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| Date: | Friday 5 May 2017 |
| Time: | 08:35 |
| Type: |  Boeing 737-46B |
| Owner/operator: | Jordan Aviation |
| Registration: | JY-JAP |
| MSN: | 24124/1679 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1989 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-3 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 101 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Tombouctou Airport (TOM/GATB) -
 Mali
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger |
| Departure airport: | Bamako Airport (BKO/GABS) |
| Tombouctou Airport (TOM/GATB) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAID Jordan |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Jordan Aviation flight JAV 7843 suffered a runway excursion after landing at Tombouctou Airport, Mali.
After touchdown and before exiting the runway, the aircraft veered to the right of the runway and ended up on the soft area adjacent to the runway and taxi exit.
The investigation showed that while on landing on runway 07 at Tombouctou airport the aircraft touched down just beyond the end of the touchdown zone with manual brakes applied. A tailwind component with an average of 16 knots was recorded when the aircraft was fully configured and aligned with the runway track at 1300 ft AAL and this tailwind effect continued until the aircraft veered right out of the paved area. The aircraft skidded sideways and came to a halt with all landing gears off the runway, shortly before the extended stop way paved surface and left to the taxiway.
The following factors are believed to be the main causal factors of the occurrence:
1. The unstabilized approach which was a result of the high vertical speed below 500 ft AFE, as the pilot flying was conducting a visual metrological conditions (VMC) approach.
2. The higher than allowed tailwind component that recorded a magnitude of 16 knots during final approach and landing phases.
3. Inadequate use of the manual braking, as the pilot flying applied asymmetric pressure to the brakes and that in turn resulted in a lower brake efficiency.
4. Crew resource management (CRM) was not evident during the approach phase of flight. The pilot monitoring was aware of the tailwind displayed on the electronic horizontal situation indicator and the progress page on the flight management computer display (FMC), and the higher than normal vertical speed; however no call outs were made by him to help in assessing the situation.
5. Commander reliance on his experience and technical skills rather than usage of automation as he elected to use manual brakes and usage of differential braking
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.carc.jo/images/Accidents/JY-JAP_05-05-2017RunwayOverrunduringlanding.pdf
Location
Images:
Photo(c): CARC
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 15-May-2018 19:09 | harro | Added |
| 09-Mar-2022 01:48 | Captain Adam | Updated [Total occupants, Category, Photo, ] |
| 09-Jul-2024 12:24 | ASN | Updated [Category, ] |
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