Date:	Thursday 12 January 2023
Time:	07:52
Type:	Airbus A330-323
Owner/operator:	Delta Air Lines
Registration:	N802NW
MSN:	533
Year of manufacture:	2003
Total airframe hrs:	69252 hours
Cycles:	19353 flights
Engine model:	Pratt & Whitney PW4168A
Fatalities:	Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 233
Other fatalities:	0
Aircraft damage:	Minor, repaired
Category:	Serious incident
Location:	Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM) -   Netherlands
Phase:	Landing
Nature:	Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:	Detroit-Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, MI (DTW/KDTW)
Destination airport:	Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM)
Investigating agency:	Dutch Safety Board
Confidence Rating:	Accident investigation report completed and information captured

Narrative:
Delta Air Lines flight DL134, an Airbus A330-323, touched down in the grass 11 meters short of the threshold of runway 22 at Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS). The landing was executed under conditions of strong gale-force winds, with severe gusts, a light drizzle, and reduced visibility of 5,000 metres, one hour before sunrise.

The Airbus A330, equipped with autopilot (AP) and autothrust (A/THR), followed a stabilized approach towards the Runway 22 touchdown zone, in adherence to the Instrument Landing System (ILS) glideslope. As the aircraft descended below the clouds, the pilots observed the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI), which signalled an accurate trajectory towards the touchdown zone. Despite Runway 22’s sufficient length of 2,020 metres for an A330-300 landing, the flight crew perceived the runway length as short.
The captain manually controlled the aircraft’s flight path after disengaging the autopilot at 240 ft radio altitude, allowing a descent below the ILS glide slope and PAPI glide path.
The crew focused on speed management more than maintaining the glide path due to concerns about a potential overrun.
The ILS and PAPI system on Runway 22, designed for smaller aircraft, did not meet the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) criteria for a minimum threshold crossing height for the A330-300’s main landing gear, contributing to the reduced safety margin.


CONCLUSIONS
On 12 January 2023, the crew of an Airbus A330-300, in an attempt to mitigate the perceived risk of an overrun on Runway 22 at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, inadvertently increased the risk of an undershoot. This contributed to the aircraft touching down before the threshold.
The psychological impact of landing on a seemingly short runway under adverse conditions, without specific training, likely led to a subconscious effort to land as early as possible.
The crew therefore, focused more on speed control over maintaining the glide path, and descended below the published glide path as they perceived an overrun as a greater threat than an undershoot. This imbalance between the risk of a runway overrun and an undershoot, and additional operator-imposed constraints, skewed their risk assessment.
By continuing below the glide path, the crew eliminated critical safety margins.
Fatigue may have influenced the crew’s performance, particularly in controlling and monitoring the aircraft’s flight path, though the exact extent remains uncertain.
After the occurrence, the operator incorporated short field landing techniques in the training program. However, there is an opportunity for the operator to enhance their training programs and SOPs to include specific guidance for threshold crossing height and landing performance on shorter runways for wide body aircraft. The operator also prohibited landing on Runway 22 at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, however, this investigation suggests that the operator may need to evaluate threshold crossing height and runway suitability for different aircraft types at other runways to effectively mitigate risks that played a role in this incident. Multiple early touchdowns on Runway 22 by the same operator on that day reveals a possible pattern that warrants further study.
While Runway 22 was adequately long for the Airbus A330-300, the configuration of the instrument landing system (ILS) and precision approach path indicator (PAPI) system were optimized for smaller aircraft like the B737, and did not meet ICAO and EASA standards for an Airbus A330-300 with regard to the recommended minimum wheel height over the threshold. The mismatch between the PAPI and the size of the aircraft left insufficient margin for unexpected deviations, which – combined with wind gusts and pilot reactions, caused the Airbus A330 to land before the threshold.

Weather about the time of the incident (07:53 LT/ 0653Z):
EHAM 120725Z 24027G39KT 9999 FEW009 SCT012 BKN016 11/10 Q1001 TEMPO 6000 -DZ BKN014
>> EHAM 120655Z 24027G38KT 6000 -DZ FEW007 SCT009 BKN011 11/10 Q1000 TEMPO 8000 BKN015
EHAM 120625Z 24028KT 210V270 5000 -DZRA FEW007 SCT008 BKN010 11/10 Q1000 TEMPO 8000

https://nos.nl/artikel/2459572-vliegtuig-landt-voor-landingsbaan-op-schiphol
https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/dl134#2ed2c750
https://eaip.lvnl.nl/2023-01-12-AIRAC/graphics/eAIP/EH-AD-2.EHAM-AOC-04-22.pdf

Date/time	Contributor	Updates
27-May-2023 01:30	Ron Averes	Updated
18-Jul-2024 19:42	ASN	Updated [Total occupants, Damage, Narrative, Accident report, ]
18-Jul-2024 19:50	ASN	Updated [Time, Embed code, Category, ]