Accident Beechcraft 58P Baron N156Z, 21 Jun 1995
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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 36787
 
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Date:21-JUN-1995
Time:11:08
Type:Silhouette image of generic B58T model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Beechcraft 58P Baron
Owner/operator:U.S. Forest Service
Registration: N156Z
MSN: TJ-369
Fatalities:Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 1
Other fatalities:2
Aircraft damage: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Category:Accident
Location:Ramona, CA -   United States of America
Phase: Approach
Nature:Fire fighting
Departure airport:Ontario, CA (ONT)
Destination airport:(L39)
Investigating agency: NTSB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
A DOUGLAS C-54G & BEECH 58P WERE ON A FIRE SUPPRESSION MISSION WITH THE USDA FOREST SERVICE. THE C-54 (TANKER 19) WAS BEING USED AS AN AERIAL TANKER, WHILE THE BEECH 58 (LEAD 56) WAS ON A LEAD OPERATION. LEAD 56 DEPARTED THE FIRE AREA ABOUT 5 MINUTES BEFORE TANKER 19. BOTH AIRPLANES PROCEEDED TO AN UNCONTROLLED AIRPORT AT RAMONA,CA, FOR LANDING ON RUNWAY 27 WITH A 360-DEGREE OVERHEAD APPROACH. TANKER 19 WAS ON THE INITIAL APPROACH ABOUT 1 MILE EAST OF THE AIRPORT, WHEN THE TWO PLANES COLLIDED. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT LEAD 56 STRUCK THE VERTICAL STABILIZER OF TANKER 19, WHILE DESCENDING. THE EMPENNAGES OF BOTH AIRPLANES SEPARATED, & BOTH CRASHED IN UNCONTROLLED DESCENTS. BEFORE THE ACCIDENT, A GRUMMAN S2 PILOT WAS FOLLOWING TANKER 19. WHILE IN A SHALLOW DESCENT TO THE AIRPORT, HE SAW TANKER 19 SLIGHTLY BELOW THE HORIZON & HEARD TANKER 19 MAKE TWO CALLS (AT 8 & 2 MILES ON INITIAL APPROACH). HE ALSO HEARD A TRANSMISSION FROM LEAD 56 MOMENTS BEFORE THE COLLISION, BUT DID NOT SEE LEAD 56, NOR WAS HE WATCHING TANKER 19 WHEN THE COLLISION OCCURRED. INVESTIGATORS WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE LEAD 56'S ACTIVITIES AFTER DEPARTING THE FIRE AREA. TRANSMISSIONS WERE HEARD FROM LEAD 56 ON THE FOREST SERVICE TACTICAL (OPERATIONS) FREQUENCY WHEN THE PLANE WAS WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE AIRPORT. MOMENTS BEFORE THE COLLISION, LEAD 56 WAS HEARD ON THE AIRPORT'S COMMON TRAFFIC ADVISORY FREQUENCY (CTAF). FOREST SERVICE PROCEDURES REQUIRED THAT ALL PILOTS TRANSMIT THEIR POSITION ON THE CTAF WITHIN 10 MILES OF THE AIRPORT. THE FOREST SERVICE HAD NOT MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE AIRPORT MANAGER TO PERFORM OVERHEAD APPROACHES, NOR WERE PARAMETERS PUBLISHED FOR INITIAL APPROACH ALTITUDE OR AIRSPEED. CAUSE: INADEQUATE VISUAL LOOKOUT BY THE BEECH 58P PILOT, AND THE OPERATOR'S INADEQUATE PROCEDURES CONCERNING 360-DEGREE OVERHEAD APPROACHES.

Sources:

NTSB: https://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001207X03733


Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
24-Oct-2008 10:30 ASN archive Added
21-Dec-2016 19:23 ASN Update Bot Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency]
01-May-2022 08:31 Ron Averes Updated [Operator]
22-Jun-2022 19:54 PolandMoment Updated [Total fatalities, Total occupants, Other fatalities, Source]
12-Nov-2022 02:38 Ron Averes Updated [Operator, Nature]
29-May-2023 22:05 Ron Averes Updated [Operator]

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