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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 249195
Last updated: 20 April 2021
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Date:23-FEB-2017
Time:11:14 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic B752 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Boeing 757-208 (WL)
Owner/operator:Icelandair
Registration: TF-FIP
C/n / msn: 30423/916
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 174
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Serious incident
Location:near Manchester Airport -   United Kingdom
Phase: Approach
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Keflavík International Airport (KEF/BIKF)
Destination airport:Manchester International Airport (MAN/EGCC)
Investigating agency: TSB Iceland
Narrative:
Flight FI440 was scheduled for departure from Keflavik Airport (BIKF) at 08:00Z on February 23rd 2017, to Manchester Airport (EGCC).
The flight ceew had not seen any Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMETs) before the flight, but he knew that it would be windy. An additional ton of fuel was added for the flight.
The take-off was delayed due to de-icing of the aircraft from the scheduled take-off at 08:00Z per the flight plan. The actual take-off was at 08:33Z.
The weather forecast for both Manchester Airport and the alternate, Liverpool Airport, were above weather minimums. However, SIGMETs were in effect that were forecasted to pass over the destination and the alternate airport at the estimated time of arrival.
The take-off from Keflavik Airport, the climb, as well as the en-route part of the flight were uneventful. The Commander was the Pilot Flying (PF) during the flight.
During the descent towards Manchester, a preceding flight had gone around twice due to wind shear and elected to divert.
The flight crew of flight FI440 then informed Manchester Radar that they were entering a holding. The flight crew of flight FI440 completed one and a half holding pattern at ROSUN at FL110, discussing the situation and the option of diverting to Liverpool Airport (EGGP), before deciding to attempt an approach to Manchester Airport. The flight crew also decided that if they could not land at Manchester Airport due to the high wind condition, they would divert directly to Liverpool Airport. The flight crew informed Manchester Radar of their intentions.
During the approach, the aircraft encountered moderate icing. The aircraft was vectored to the ILS for RWY 23R at Manchester Airport.
At 10:48:13, the flight crew contacted Manchester tower and received clearance to land on RWY 23R. According to the Commander, the aircraft encountered severe turbulence on final approach and around 800 feet it was clear that the approach could not be continued due to the turbulence.
At 10:51:39, the flight crew advised Manchester tower that they had executed a go-around. According to the FDR, flight FI440 had just below 4.9 tons of fuel remaining.
The flight crew commenced a go-around on RWY heading, climbing to 3500 feet, and then diverted to Liverpool Airport.
At 10:58:44, the flight crew contacted Liverpool Radar and advised that they were ready to start the approach. At 10:59:27, Liverpool Radar instructed the flight crew to turn right again to heading 230°and cleared them for approach to RWY 27.
At 11:03:12 the flight crew of flight FI440 contacted Liverpool tower and notified that they were established on the localizer for RWY 27. Liverpool tower replied that flight FI440 was cleared to land. The flight crew configured the aircraft for landing and selected FLAP 25.
According to the Commander, the aircraft encountered severe turbulence on final approach (ILS to RWY 27). Passing 1000 feet the wind was around 73 knots and around 800 feet a wind shear warning initiated.
At 11:06:36, the flight crew of flight FI440 advised Liverpool tower that they had executed a go-around due to wind shear. According to the FDR, flight FI440 had just over 3.9 tons of fuel remaining.
According to the Commander, after go-around was initiated the flight experienced heavy turbulence in addition with a low-level altitude capture which resulted in both altitude and airspeed exceedances.
The flight crew of flight FI440 noticed that they were reaching their minimum diversion fuel of 3664 kg at this time. They had 1950 kg to burn before reaching final reserve fuel 1714 kg.
At 11:09:35, the flight crew contacted Liverpool Radar and informed that they were becoming low on fuel and requested an alternate airport in the vicinity.
Around this time, the Commander called an experienced airline pilot, which he knew was travelling on the flight, to the cockpit. The Commander did this to have an additional trained pilot with a fresh mind in the cockpit, as well as to assist with locating airport charts in the library stowed under the jump seat, as ATC had been giving options on alternate airports such as Leeds that were not in the LIDO9 database.
At 11:10:37, Liverpool Radar informed the flight crew that Leeds Airport could accept them and the flight crew of flight FI440 replied that they would like to go to Leeds.
The flight crew did not find any data for Leeds Airport in the LIDO database, nor were they familiar with the airport. Scottish Control was asked for runway information and ILS frequency.
The flight crew meanhile reviewed their options. They were down below the minimum diversion fuel and Leeds Airport (which they were unfamiliar with) was now at a distance of 50 NM. They made the decision to commit to Manchester Airport, as they were familiar with that airport.
It was very windy in the whole area, and Manchester was much closer than Leeds.
At 11:15:31, the flight crew contacted Scottish Control requesting to divert to Manchester with fuel emergency. Manchester Radar then vectored the flight for an ILS approach to RWY 23R
At 11:25:12, Manchester Tower informed the flight crew of flight FI440 that a departing aircraft had reported positive wind shear, gain of 15 knots on departure 1000 feet.
According to the Commander, the aircraft encountered severe turbulence on final approach and the autopilot had difficulties maintaining localizer and glideslope. The flight crew configured the aircraft for landing and selected FLAP 25.
At 11:27:22, the aircraft landed at Manchester Airport. According to the FDR, flight FI440 had 2.7 tons of fuel remaining. This was 986 kg above final reserve fuel, or about 20 minutes of flying time before using final reserve fuel.

CONCLUSIONS
Causes:
- Inappropriate selection of an alternate airport considering the meteorological conditions
- Flight plan did not highlight SIGMET information included in the flight documents
- The flight crew did not notice the SIGMETs
Contributing factors:
- Limited time and facility for crew briefing

Sources:

RNSA

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: TSB Iceland
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 4 years 1 month
Download report: Final report


Images:

Photo of TF-FIP courtesy AirHistory.net


Helsinki - Vantaa (EFHK / HEL)
1 December 2019; (c) Juhani Sipilä


Flight track of the two go-arounds, fuel emergency and landing

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
28-Mar-2021 09:01 harro Updated [Photo]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description