Incident Embraer ERJ-145MP A6-RRA,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 191399
 
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Date:Saturday 12 September 2015
Time:
Type:Silhouette image of generic E145 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Embraer ERJ-145MP
Owner/operator:Rotana Jet Aviation
Registration: A6-RRA
MSN: 145398
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 14
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Incident
Location:over Oman -   Oman
Phase: En route
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Abu Dhabi International Airport (AUH/OMAA)
Destination airport:Oman-Salalah International Airport
Investigating agency: GCAA
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
An Embraer EMB-145MP, operating scheduled flight number RJD123, took off from Abu Dhabi International Airport, UAE, at 15:05 UTC bound for Salalah International Airport, Oman, with two flight crewmembers, one cabin crewmember, and 11 passengers onboard.
The flight continued normally until the top of climb at flight level (FL)360 when the primary flight display (PFD)1, the multi-function flight display (MFD) and the engine indicating and crew alerting system (EICAS), went blank and displayed a red cross (X) along the diagonal.
The flight crew stated that from their experience and initial training, they believed that the cause of the blackout of the screens was the failure of No.1 integrated computer (IC-600).
The Commander, who was the pilot monitoring (PM), pushed the symbol generation (SG) button located on the No.1 reversionary panel which then resulted in the other IC-600 (No.2 IC-600) generating the indications for the PFD1, MFD1 and EICAS. In addition, IC BUS FAIL message was displayed on the EICAS.
The display failures were accompanied by autopilot disengagement, accordingly the pilot flying (PF), who was the copilot at the time of the event, flew the aircraft manually until landing.
Soon after, the crew sensed, with no accompanying sign of smoke, an electrical odor which they suspected to be coming from the IC-600.
Because of the increasing odor, the unidentified source, and the accompanying No.1 IC-600 malfunction, the Commander assessed the situation for the potential development of an electrical system fire.
The Commander decided to initiate the memory items for Electrical System Fire or Smoke and both crewmembers donned their emergency oxygen masks.
Flight crew communication was normal with their oxygen masks on and the copilot continued to fly the aircraft manually, as the Commander broadcast a MAYDAY to Muscat Airport, Oman.
The Commander then reviewed the Electrical System Fire or Smoke procedure from the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). He confirmed that the memory items had been completed and that the aircraft was being diverted to land at Muscat International Airport, Oman, as this was the nearest suitable airport.
Upon receiving air traffic control (ATC) clearance, the crew initiated a fast descent (3,000-6,000 feet per minute) to the initially cleared altitude of 12,000 ft, turned to the north and set the transponder to ‘7700’. Further descent clearance was given to 10,000 ft during the descent.
During descent, TERR INOP and GPWS INOP messages appeared on the EICAS. The Commander stated that he pressed the AC power button to isolate the affected systems and decided to divert to Al Ain Airport, UAE, due to high terrain in the vicinity of Muscat Airport.
The Electrical System Fire or Smoke, IC Failure/IC Bus Failure, and GPWS INOP checklists were completed.
The cabin crewmember called the cockpit, using the interphone, reporting a burning odor in the cabin, and the Commander briefly explained that there was a technical fault, and he would give her a briefing shortly. Upon establishing the aircraft on a track to Al Ain, and completing various other procedures, the Commander contacted the cabin crewmember and requested her to open the cockpit door for a briefing. The Commander asked the cabin crewmember if she could smell any burning, or see any smoke, and she responded that there was no smell or smoke.
The Commander stated that the briefing verified that the landing would be precautionary unless smoke developed and if this happened, he required the cabin crewmember to inform him and prepare for an evacuation.
After the briefing had been completed, the cabin crewmember secured the cabin and informed the passengers that the aircraft was diverting to Al Ain due to technical issue.
The flight continued with the copilot flying manually and wearing his oxygen mask. The descent, descent transition, approach and landing checklists were completed and the aircraft was configured for landing.
The aircraft landed uneventfully on runway 01 at Al Ain International Airport at approximately 16:13 UTC.
After landing, the airport rescue and firefighting staff attended the Aircraft and reported no smoke or fire. The aircraft then taxied to the stand normally. After parking, the engines were shutdown normally and the passengers disembarked. There were no injuries to the crew or passengers, and the Aircraft was undamaged.

Causes:
The Air Accident Investigation Sector determines that the cause of the No.1 IC-600 failure was the overheating of the power supply printed board assembly (PBA). It is most likely that an internal breakdown of the transformer (T1) caused a short circuit resulting in heat buildup on the PBA. The Investigation could not determine why the transformer (T1) had broken down.
The heat caused the power supply board to disconnect the No.1 IC-600 resulting in PFD1, MFD1, and EICAS displays going blank with a red (X), and the autopilot to automatically disengage.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: GCAA
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration:
Download report: Final report

Sources:

https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/admin/iradmin/Lists/Incidents%20Investigation%20Reports/Attachments/94/2015-2015-%20ummary%20Report,%20AAIS%20Case%20AIFN-0010-2015%20A6-RRA%20Incident.pdf

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
17-Nov-2016 19:16 harro Added

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

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