Date:	Sunday 27 August 2006
Time:	06:07
Type:	Canadair CL-600-2B19 Regional Jet CRJ-100ER
Owner/operator:	Delta Connection, opb Comair
Registration:	N431CA
MSN:	7472
Year of manufacture:	2001
Total airframe hrs:	12048 hours
Cycles:	14536 flights
Engine model:	General Electric CF34-3A1
Fatalities:	Fatalities: 49 / Occupants: 50
Other fatalities:	0
Aircraft damage:	Destroyed, written off
Category:	Accident
Location:	Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, KY (LEX) -   United States of America
Phase:	Take off
Nature:	Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:	Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, KY (LEX/KLEX)
Destination airport:	Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, GA (ATL/KATL)
Investigating agency:	NTSB
Confidence Rating:	Accident investigation report completed and information captured

Narrative:
Delta Connection flight 5191, a Canadair Regional Jet CRJ-100, operated by Comair crashed during takeoff from the wrong runway at Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, Kentucky,. USA, killing 49 occupants; 1 survived the accident.

Comair Flight 5191 was a regularly scheduled flight bound for Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL), Atlanta, Georgia. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were 8 miles visibility, broken clouds at 5,000 feet, and no precipitation. Sunrise was at 7:03 AM, approximately one hour following the accident.

At 05:48 the CVR recorded automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information "alpha" which indicated that runway 22 was in use. About one minute later, the first officer told the air traffic controller that he had received the ATIS information. Two minutes later, the controller provided the crew of Flight 5191 departure information for their planned flight to Atlanta. At 5:52 a discussion among the flight crew was recorded on the CVR concerning which pilot would fly the airplane to Atlanta. It was decided that the first officer would be the flying pilot.

At 05:56, the captain stated, "Comair standard," which was determined to be part of the taxi briefing, and "Run the checklist at your leisure." At about 5:56, the first officer began the takeoff briefing, which is part of the before-starting-engines checklist. During the briefing he stated, "He said what runway...two four?" to which the captain replied, "It's two two." The first officer continued the takeoff briefing, which included three additional references to runway 22. After briefing that the runway end identifier lights were out, the first officer commented, "...Came in the other night it was like...lights are out all over the place." Investigators believed that what the first officer was referring to was on the previous day during a repositioning flight that landed on runway 22 at about 01:40 AM, the right runway edge lights after the intersection of runway 26 were out at the time.
Following the comment regarding the inoperative lighting, the first officer then stated, "Let's take it out and...take...(taxiway) Alpha. Two two's a short taxi." The captain called the takeoff briefing complete at about 05:57. At 05:58 the first officer called for the first two items on the before-starting-engines checklist, to which the captain commented that the before-starting-engine checklist had already been completed. The first officer questioned, "We did?" The first officer then briefed the takeoff decision speed (V1) as 137 kts and the rotation speed (VR) as 142 kts.
Flight data recorder (FDR) data for the accident flight started at about 05:58. FDR data showed that the pilot's heading bug on the multi function display (MFD) had been properly set to 227 degrees, which corresponded to the magnetic heading for runway 22.

At 05:59, the captain stated that the airplane was ready to push back from the gate. FDR data showed that at about 6:00 they started the left and right engines. At 06:02 the first officer notified the controller that the airplane was ready to taxi. The controller then instructed the flight crew to taxi the airplane to runway 22. This instruction at that time authorized the airplane to cross runway 26 (the intersecting runway) without stopping. The first officer responded, "Taxi two two." FDR data showed that the captain began to taxi the airplane at about 06:02. About the same time, a Sky West Flight 6819 departed runway 22, which would have been parallel to their taxi route at that time.
At this point, the captain called for the taxi checklist. Beginning at about 06:03, the first officer stated, "Radar terrain displays" and "Taxi checks complete." At about 06:04 another commercial transport airplane, American Eagle Flight 882, departed runway 22.
From about 06:03 to 06:04, investigators determined that the flight crew engaged in conversation that was not pertinent to the operation of the flight. At about 06:04 the first officer began the before-takeoff checklist and indicated again that the flight would be departing from runway 22.

