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| Date: | Tuesday 19 December 2023 |
| Time: | 08:42 |
| Type: |  Boeing 737-4M0 (SF) |
| Owner/operator: | ASL Airlines Ireland |
| Registration: | EI-STW |
| MSN: | 29201/3018 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-3 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM) -
 Netherlands
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Cargo |
| Departure airport: | Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM) |
| Brussel-Zaventem Airport (BRU/EBBR) | |
| Investigating agency: | Dutch Safety Board |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
ASL Airlines Ireland flight BCS38L a Boeing 737-4M0(SF), was taking off from runway 18L, when it left the runway well past its rotation speed.
The aircraft commenced the take-off from Intersection E4 of runway 18L at Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport. During the take-off roll, the pilot flying experienced difficulties in rotating the aircraft to a lift-off attitude. Although the pilot applied more nose-up elevator input than normally required, the nose wheel of the aircraft remained on the ground until a further increase in airspeed. This allowed the aircraft to rotate and take off.
Once airborne, elevator trim adjustments restored normal control. After the trim adjustment, the flight crew did not further experience any control problems during the remainder of the flight. After landing, the flight crew was informed that the aircraft had been incorrectly loaded.
Conclusion:
The incorrect loading of the ballast block happened within the context of time pressure, where papers were signed without actually checking the correct position of the ballast block. This resulted in center of gravity being significantly further forwards than the flight crew assumed and created a mismatch of the stabilizer trim position.
Elevator deflection during rotation at the calculated Vr was ineffective because the stabilizer was seven units out of the required trim position. This delayed rotation and lift off and demanded more runway length. Despite the fact that the center of gravity was significantly out of the flight envelope, with the adjusted stabilizer trim the aircraft was controllable during the remainder of the flight.
When using intersection E4, the available runway length (TORA) and take-off distance (TODA) were adequate for the actual required runway length and threshold obstacle clearance.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ei-stw#334a30fc
https://onderzoeksraad.nl/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Quarterly-Aviation-Report-Q4-2023.pdf
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 22-Mar-2024 19:15 | ASN | Added |
| 22-Mar-2024 19:16 | ASN | Updated |
| 29-Aug-2025 07:24 | ASN | Updated [Narrative, Accident report, ] |
| 29-Aug-2025 07:27 | ASN | Updated [Narrative, ] |
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