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| Date: | Wednesday 22 June 2022 |
| Time: | 16:45 |
| Type: |  Bell UH-1B Iroquois |
| Owner/operator: | MARPAT Aviation |
| Registration: | N98F |
| MSN: | 488 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1962 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 9029 hours |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 6 / Occupants: 6 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed, written off |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Amherstdale, WV -
 United States of America
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Private |
| Departure airport: | Logan County Airport, WV (6L4) |
| Amherstdale, WV | |
| Investigating agency: | NTSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
On June 22, 2022, about 1645 eastern daylight time, a Bell UH-1B helicopter, N98F, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident in Amherstdale, West Virginia. About 15 minutes after the flight departed, the helicopter impacted two powerlines and a rock face during a forced landing, and a postcrash fire ensued. The pilot and five passengers were fatally injured. The helicopter was operated by MARPAT Aviation under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.1
This accident occurred during a flight offered as part of an annual event at Logan County Airport, Logan, West Virginia, that showcased a former military UH-1B helicopter. A volunteer pilot for the event (the pilot-in-command) was in the left front seat, a passenger was in the right front seat, and four other passengers were seated in the cabin. The right front-seat passenger made a required $250 donation to fly the helicopter for 30 minutes, and the other four passengers each made a smaller donation to ride in the helicopter. About 15 minutes after the flight departed, the helicopter impacted two powerlines and a rock face located about 3.5 nautical miles east of the airport during an attempted forced landing. The helicopter came to rest partially inverted on its right side on an asphalt road, and a postcrash fire ensued. The six helicopter occupants were fatally injured, and the helicopter was destroyed.
Postaccident examination of the engine found static damage in the compressor section; rotational damage in the gas-producer turbine; and other damage to the exhaust diffuser, rear bearing cover, the No. 2 bearing, and two power turbine blades. Postaccident examination of the helicopter’s main rotor blades found no evidence indicating a powered impact; thus, a partial or total loss of engine power occurred before impact.
The National Transportation Safety Board found that, at the time of the accident, the helicopter was being operated under a special airworthiness certificate in the experimental exhibition category. The certificate, which was dated December 2014, was issued by the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Charleston, West Virginia, Flight Standards District Office (FSDO). The FSDO also issued operating limitations as part of the special airworthiness certificate. These operating limitations included specific inspection standards for the helicopter.
In August 2010, the FAA issued Order 8130.2, titled “Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft and Related Products,” to establish policies and procedures for issuing airworthiness certificates for aircraft. In December 2011, the FAA issued a Memorandum of Deviation to Order 8130.2G, which revised the operating limitations for experimental airworthiness certificates that were issued for the purpose of exhibition. The Memorandum of Deviation allowed former military turbine-powered rotorcraft with an experimental exhibition certificate, including the accident helicopter, to be inspected under the provisions of Appendix D to Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 43.
The NTSB found that the inspection standards in Part 43 Appendix D did not have sufficient scope and depth for inspecting former military turbine-powered rotorcraft because the standards comprised generic inspection criteria for aircraft systems and components undergoing annual and 100-hour inspections. The Board also found that the damage to the engine exhaust diffuser (cracking) and the rear bearing cover (outer flange separation) were significant long-term engine issues that could have been detected if the operator, MARPAT Aviation, had used more detailed inspection criteria and more frequent inspection intervals than those in Part 43 Appendix D. (The operator followed more stringent inspection requirements when the helicopter was operated under a restricted-category certificate; those requirements, which were derived from the helicopter’s type certificate, were last in effect in 2014.)
Further, the NTSB found that an operating limitation to the helicopter’s experimental airworthiness certificate required the owner/operator to submit annual program letters that included “a list of events at which the aircraft will be exhibited.” The FAA used these program letters to plan its surveillance of experimental aircraft. However, the FAA did not have a program letter or other correspondence from MARPAT Aviation indicating that the helicopter would be flown at the June 2022 annual event. As a result, the Charleston FSDO was unaware that MARPAT Aviation was operating the accident helicopter at that event.
The Charleston FSDO was also unaware of the helicopter flights at the June 2022 annual event because the FSDO had not performed surveillance of the operator (separate from its Part 145 repair station certificate) before the accident. FAA Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System, did not include a requirement for inspectors to perform routine surveillance of operators with experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates.
In addition, the NTSB found that MARPAT Aviation advertised the opportunity to fly the accident helicopter for a required “donation” or ride in the helicopter for a “small donation.” However, the operator did not hold a living history flight experience exemption for the helicopter, which would have allowed the helicopter to be operated for compensation.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the operator’s failure to adequately inspect the former military turbine-powered helicopter, which allowed an engine issue to progress and result in a loss of engine power and a subsequent loss of control after the helicopter struck powerlines during a forced landing.
Also causal to the accident were the following:
• the FAA’s inadequate inspection and maintenance standards for former military turbine-powered aircraft operating with an experimental exhibition airworthiness certificate;
• the operator’s use of those standards instead of more rigorous standards, which were readily available to the operator and previously used to inspect and maintain the helicopter; and
• the FAA’s inadequate oversight of the operator, which did not detect the inherent risk associated with the operation.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://wvmetronews.com/2022/06/22/faa-confirms-helicopter-crash-in-logan-county/
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/06/22/us/helicopter-crash-west-virginia-route-17/index.html
https://www.lootpress.com/six-people-dead-after-plane-crashes-in-logan-county-wv/
https://wvmetronews.com/2022/06/22/faa-confirms-helicopter-crash-in-logan-county/
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20240827.aspx
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=105306
https://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=98F
https://marpataviation.com/main
https://photos-e1.flightcdn.com/photos/retriever/227be6203a4fbbc9176135c0eafc925304411b0a (photo)
Location
Images:
Photo: Accident Helicopter (NTSB)
Photo: Wreckage (Circle denotes the area where the NTSB found pieces of plexiglass, the aft cap of the left skid, a tail rotor blade segment, and green paint transfer onto a rock)
Photo: Cockpit and Cabin Wreckage (NTSB)
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 23-Jun-2022 04:37 | Geno | Added |
| 23-Jun-2022 04:43 | Geno | Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Operator, Source, ] |
| 23-Jun-2022 06:35 | harro | Updated [Registration, Operator, Source, Damage, Narrative, ] |
| 23-Jun-2022 06:37 | harro | Updated [Departure airport, Destination airport, Narrative, ] |
| 23-Jun-2022 07:27 | RobertMB | Updated [Aircraft type, Cn, Location, Phase, Nature, Source, Narrative, ] |
| 23-Jun-2022 07:31 | RobertMB | Updated [Narrative, ] |
| 23-Jun-2022 10:28 | Aerossurance | Updated [Aircraft type, ] |
| 24-Jun-2022 05:31 | nhofmann54 | Updated [Time, Cn, ] |
| 24-Jun-2022 05:31 | harro | Updated [Cn, ] |
| 24-Jun-2022 13:44 | Captain Adam | Updated [Time, Location, Source, Narrative, ] |
| 13-Jul-2022 00:16 | Captain Adam | Updated [Time, Location, Destination airport, Narrative, Category, ] |
| 27-Aug-2024 20:45 | Captain Adam | Updated [Nature, Source, Narrative, Accident report, Photo, ] |
| 27-Aug-2024 20:47 | Captain Adam | Updated [Photo, ] |
| 27-Aug-2024 20:52 | Captain Adam | Updated [Photo, ] |
| 28-Aug-2024 05:45 | ASN | Updated [Narrative, ] |
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