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| Date: | Monday 14 November 2016 |
| Time: | 08:10 |
| Type: |  ATR 72-600 (72-212A) |
| Owner/operator: | SAS Scandinavian Airlines, opb Jet Time |
| Registration: | OY-JZC |
| MSN: | 1120 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2013 |
| Engine model: | P&W Canada PW127 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 40 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | west of Førde Airport Bringeland -
 Norway
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Bergen-Flesland Airport (BGO/ENBR) |
| Ålesund-Vigra Airport (AES/ENAL) | |
| Investigating agency: | AIBN |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Flight SAS4144 from Bergen to Ålesund was operated by the Danish airline Jet Time on behalf of SAS. En route to Ålesund, control of the aircraft was temporarily lost in severe icing conditions.
The control loss occurred in the airspace just west of Førde Airport Bringeland as the crew had started to change course to escape the icing conditions.
The crew regained control of the aircraft and continued its flight to Ålesund where it subsequently landed as normal. No people on board were injured, nor was there any damage to the aircraft.
The AIBN is of the opinion that the loss of control was the result of a combination of insufficient planning and inappropriate decisions en route, particularly the crew's attempt to climb above the icing conditions despite degraded aircraft performance as well as incorrect use of the autopilot.
Control recovery may have been impeded by the commander's initial response, pulling the control wheel back as the stick shaker activated. The commander is likely to have become startled when the stick shaker activated and the autopilot automatically deactivated, while the aircraft at the same time suddenly banked sharply and simultaneously pitched nose down. He may consequently have pulled the control wheel back due to the so-called startle effect.
Another contribution to the non-optimal control recovery was that two memory items on the checklist for stalling, deploying flaps and increasing engine power, were omitted. However, the crew quickly regained their composure and the rest of the flight and landing in Ålesund proceeded without any further problems.
AIBN is of the opinion that icing should be a priority item in risk analyses for airlines when planning to operate in Norway during the icing season, and that it is important to take the characteristics of the aircraft type into account. Such analysis should conjointly consider the flown
routes, the flown flight levels, expected icing conditions, and mitigation actions to adverse conditions including icing, with regard to the aircraft type and specific performance.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
AIBN
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 28 June 2022 | ES-ATE | SAS Scadinavian Airlines, opb Xfly | 0 | Hamburg-Helmut Schmidt Airport (HAM/EDDH) |  |
min |
| 28 June 2022 | ES-ATE | SAS Scandinavian Airlines, opb Xfly | 0 | Hamburg-Helmut Schmidt Airport (HAM/EDDH) | |
min |
| Landing gear issues | ||||||
Media:
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 19-Sep-2020 12:41 | harro | Added |
| 20-Sep-2020 12:44 | harro | Updated [Embed code, Accident report, ] |
| 10-Aug-2024 18:49 | ASN | Updated [Destination airport, ] |
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