ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 197257
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Narrative:In the night of 15th July, 2017, just 19 minutes before the curfew, Polar Air Cargo flight PAC/PO213 to Shanghai Pudong International Airport was taking off from runway 16L (2500 m/8202 ft long) at Tokyo/Narita. The Boeing 747-8F cargo plane rotated about 7,860 ft from the threshold of departure runway, and about 340 ft from the end of departure runway. It passed the end of the runway at a radio altitude of 16 feet.
|Owner/operator:||Polar Air Cargo|
|Fatalities:||Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2|
|Aircraft damage:|| None|
|Location:||Tokyo/Narita International Airport (NRT/RJAA) -
|Phase:|| Take off|
|Departure airport:||Tokyo/ Narita International Airport (NRT/RJAA), Japan|
|Destination airport:||Shanghai Pudong International Airport (PVG/ZSPD), China|
|Investigating agency: ||JTSB|
|Confidence Rating:|| Accident investigation report completed and information captured|
No personal injuries were reported, and there was no further trouble for the rest of the flight.
A fence near the runway 16L departure end was damaged by the engine exhaust. A resident under the departure course reported household effects were blown away by the plane.
The flight crew initially programmed the Flight Management System (FMS) for a departure from runway 16R because that runway was close to their parking position. This runway has a length of 13123 feet (4000 m).
However, the air traffic controller cleared the flight to taxy to runway 16L for departure. The taxy route to this runway is complex and the runway length is considerably shorter (8202 feet/2500 m long).
At the parking spot, before pushback, the captain changed the settings related to the take-off by himself in the FMS from runway 16R to runway 16L, and instructed the FO to change the settings related to the flight route including standard departure procedures. The captain only changed the assumed temperature without changing De-rated Take-off Thrust to the Rated Takeoff Thrust necessary for this departure. After changing the necessary FMS settings associating with the runway change, the captain briefed the taxi route to runway 16L and others, but did not brief on the verification of the take-off data. The captain instructed the FO to verify that there was no discrepancy of take-off data between Control Display Unit (CDU) and Flight Deck Performance (FDP).
The taxi route to runway 16L was so long and complicated that the captain carefully taxied the route instructed by ATC while checking it on a chart. After gaining clearance for take-off from the Narita Tower and commencing a take-off roll from runway 16L, the captain verified the engine indications of EICAS for the N1 values and he did not see the values as abnormal because they were almost the same with those for take-off from runway 16R.
During the take-off roll, the captain felt that the acceleration of the aircraft was a little slow but not so abnormal, while recognizing that they were approaching the end of departure runway, and performed the normal take-off procedures. The captain felt that the aircraft lifted off in the vicinity of the end of departure runway and the take-off path became lower, therefore, he discussed with the FO what he felt that the take-off path was low during the flight.
Probable Cause (JTSB):
It is probable that in this serious incident, the aircraft commenced a take-off roll by using the take-off thrust lower than the thrust required for the Aircraft to take off, causing it to take a longer take-off roll distance to lift off; and its lifting off in the vicinity of the end of departure runway resulted in a case equivalent to runway overrun.
It is probable that the aircraft commenced a take-off roll by using the take-off thrust lower than the thrust required for the Aircraft to take off, because the Captain did not correctly change the FMC settings for the take-off thrust at the time of take-off from the runway different from what the Captain and the FO had assumed, the Captain did not correctly change the FMC settings for the take-off thrust, in addition, the Captain and the FO did not ensure to verify the take-off thrust by the time when they commenced the take-off.
| || |
|Investigating agency: ||JTSB |
|Status: ||Investigation completed|
|Duration: ||1 year and 10 months|
|Download report: || Final report|
||Updated [Time, Registration, Cn, Source, Narrative]|
||Updated [Aircraft type, Destination airport, Narrative, Photo, ]|
||Updated [Operator, Source, Narrative, Photo, Accident report, ]|
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