ASN logo
ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 204156
Last updated: 24 July 2020
This information is added by users of ASN. Neither ASN nor the Flight Safety Foundation are responsible for the completeness or correctness of this information. If you feel this information is incomplete or incorrect, you can submit corrected information.

Time:15:18 UTC
Type:Silhouette image of generic P28A model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Piper PA-28-181 Cherokee Archer II
Owner/operator:Aeroclub de Tenerife
Registration: EC-JMT
C/n / msn: 28-7790327
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Location:nr TESEL, Islas Canarias TMA -   Spain
Phase: En route
Departure airport:Tenerife-Norte Los Rodeos Airport (TFN/GCXO)
Destination airport:Tenerife-Norte Los Rodeos Airport (TFN/GCXO)
Investigating agency: CIAIAC
A Piper PA-28 and an ATR 72-600 were involved in an airprox incident in the Canary Islands TMA, Spain.
The Piper PA-28-181 (EC-JMT), was on a private VFR flight in the northwest of the island of Tenerife. The pilot informed the controller of his intention to descend from flight level FL115 for an approach to runway 12 at the Tenerife North Airport (GCXO). The controller authorized the maneuver and informed him that there was traffic, an ATR 72-600, which was reaching FL100, 10 miles northeast of its position.
The Binter Canarias ATR 72 aircraft (EC-MPI, flight NT631) had taken off from the Tenerife North Airport runway 12 using the SID ARACO3K. The flight was authorized to climb to flight level FL100 and, subsequently, to fly directly to 8.5 DME fix of runway 36 at the La Palma Airport.
Subsequently, the controller informed the Piper aircraft of the position of the ATR 72. At that time they were 5 miles apart. The controller also instructed him to maintain his flight level, between 105 or 110, until he had the ATR 72 in sight.
When the aircraft were 3 miles apart, the Piper pilot informed the controller that he had traffic in sight. The controller authorized him to continue the descent and proceed to the approach for runway 12.
The aircraft were in radio contact with the air traffic control service on different frequencies. The executive controller who was in contect with the ATR 72 was absent and his position was assumed by the planning controller. This last controller was unaware of the existence of the Piper traffic and was surprised that the ATR 72 informed him that he had had a TCAS warning.
Despite being visible, the distance between the aircraft was reduced to 1.13 miles, horizontally, and 200 feet vertically.
After the loss of separation, the aircraft continued their flights without further incident.

Causes/contributing factors:
The investigation has determined that this incident was caused because the GCCCINB sector controller did not inform the ATR 72-212A aircraft of the existence of another aircraft and its proximity.
They were contributing factors:
- Lack of compliance by controllers with the letter of agreement between units regarding transfers of control.
- A deficient relay of control post after the temporary absence of the sector controller GCCCINB.



Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: CIAIAC
Status: Investigation completed
Download report: Final report

Revision history:

11-Jan-2018 07:22 harro Added
24-Jul-2020 17:52 harro Updated [Departure airport, Narrative, Accident report, ]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description