change of duties by the OIM combined with insufficient visual reference from the HLO´s safe position and the crane resulted in a “less optimal” deck clearance procedure and no visual warning of the developing conflict.

Human factors such as a backup HLO with limited “on hands training” left a “rusty” feel to the execution of the procedures and execution of tasks.

The limitations of the communication and visual references did not give the CO the opportunity to stay in the loop during the time leading up to the incident.

The AIB Denmark could not establish the actual position of the crane, leaving no opportunity to exactly evaluate the severity of the incident.


Revision history:

14-Mar-2015 14:37 Aerossurance Added

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