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| Date: | Saturday 5 April 1958 |
| Time: | c. 12:00 |
| Type: | Ilyushin Il-14P |
| Owner/operator: | CAAC Airlines |
| Registration: | 632 |
| MSN: | |
| Year of manufacture: | 1956 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 19 / Occupants: 19 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed, written off |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Foping County, Hanzhong, Shaanxi Province -
China
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Chengdu |
| Destination airport: | Xi'an |
Narrative:On April 5, 1958, the Ilyushin Il-14 aircraft No. 632 operated by the Chengdu Management Office was on a flight mission from Chengdu to Xi'an and then to Beijing. The crew included the captain, first officer, flight engineer, radio operator, and trainee radio operator. Originally scheduled to depart Chengdu at 11:00, the flight was advanced to 10:03 due to deteriorating weather conditions in Xi'an. The aircraft passed over Hanzhong at 11:21 at an altitude of 3,300 meters while flying above the clouds. After Hanzhong, it climbed to 3,600 meters. At 11:45, the flight reported to Xi'an Station that it was expected to arrive in Xi'an at 11:58. At 11:56, the crew reported to the control tower that their high-frequency radio was malfunctioning and requested the activation of medium-frequency communication. Subsequently, contact with the aircraft was lost. It was later discovered that the aircraft had crashed into a mountain near Zhubeigou in Sifangtai Mountain, Gaoping District, Shuangmiao Township, Foping County, approximately 70 kilometers southwest of Xi'an, at an altitude of 2,200–2,300 meters. The fuselage broke apart upon impact, and the cockpit caught fire. All nine passengers and five crew members on board were killed. The accident was classified as a major incident. On the day of the incident, the weather forecast provided by Xi'an Station was not sufficiently accurate. The high-altitude wind forecast was underestimated, and the speed and intensity of the cold front were not timely and accurately communicated to the flight. The station only informed the aircraft that the weather in Xi'an would deteriorate after 12:00, with visibility reduced to 2 kilometers, and advised the flight to arrive over Xi'an by 11:50 and land by 12:00. The Xi'an dispatch relayed this information to the aircraft accordingly.
The main cause of the accident was the captain's unauthorized early descent during cloud-top flying, leading to a mountain collision. The flight operation errors were: the captain descended before entering the terminal area, crossing a homing beacon, or confirming the position via radio, solely based on dead reckoning without reporting to or getting ATC's approval. The captain used the ground speed from the first leg (Chengdu-Hanzhong) to calculate the arrival time for the second leg (Hanzhong-Xi'an), ignoring wind changes that altered the ground speed, causing errors.The ideological root was the captain's pride and carelessness, shown in: violating flight regulations. Flight Regulation Article 356 prohibits aircraft from descending below the first altitude layer of a route segment; any descent must follow position confirmation, ATC reporting, and approval. Article 390 bans altitude reduction or cloud penetration in mountainous regions along routes, except within terminal areas per the approved cloud-penetration chart. Also, there was a failure to learn from past incidents. On January 21, 1956, Beijing Management Office's Ilyushin Il-14 No. 602 nearly had a serious accident on the Beijing-Chongqing route when the captain miscalculated and descended early, causing the left wing to hit trees. The Civil Aviation Administration then issued Directive No. 33 (56) Aviation, stressing strict altitude maintenance during cloud or cloud-top flying, with altitude reduction only allowed after accurate position determination via homing or direction-finding beacons and ATC approval, and not below the route segment's minimum safe altitude. Moreover, the captain ignored colleagues' warnings and criticisms during the 1957-1958 rectification movement about the dangers of flying through mountain valleys. Meteorological forecasts were also inaccurate, with actual frontal movement and high-altitude wind speeds along the route exceeding forecasts, affecting ground speed calculations. Xi'an control station commanded improperly, demanding the flight arrive by 11:50 without calculating ground speed. This would require a 425 km/h ground speed, impossible for the Il-14 in headwind conditions. The Chengdu Management Office had weak ideological leadership and lax flight personnel management. The captain's long-standing pride and disregard for ground instructions, along with his unauthorized descents and mountain valley flying (earning him the "mountain-piercing expert" nickname), were never seriously addressed by management. Additionally, despite a January 27, 1958, Civil Aviation Administration order to ground the captain due to vision issues, the office failed to comply.
Sources:
Soviet Transports CAAC. Compilation of Civil Aviation Accidents (I) 1949~1958. pp. 26-28. (in Chinese)
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
| 02-May-2024 09:11 |
RDV |
Updated [Time, Aircraft type, Location, Phase, Source, Narrative, ] |
| 06-Sep-2025 15:55 |
aonauterica |
Updated [Operator, Total fatalities, Total occupants, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative, ] |
| 12-Sep-2025 15:25 |
Yinling_Baixing |
Updated [Destination airport, Source, ] |
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