Date:	Monday 2 January 2023
Time:	13:59
Type:	Eurocopter EC 130B4
Owner/operator:	Sea World Helicopters Pty Ltd
Registration:	VH-XH9
MSN:	3845
Year of manufacture:	2004
Engine model:	Turbomeca ARRIEL 2B1
Fatalities:	Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 6
Other fatalities:	4
Aircraft damage:	Substantial
Category:	Accident
Location:	near Sea World Heliport (YSWD), Main Beach, QLD -   Australia
Phase:	Approach
Nature:	Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi
Departure airport:	YSWD
Destination airport:	YSWD
Investigating agency:	ATSB
Confidence Rating:	Accident investigation report completed and information captured

Narrative:
Two Eurocopter EC 130B4 helicopters of Sea World Helicopters suffered a mid-air collision near Sea World Heliport (YSWD), Main Beach, Queensland.
VH-XKQ was departing Sea World Heliport when it was struck by the approaching VH-XH9 and it crashed nose down onto a sand bank and VH-XH9 made an emergency landing on the same sand bank with severe damage to the cockpit section.
Four of the seven occupants died and three received critical injuries. Five of the six occupants of the VH-XH9 received minor injuries by cockpit glass debris.


Contributing factors
- VH-XH9 and VH-XKQ collided at an intersection created by simultaneous operation of the park pad and main heliport. Separation at the intersection relied solely upon alerted see-and-avoid.
- Due to the prioritisation of passenger loading and cabin preparation activities, it is unlikely that the pilot of VH-XKQ focused on the inbound radio call made by the pilot of VH-XH9.
- The airspace information provided to the pilot of VH-XKQ by ground crew was not relevant by the time VH-XKQ took off. As per the operator's procedures, after giving the thumbs up the ground crew member ceased monitoring the water and airspace behind the helicopter.
- The radio system used by pilots of VH-XKQ for external communication had defects that limited transmission range and affected reliability of transmission.
- It is almost certain that a taxi call was not successfully broadcast from VH-XKQ. It is likely that the pilot made a taxi call, and that it was subject to transmission failure.
- The ability of the pilot of VH-XKQ to visually identify VH-XH9 north-west of their position over the Broadwater was limited due to restrictions on manoeuvring and visibility from the operationally required parking position facing south-east on the park pad.
- Having to rely solely on unalerted see-and-avoid for separation, the pilot of VH-XKQ almost certainly did not sight VH-XH9 or manoeuvre VH-XKQ to do so.
- Although the pilot of VH-XH9 made a procedural call to announce their position when approximately 2 minutes from the heliport, they made no further radio calls. Consistent with the operator's procedures, upon sighting VH-XKQ on the park pad, the pilot of VH-XH9 assessed the risk of collision and did not consider it necessary to make an additional radio call to alert VH-XKQ to their presence.
- As the pilot of VH-XH9 did not hear a taxi call they had no trigger to reassess the status of VH-XKQ as a collision risk.
- Inbound for the heliport, the pilot of VH-XH9 concentrated on their primary task of landing, directing their attention to their landing site and a vessel on the water. Consequently, the pilot did not maintain an active scan, and the left door pillar blocked the view of the park pad and VH-XKQ at times during their approach. As a result, the pilot of VH-XH9 did not sight VH-XKQ airborne before the collision.
- Sea World Helicopters’ standard inbound call from Porpoise Point was not a reliable alert for a pilot on the ground while boarding and interacting with passengers. Where collision risk on departure existed, a pilot on the ground would highly likely be focused on cabin preparation at the time of that inbound call. (Safety issue)
- Sea World Helicopters’ procedure did not require ground crew to monitor the airspace up to the time of the helicopter departing the helipad. As the presence of hazards behind the helicopter could change significantly within a short space of time, helicopters routinely departed without current hazard information from ground crew. (Safety issue)
- Reopening the park pad in March 2022 created an increased risk of collision with traffic operating from the existing heliport. The conflict point was placed at a location where:
- there was a higher workload for both pilots
- both pilots needed to consider the effect of helicopter downwash on surface traffic
- it was less likely that an inbound pilot would notice a change in the status of a helicopter on the ground
- it was more difficult for an outbound pilot to acquire traffic
- helicopters would close on each other vertically and laterally, decreasing likelihood of detection
- the operator's airborne collision avoidance systems would not provide traffic advisories (Safety issue)
- Sea World Helicopters' documented procedures for communication between inbound and outbound helicopters were not specific to their usual operation and location, and permitted a reactive model of separation, increasing the likelihood that an outbound pilot would not form awareness of relevant traffic. While some company pilots made proactive calls during final approach, this was not a standard practice. (Safety issue)
- Sea World Helicopters was aware of the hazard of midair collision and assumed that any conflicting traffic would always be visible to pilots. Furthermore, the operator did not deem the collision risk to be unusual and considered its existing baseline controls to be effective.
- Following the change in ownership of Sea World Helicopters, changes to the operation gradually degraded existing controls of enhanced communication and in-cockpit traffic display that informed team situation awareness, and the controls were eventually withheld without formal analysis of the change. This reduced opportunity for company pilots to form and maintain awareness of each other's position and intentions. (Safety issue)
- Sea World Helicopters was reliant on CTAF calls, ground crew advice, and pilot visual detection of aircraft to ensure separation in VH-XH9 and VH-XKQ. Available additional controls for enhancing alerted see-and-avoid and reducing the risk of collision were not implemented. (Safety issue)
- Sea World Helicopters' implementation of their SMS did not effectively manage aviation safety risk in the context of the operator's primary business. Additionally, their objectives were non-specific, and the focus of safety management was primarily ground handling and WHS issues. This limited the operator's ability to ensure that aviation safety risk was as low as reasonably practicable. (Safety issue)
- Sea World Helicopters' change management process, conducted prior to reopening the park pad, did not encompass the impact of the change on the operator's existing scenic flight operations. Crucially, the flight paths and the conflict point they created were not formally examined, therefore limitations of the operator’s controls for that location were not identified. (Safety issue)

https://www.9news.com.au/national/gold-coast-helicopters-major-incident-main-beach/a0cce383-ae23-47ae-ba3f-180e8129ef48
https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/watch-live-qld-police-give-update-after-two-helicopters-collided-and-crashed-on-the-gold-coast/news-story/422e2b5f6e808af51ff0a22e0cac8f65
https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/helicopters-crash-on-gold-coast-20230102-p5c9ws.html
https://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/incidents/two-helicopters-reportedly-crash-into-each-other-near-sea-world-on-the-gold-coast/news-story/15620308ba3c8015cdfff0538766c94f
https://7news.com.au/news/gold-coast/grave-fears-as-helicopters-collide-near-sea-world-c-9331876
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2023/report/ao-2023-001

Ex ZK-IVP, HP-12BL, N702LV, N325MP

Date/time	Contributor	Updates
09-Apr-2025 11:49	ASN	Updated [Departure airport, Destination airport, Embed code, ]
09-Apr-2025 12:10	ASN	Updated [Narrative, ]