Accident Cirrus SF50 Vision Jet G2 N15VJ, Friday 25 November 2022
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Date:Friday 25 November 2022
Time:09:00 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic SF50 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Cirrus SF50 Vision Jet G2
Owner/operator:Verijet
Registration: N15VJ
MSN: 0215
Year of manufacture:2020
Engine model:Williams FJ33-5A
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 1
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Substantial, written off
Category:Accident
Location:1,6 km SW of Indianapolis Regional Airport, IN -   United States of America
Phase: Initial climb
Nature:Ferry/positioning
Departure airport:Indianapolis Regional Airport, IN (KMQJ)
Destination airport:Greensboro, GA (3J7)
Investigating agency: NTSB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
A Cirrus SF50 airplane, N15VJ, was substantially damaged following deployment of the airframe parachute system near Mount Comfort, Indiana. The pilot was not injured.

The pilot reported that he engaged the autopilot (AP) and autothrottle (AT) just after takeoff. Shortly thereafter, he received landing gear up warnings, and the airplane pitched up and engine thrust reduced uncommanded. He stated that he unsuccessfully attempted to disconnect the autopilot and manually override the nose-up pitch and throttle position, but he felt resistance in the control yoke, and the throttle returned to the idle position when he released it. After receiving a stall warning, he chose to activate the airframe parachute system (CAPS). The CAPS deployed and the airplane descended under canopy, coming to rest in a retention pond.
Data recovered from the airplane indicated that the CAPS AP mode activated just after takeoff about 226 ft above ground level (agl). CAPS AP mode is designed to slow the airplane by commanding idle thrust with AT, leveling the wings, and increasing the airplane's pitch attitude in order to bring the airspeed within CAPS deployment parameters. The landing gear warnings the pilot received were due to the airplane's low altitude and reduced engine power. Although the pilot reported that he pressed the AP disconnect button on the yoke, recorded data showed that the pilot attempted to override the AP and AT servos with manual inputs to the control yoke and throttle lever, and did not press the AP disconnect button until about 27 seconds after CAPS AP mode activated. By this time, the airplane's pitch trim was in the full nose-up position, and some aileron trim would have been applied in order to level the wings; this is consistent with the pilot's statement that the airplane pitched up and rolled, which he interpreted as a stall, and resulted in his decision to activate the CAPS at an altitude about 570 ft above ground level. In CAPS AP mode, manual throttle inputs would not decouple AT, and the AP disconnect button was required to disengage AT.
Examination and testing of modules from the CAPS activation system showed corrosion on electronic components. Further testing revealed that a momentary interruption of electrical power or ground to the electronic modules in the CAPS would result in the generation of a “CAPS Activated' signal, even if power was restored to the modules.
It is likely that the corrosion of electrical components in the CAPS activation system resulted in a transient power or ground interruption, which resulted in generation of the “CAPS Activated' signal and subsequent uncommanded activation of the CAPS AP mode. The pilot likely did not recognize the situation, even though the autopilot status bar indicated the autopilot was in CAPS mode and believed that the airplane was in an unrecoverable flight condition, which resulted in his decision to deploy the CAPS.

Probable Cause: The uncommanded activation of the CAPS autopilot mode due to corrosion of the system's electrical components. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to identify the CAPS autopilot mode and promptly follow the procedures in the airplane flight manual.

METAR:

12:57 UTC / 07:57 local time:
KMQJ 251256Z AUTO 30007KT 7SM OVC012 07/07 A3017 RMK AO1

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: NTSB
Report number: CEN23FA045
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 2 years and 2 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

NTSB CEN23FA045

Location

Images:


Photo: NTSB

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
19-Aug-2024 12:21 ASN Updated
01-Mar-2025 13:05 ASN Update Bot Updated [Time, Other fatalities, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative, Category, ]
01-Mar-2025 13:25 ASN Updated [Departure airport, Narrative, ]
01-Mar-2025 13:26 ASN Updated [Departure airport, Photo, ]
29-Sep-2025 11:54 ASN Updated

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