At about 06:04, the report indicated that the captain stopped the airplane at the hold-short line for runway 26. To get to the hold-short line for runway 22, (their assigned runway) they should have crossed the end of runway 26 and continued on the connecting taxiway. Afterward, the first officer made an announcement over the public address system to welcome the passengers and completed the before-takeoff checklist. At about 06:05, while the airplane was still at the hold-short line for runway 26, the first officer told the controller that, "Comair one twenty one" was ready to depart. Three seconds later the controller responded, "Comair one ninety one...fly runway heading. Cleared for takeoff." At 6:05, the captain began to taxi the airplane across the runway 26 hold short line. CVR recording showed that the captain called for the lineup checklist at the same time. About one second later, Comair Flight 5191 began turning onto runway 26. About 06:05, the first officer called the lineup checklist complete.

At about 6:06, the captain told the first officer, "All yours," and the first officer acknowledged, "My brakes, my controls." FDR data showed that the magnetic heading of the airplane at that time was about 266 degrees, which corresponded to the magnetic heading for runway 26. At that point, the CVR recorded the sound of engines increasing in power. The first officer then stated, "Set thrust please." to which the captain responded, "Thrust set." Shortly after this response from the captain, the first officer stated, "(that) is weird with no lights," and the captain responded, "Yeah," two seconds later.

Approximately eight seconds later, the captain called, "One hundred knots," to which the first officer replied, "Checks." Approximately seven seconds later the captain called, "V-one, rotate," and then stated, "Whoa!" Investigators determined that the callout for V1 was six knots early, and the callout for VR was 11 knots early. It was also believed that the captain may have been reacting to seeing the end of the runway rapidly approaching.

The airplane impacted an earthen berm 265 feet beyond the end of runway 26, became temporarily airborne, then struck trees and burst into flames. Maximum airspeed recorded was 137 knots. The FDR ended at 06:06:36.


PROBABLE CAUSE: "The flight crew's failure to use available cues and aids to identify the airplane's location on the airport surface during taxi and their failure to cross check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff. Contributing to this accident were the flight crew's nonpertinent conversation during taxi, which resulted in loss of positional awareness and the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to require that all runway crossings be authorized only by specific air traffic control clearances."

09:54 UTC / 05:54 local time:
KLEX 270954Z 20007KT 8SM FEW090 SCT120 24/19 A3000

NTSB

photo (c) NTSB; Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, KY (LEX/KLEX); August 2006; (publicdomain)

photo (c) NTSB; Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, KY (LEX/KLEX); August 2006; (publicdomain)

photo (c) NTSB; Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, KY (LEX/KLEX); August 2006; (publicdomain)

photo (c) NTSB; Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, KY (LEX/KLEX); August 2006; (publicdomain)

photo (c) NTSB; Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, KY (LEX/KLEX); August 2006; (publicdomain)

photo (c) NTSB; Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, KY (LEX/KLEX); August 2006; (publicdomain)

photo (c) NTSB; Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, KY (LEX/KLEX); August 2006; (publicdomain)

photo (c) NTSB; Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, KY (LEX/KLEX); August 2006; (publicdomain)

photo (c) NTSB; Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, KY (LEX/KLEX); August 2006; (publicdomain)

photo (c) NTSB; Lexington-Blue Grass Airport, KY (LEX/KLEX); August 2006; (publicdomain)

photo (c) Stefan Hofecker/Werner Fischdick collection; Miami International Airport, FL (MIA); 08 February 2005

Date/time	Contributor	Updates
15-Apr-2025 10:43	ASN	Updated [Narrative, ]
15-Apr-2025 13:52	ASN	Updated [Narrative, ]