ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 232522
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Narrative:Before departing on the instrument flight rules cross-country flight, the pilot cleaned melting snow off the airplane and visually inspected the airframe flight control surfaces for snow and ice contamination, which included checking the pitot tube for contamination and proper function of the pitot heat.
|Date:||Monday 27 January 2020|
Cirrus SR22T G6
|Owner/operator:||Noel Development LLC|
|Year of manufacture:||2017|
|Fatalities:||Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2|
|Aircraft damage:|| Substantial|
|Location:||near Woody Creek, Aspen, CO -
United States of America
|Phase:|| En route|
|Departure airport:||Aspen-Pitkin County Airport, CO (ASE/KASE)|
|Destination airport:||Vail-Eagle County Airport, CO (EGE/KEGE)|
|Investigating agency: ||NTSB|
|Confidence Rating:|| Accident investigation report completed and information captured|
The pilot reported that, just after takeoff, the indicated airspeed decreased from normal climb speed to less than 20 knots. Immediately thereafter, the primary flight display showed red X’s in place of the airspeed indication, and the backup airspeed indicator became unreliable. The airspeed indicator became functional again for a short time before airspeed indications were lost after the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions. As the airplane was approaching rising terrain, the pilot chose to activate the airframe parachute system (CAPS), and the airplane descended under the CAPS canopy to the mountainous terrain.
Recorded data indicated that the pitot heat remained on throughout the flight. The data corroborated the pilot’s reported loss of airspeed indications after takeoff but showed that airspeed indications returned about 1 minute later for the remainder of the flight, until the CAPS activation. The flight director was activated during the takeoff and climb before the autopilot was activated. The data indicated that the autopilot was turned off then turned back on until the CAPS was deployed.
An internally mounted alternate static pressure source provided backup static pressure if the primary static source should become blocked. Whether the alternate static source was opened during the accident flight could not be determined.
Given the available information, the static system most likely had trapped water that caused the unreliable display information.
Probable Cause: Water trapped in the static system, which resulted in incorrect airspeed display information and the pilot’s forced landing.
NTSB https://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Results.aspx?NNumbertxt=N288WT https://flightaware.com/live/flight/N288WT/history/20200127/2125Z/KASE/KEGE
| || |
|Investigating agency: ||NTSB |
|Report number: ||CEN20LA069 |
|Status: ||Investigation completed|
|Duration: ||2 years 1 month|
|Download report: || Final report|
||Updated [Time, Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Operator, Phase, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Embed code]|
||Updated [Aircraft type, Nature, Narrative]|
||Updated [Registration, Source]|
||Updated [Registration, Source, Damage, Narrative]|
||Updated [Embed code]|
||Updated [Time, Source, Narrative]|
||Updated [Location, Phase, Source, Embed code, Narrative, Accident report]|
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