Loss of control Accident Piper PA-34-200T Seneca II N593MS,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 216240
 
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Date:Saturday 13 October 2018
Time:10:58
Type:Silhouette image of generic PA34 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Piper PA-34-200T Seneca II
Owner/operator:Private
Registration: N593MS
MSN: 34-7870391
Year of manufacture:1978
Total airframe hrs:3761 hours
Engine model:Continental LTSIO-360-EB1
Fatalities:Fatalities: 3 / Occupants: 3
Aircraft damage: Destroyed
Category:Accident
Location:off the Hamptons, Quogue Canal, NY -   United States of America
Phase: Manoeuvring (airshow, firefighting, ag.ops.)
Nature:Training
Departure airport:Danbury, CT (DXR)
Destination airport:Charleston, SC (JZI)
Investigating agency: NTSB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
The flight instructor picked up the private pilot and passenger for a cross-country flight. The instructor requested visual flight rules (VFR) flight following services from air traffic control (ATC) and indicated a planned climb to 8,500 ft mean sea level (msl); however, the airplane continued to climb past that altitude. During the climb, the instructor indicated to the ATC controller, in separate transmissions, that he was climbing to reach "VFR on-top," that he was experiencing problems with an "unreliable" attitude indicator, and that the airplane was "in and out of IMC [instrument meteorological conditions]." Based on weather sounding and satellite imagery, it is likely that the airplane was operating in IMC above 4,100 ft.

About 20 minutes after the airplane departed, the controller declared an emergency on behalf of the pilot and provided multiple radar vectors for the airplane to return to visual meteorological conditions (VMC); however, the airplane's radar track showed that the airplane continued climbing to 19,400 ft msl before it entered a series of figure-eight turns followed by a steep, turning descent. A witness stated that the airplane sounded "as if it were a stunt plane doing spins (pitch changing)" and then heard a "pop" and saw large pieces of the airplane descending from the overcast sky. Examination of the recovered portions of the airplane revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical anomalies and a wreckage distribution consistent with an in-flight breakup.

Both the instructor and the private pilot had low levels of ethanol in cavity blood but none in vitreous (instructor) or urine (private pilot). The absence of ethanol in the second specimen indicates it is likely the ethanol was not from ingestion and therefore it did not contribute to the accident circumstances. The private pilot also had evidence of use of morphine, an impairing opioid. However, the decision-making on this flight, including the route and response to weather conditions, was most likely performed by the instructor. Therefore, it is unlikely that effects from low levels of morphine in the private pilot contributed to the accident circumstances.

The instructor demonstrated several lapses in judgment associated with conducting the flight. Specifically, the instructor did not appear to recognize the significance of widespread ceilings along his route of flight and planned a cruise altitude that took him into instrument conditions. The instructor likely did not carry supplemental oxygen onboard the nonpressurized airplane and continued to climb the airplane to altitudes that required the use of oxygen; without oxygen he risked becoming susceptible to the effects of hypoxia. Further, another pilot who had flown the accident airplane before the accident flight stated that the airplane had a known problem with the directional gyro, yet the instructor flew the airplane in instrument conditions; based on the instructor's failure to follow the controllers' directional instructions, it is likely the directional gyro was still not working. Lastly, review of the instructor's logbook and an interview with another flight instructor indicated that the instructor was likely not instrument current, so his ability to safely maneuver the airplane in the clouds that were prevalent during the flight would have been negatively impacted by the broken gyro and his lack of currency.

In summary, the instructor's decision to continue the flight in instrument conditions with a known flight instrument anomaly greatly increased his workload and likely resulted in his eventual loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation. The rapidly descending turn (graveyard spiral) depicted on radar and the in-flight breakup due to overstress during the ensuing uncontrolled descent were consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Further, the airplane had been operating above 16,000 ft msl for more than 10 minutes at the time of the upset; there was no evidence that the airplane was equipped with supplemental oxygen. Therefore, the

Probable Cause: The instructor's decision to conduct and continue a visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions with a known flight instrument anomaly, which resulted in spatial disorientation, causing a loss of airplane control and subsequent in-flight breakup. Contributing to the accident were the instructor's lack of recent instrument flight experience and degraded airplane control and decision-making due to hypoxia.

Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: NTSB
Report number: ERA19LA012
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 10 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

NTSB
FAA register: https://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Results.aspx?NNumbertxt=N593MS

Location

Images:


Media:

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
13-Oct-2018 16:56 gerard57 Added
13-Oct-2018 17:00 gerard57 Updated [Total occupants, Location, Source, Narrative]
13-Oct-2018 17:16 Aerossurance Updated [Time, Aircraft type, Location, Narrative]
13-Oct-2018 17:20 Aerossurance Updated [Time, Source, Narrative]
13-Oct-2018 18:54 Iceman 29 Updated [Aircraft type, Other fatalities, Departure airport, Source, Narrative]
13-Oct-2018 18:56 Iceman 29 Updated [Source, Narrative]
13-Oct-2018 19:26 Iceman 29 Updated [Photo]
14-Oct-2018 04:30 Iceman 29 Updated [Embed code]
14-Oct-2018 04:45 Iceman 29 Updated [Departure airport, Destination airport, Embed code, Narrative]
14-Oct-2018 04:49 Iceman 29 Updated [Embed code]
14-Oct-2018 04:54 Iceman 29 Updated [Embed code]
14-Oct-2018 05:02 Iceman 29 Updated [Total fatalities, Narrative]
14-Oct-2018 14:50 Iceman 29 Updated [Destination airport]
14-Oct-2018 18:24 Geno Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Phase, Source]
15-Oct-2018 05:12 Iceman 29 Updated [Total fatalities, Source, Narrative]
15-Oct-2018 05:15 Iceman 29 Updated [Narrative]
15-Oct-2018 05:23 Iceman 29 Updated [Narrative]
15-Oct-2018 06:10 Iceman 29 Updated [Source]
25-Oct-2018 04:32 Iceman 29 Updated [Source, Narrative]
15-Aug-2020 16:00 ASN Update Bot Updated [Time, Nature, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Embed code, Narrative, Accident report, ]

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