ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 196377
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| Date: | Wednesday 9 November 2016 |
| Time: | |
| Type: |  Airbus A380-861 |
| Owner/operator: | Emirates |
| Registration: | A6-EDQ |
| MSN: | 080 |
| Engine model: | Engine Alliance GP 7270 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 372 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Category: | Incident |
| Location: | Dubai Airport (DXB/OMDB) -
 United Arab Emirates
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | London Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) |
| Dubai Airport (DXB) | |
| Investigating agency: | GCAA |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
On 9 November 2016, at 1405 UTC, an Emirates Airbus A380-861 aircraft, operating scheduled flight number EK002, departed from London Heathrow, the United Kingdom, for Dubai International Airport, the United Arab Emirates. The Aircraft had two flight crewmembers, 25 cabin crewmembers, and 345 passengers onboard.
The departure and the initial cruise continued normally until the flight crew received an electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) message, indicating that the green hydraulic system temperature was high and the system subsequently overheated. The flight crew followed the flight crew operating manual (FCOM) instructions and isolated the green hydraulic system, which resulted in a number of hydraulic system limitations, including the need to extend the landing gear using the emergency gear extension method.
Consequently, the flight crew prepared to lower the landing gear using the emergency gear extension, or free-fall method. The loss of green hydraulic system pressure also resulted in restricted use of the nose gear steering, slow flap and slat extension, and limited brake function.
On the final approach at about 4,000 feet, eight minutes prior to landing, the landing gear was selected down. The landing gear indication showed that the landing gear, except for the left wing gear, was down and locked. This caused the flight crew to declare an emergency four minutes prior to landing.
As the green hydraulic system had been isolated, the landing gear could not have been retracted in the event of a go-around. Had a go-around been flown it would have entailed a significant increase in drag and fuel consumption. With the remaining fuel as a consideration, and notwithstanding the left wing gear indication, the Commander elected to continue the approach and land.
After an uneventful landing at 2022 UTC, the flight crew communicated with Dubai International Airport staff and it was decided to tow the Aircraft from the runway to the assigned stand F20, which was adjacent to the exit taxiway. After arrival at the stand, it became evident that the left wing gear had not been released by the emergency extension system and was still in its bay. The passengers and crew disembarked and no injuries were reported.
The Air Accident Investigation Sector (AAIS) determines that the cause of the failure of the emergency unlock actuators to release the left wing landing gear was the flexure endurance fatigue damage to the independent channel A and channel B emergency unlock actuator command wires. The flexure endurance fatigue was induced by wind effect acting on the inadequately secured wiring loom during the landing gear operation.
Two safety recommendations were issued by AAIS to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to ensure that the Aircraft manufacturer determines the root cause of the unlock actuator wire damage and that the manufacturer develops a design improvement to eliminate the possibility of future wire damage that could result in emergency landing gear freefall system failures.
Two additional safety recommendations were later issued to the Operator to revise their network control center procedures and to provide towing instructions. Two recommendations were issued to the Aircraft manufacturer, to amend current information in the FCOM and to provide instructions in aircraft documentations to safely tow an aircraft from the runway, with passengers and freight onboard, in similar conditions.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/pages/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=453
Images:
Photo: GCAA
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 28-Jun-2017 07:58 | harro | Added |
| 28-Jun-2017 08:02 | harro | Updated [Photo, ] |
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