Serious incident ATR 72-201 OY-RUR,
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 240465
 
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Date:Thursday 21 February 2019
Time:15:35 UTC
Type:Silhouette image of generic AT72 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
ATR 72-201
Owner/operator:Danish Air Transport (DAT)
Registration: OY-RUR
MSN: 145
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 30
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Serious incident
Location:near Copenhagen -   Denmark
Phase: En route
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:København-Kastrup Airport (CPH/EKCH)
Destination airport:Karup Airport (KRP)
Investigating agency: HCLJ
Confidence Rating: Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities
Narrative:
The serious incident flight was the second flight of the day.
Aircraft scheduled maintenance was performed in the period between the first flight and the serious incident flight.
After engine start and during taxi to the departure runway, the right hand engine air conditioning pack valve caution triggered. The flight crew reset the pack valve and normal operation was resumed.
Following take off from runway 22R, when passing an altitude of 500 feet mean sea level (msl), the flight crew set engine climb power.
Shortly after and approaching approximately 1000 feet msl, the flight crew sensed a chemical or electrical smell in the cockpit.
The first officer perceived smoke (..it looks misty..) in the commander foot well area, but the commander did not observe any smoke.
The flight crew donned oxygen masks and declared an emergency, requesting a diversion back to EKCH.
Air traffic control issued left hand radar vectors to runway 30.
While the first officer flew the aircraft, the commander performed the SMOKE and the ELECTRICAL SMOKE emergency checklists.
Through intercom communication, the commander informed the cabin crew of the situation. The cabin crew informed the commander that they could sense a smell, but could not see any smoke.
At this time, there was no visible smoke in the cockpit.
Due to the perceived low intensity of the smell, the cabin crew decided not to put on their protective breathing equipment (smoke hood).
Within a few minutes, the aircraft landed on runway 30 and turned onto taxiway B in order to assess whether to evacuate the aircraft.
Since smoke was neither visible in the cockpit nor in the cabin, and the smell was only light in intensity, the commander decided to taxi the aircraft to the assigned parking stand and disembark the passengers by normal procedure through the aircraft entrance door.
The crew did not observe any ELEC SMOKE warning during the serious incident flight.


It has not been possible for the AIB to identify definitively the source of the perceived smoke or smell in the aircraft/cockpit.
The oil consumption log did not indicate any unusual oil consumption of either engine, but it is possible, following the oil refill that a small amount of excess or spilled engine oil produced the perceived smoke or smell vented through the air conditioning system.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: HCLJ
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration:
Download report: Final report

Sources:

AIB Denmark

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
25-Aug-2020 18:36 harro Added
25-Aug-2020 18:36 harro Updated [Destination airport, Accident report, ]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

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