ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 23156
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| Date: | Tuesday 19 September 2006 |
| Time: | 14:00 UTC |
| Type: |  Bell 206B JetRanger |
| Owner/operator: | Quantum Helicopters |
| Registration: | C-GSLV |
| MSN: | 4199 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1991 |
| Engine model: | Allison 250-C20J |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 3 / Occupants: |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Alice Arm, 142 km N of Terrace, British Columbia -
 Canada
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Private |
| Departure airport: | Terrace, BC |
| Investigating agency: | TSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The helicopter was destroyed when it crashed on tidal mud flats at Alice Arm, approximately 75 nautical miles North of Terrace, British Columbia (at approximate co ordinates 55 28.749N, 129 29.544W) while en route to a remote site. At impact it was said to have been 'travelling at high speed.' The accident happened in daylight (07:40 hours Local time) and in clear weather.
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors
1. The dimensional restoration repair of the spindle journal introduced a stress concentration feature at the location of the subsurface radius, which was responsible for the formation of the fatigue crack and subsequent failure of the right-hand pylon support spindle.
2. Failure of the right-hand pylon support spindle in flight caused the helicopter to become uncontrollable and collide with the level ground.
Findings as to Risk
1. It is likely that the pylon support spindle repair process was designed without the benefit of all original design data. It could not be shown that tests, stress analyses or other techniques were used to ensure that the repair maintained the strength and other properties assumed in the original design data.
2. There is a risk that repair designs for parts identified as critical parts may have been approved before the definition of critical parts, applicable to normal category rotorcraft, was adopted by Transport Canada. Such repair schemes may not ensure that critical parts maintain the critical characteristics on which certification is based.
3. Transport Canada made inquiries regarding approved spindle repair procedures following the release of Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. Operational Safety Notice 206-99-35 Revision A, but closed the file without formally reviewing or cancelling the two approved repair certificates, thus allowing the repair to continue in its original form.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
CASDORS Query 2006P1805
https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2006/a06p0190/a06p0190.pdf
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 27-Sep-2008 01:00 | ASN archive | Added |
| 21-Aug-2016 20:46 | Dr.John Smith | Updated [Registration, Cn, Location, Phase, Nature, Departure airport, Source, Narrative] |
| 12-Aug-2020 16:56 | KagurazakaHanayo | Updated [Source, Narrative] |
| 12-Aug-2020 16:57 | harro | Updated [Source, Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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