| Date: | Sunday 22 November 2015 |
| Time: | 07:58 |
| Type: |  Boeing 737-3Y0 |
| Owner/operator: | Avia Traffic Company |
| Registration: | EX-37005 |
| MSN: | 24681/1929 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1990 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 50668 hours |
| Cycles: | 43958 flights |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-3B2 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 159 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial, written off |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Osh Airport (OSS) -
 Kyrgyzstan
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Bishkek-Manas International Airport (FRU/UAFM) |
| Osh Airport (OSS/UAFO) | |
| Investigating agency: | MAK |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Avia Traffic Company flight YK768, a Boeing 737-300, sustained substantial damage in botched landing and subsequent runway excursion at Osh Airport (OSS), Kyrgyzstan.
Flight YK768 originated from Krasnoyarsk Airport (KJA), Russia. Poor visibility at the destination of Osh in Kyrgyzstan (fog, runway visibility 400 m, vertical visibility 100 ft) forced the crew to diverted to Bishkek, where it landed at 05:20 hours.
Before boarding passengers, the pilot-in-command called the on-duty meteorologist at Osh, who reported: “Wind 260° at 2 m/s, visibility 600 m, OVI 1600 m, vertical visibility 200 ft, fog, landing trend – visibility 100 m, vertical 100 ft.” The PIC then confirmed the decision to depart.
At 07:04, during taxi, the controller reported weather at Osh: “Visibility 250 m, on the runway 800 m, fog, vertical 200 ft (60 m), occasionally 100 m, vertical 100 ft.”
The flight took off four minutes later.
About 07:32, the controller at Osh cleared the flight to descend to FL80 for an ILS approach to runway 12.
At 07:38, the controller advised: “Visibility 900 m, vertical 100 ft,” and asked if the flight was continuing. The crew replied: “Yes, we’ll proceed to decision height, 768.”
At 07:43: the controller reported updated weather information: “Visibility on the runway 500 m, vertical 100 ft.”
At 08:44:35, the crew reported going around. During the go-around, the aircraft struck the runway.
Afterward, the Approach controller asked about the intentions of flight 768. The crew replied that they would attempt another approach. The controller reported: “Visibility 50 m, on the runway 50 m, vertical 100 ft.” The crew acknowledged and at 07:46:47 reported climbing to FL150 en route to the alternate Manas. Permission to climb was granted.
However, due to the runway strike, both hydraulic systems failed, and the right engine experienced oil pressure loss and rising exhaust gas temperature. The crew reported the situation and, after evaluating the risks, requested an emergency landing at Osh despite weather below minima. During descent, the right engine was shut down.
The emergency landing was performed with a long touchdown beyond the aiming zone; the aircraft overran the runway by 529 m and sustained significant damage.
During the emergency landing, six passengers sustained moderate injuries and were taken to hospitals by ambulance; five others had minor bruises. There was no post-landing fire.
Cause
The aviation accident involving the Boeing 737-300 EX-37005 occurred as a result of the aircraft overrunning the runway after performing an emergency landing with both hydraulic systems inoperative, on one engine, with flaps set at 15°, and with damaged main landing gear, during twilight conditions and fog, with runway visual range (RVR) of 50 meters and vertical visibility of 130 feet.
The most probable cause of the accident was a combination of the following factors:
* The absence, in the Kyrgyz Republic’s aviation regulations (APKР-6) and the airline’s flight operations manual, of procedures for accounting for forecasted weather deterioration (TREND-type forecasts) during flights lasting up to two hours
* A formal approach by the crew in assessing weather conditions when deciding to depart, despite having previously diverted to an alternate airport due to weather below landing minima at Osh Airport; the decision to depart was based on current weather only, without considering the forecasted deterioration (TREND forecast) at the destination
* The pilot-in-command’s lack of practical experience performing go-arounds in actual instrument meteorological conditions corresponding to ICAO categories (the PIC was certified for CAT IIIA); crew training programs allowed such exercises for obtaining and maintaining minima only on certified simulators
* The crew’s failure to follow standard operating procedures for a go-around; an erroneous action by the PIC—pushing the control column forward (“away from himself”) at 38 meters above runway threshold (after activating the TO/GA mode) and holding it for five seconds—disrupted the go-around profile and led to continued descent of the aircraft; the first officer’s passivity in monitoring flight parameters prevented correction of the PIC’s error
* Improper distribution of attention when monitoring instruments during the go-around initiation (failure to monitor pitch angle while focusing on airspeed)
* Possible somatogravic illusions (illusion of pitch-up) affecting the crew, combined with potential fatigue (duty time at the moment of the accident was 13 hours), which, together with lack of pitch monitoring, could have contributed to prolonged forward control column input
* Insufficiently forceful backward control column movement when the ground proximity warning system activated
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
AKIpress
Radio Azattyk
Location
Images:
photo (c) Werner Fischdick; Moskva-Domodedovo Airport (DME/UUDD); 13 July 2012
Photo: MAK
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 19-Oct-2025 18:01 | ASN | Updated [Total occupants, Narrative, Accident report, ] |
| 19-Oct-2025 18:18 | ASN | Updated [Narrative, Photo, ] |
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