| Date: | Saturday 28 October 2023 |
| Time: | |
| Type: | Cessna 525A Citationjet CJ2 |
| Owner/operator: | Valljet |
| Registration: | F-HMSG |
| MSN: | 525A-033 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 3 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Paris-Le Bourget Airport (LBG/LFPB) -
France
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi |
| Departure airport: | Paris-Le Bourget Airport (LBG/LFPB) |
| Destination airport: | Farnborough Airport (FAB/EGLF) |
| Investigating agency: | BEA |
| Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:A landing gear failure occured after takeoff. Despite attempts at emergency release of the gear, the front landing gear remained stuck in the retracted position.The crew made a low pass past the Bourget tower which confirmed that the front landing gear was not extended, then made a nosegear-up landing with the firefighters in place.
Contributing factors
The following factors may have contributed to the aeroplane’s return to service, when all the maintenance tasks on the nose landing gear had not been completed:
• the fact that the task associated with the nose landing gear inspection was divided between three technicians, over several days, combined with a lack of precise information being shared by the different technicians regarding the actions carried out. As a result, the last item in the task, which included reconnecting the rods of the nose landing gear
doors, was omitted;
• the absence of an appropriate organisation meeting the regulatory requirements at the Part-145 maintenance workshop, which did not enable technicians working on F-HMSG to identify the roles and responsibilities of each person correctly, particularly in the absence of the only team supervisor of the Citation sector within this organisation;
• the installation of adhesive strips or a red flag without this being mentioned elsewhere;
• the crew’s failure to identify the adhesive strips taped on the nose landing gear doors during the pre-flight inspection.
The following factors contributed to the degraded decision-making process applied by the crew to manage the fault in flight:
• the rather unstructured application of the FORDEC method;
• a large amount of information, sometimes superfluous or improvised, transmitted by the various control services and the fire services, which increased the crew’s workload.
Accident investigation:
|
|
| | |
| Investigating agency: | BEA |
| Report number: | BEA2023-0496 |
| Status: | Investigation completed |
| Duration: | 11 months |
| Download report: | Final report
|
|
Sources:
https://bea.aero/en/investigation-reports/notified-events/detail/serious-incident-to-the-cessna-525-registered-f-hmsg-on-28-10-2023-at-bourget/ Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
| 08-Nov-2023 10:52 |
Anon. |
Added |
| 08-Nov-2023 10:52 |
Anon. |
Updated [Location, ] |
| 23-Sep-2024 18:07 |
ASN |
Updated [Total occupants, Other fatalities, Nature, Narrative, Accident report, ] |
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