You can contribute by submitting additional or updated information.
| Date: | Monday 29 January 2024 |
| Time: | 20:53 |
| Type: |  Bombardier BD-700 Global 5000 |
| Owner/operator: | NetJets |
| Registration: | CS-GLY |
| MSN: | 9498 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 3 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Dubai Airport (DXB/OMDB) -
 United Arab Emirates
|
| Phase: | Taxi |
| Nature: | Ferry/positioning |
| Departure airport: | London-Biggin Hill Airport (BQH/EGKB) |
| Dubai Airport (DXB/OMDB) | |
| Investigating agency: | GCAA |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Saudia flight SV561, an Airbus A330-343 (HZ-AQ14), and a Bombardier BD-700 Global 5000 (CS-GLY), were involved in a runway incursion incident at Dubai Airport (DXB).
The NetJets Global 5000 aircraft was operated ferry flight NJE316K, from London Biggin Hill Airport, the United Kingdom, to DXB.
After the landing on runway 30L at DXB, the aircraft vacated the runway. The aircraft needed to taxi via specific taxiways and crossed runway 30R to reach its designated parking stand. Before crossing, the flight crew received a conditional clearance to cross Runway 30R. However, during the aircraft's crossing the runway, a runway incursion occurred as SV561 took off from Runway 30R. The minimum distance between the two aircraft was about 1,330 meters when the departing aircraft lifted off while the crossing aircraft was at the edge of the runway.
Causes
The Air Accident Investigation Sector determines that the causes of the runway incursion Serious Incident were:
(a) The Tower controller’s use of a non-standard phraseology in the conditional clearance issued to NJE316K flight crew for crossing the runway, led to the NJE316K flight crew incorrectly identifying the A330 taxiing ahead as the
conditional aircraft.
(b) The NJE316K flight crew did not seek clarification from the Tower controller despite being uncertain about the taxiway lights being off beyond the stop bars and the guidance lights for crossing the runway.
Contributing Factors
The Air Accident Investigation Sector identifies the following contributing factors to the Serious Incident:
(a) NJE316K was not yet on the Tower frequency when the Tower controller issued take-off clearance to SVA561 for runway 30R, resulting in the NJE316K flight crew being unaware of SVA561 departure.
(b) The improper handling of the stop bars at Mike 2 led to their activation nearly simultaneously with the NJE316K crossing, preventing the flight crew from noticing the stop bars activation as they passed.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.gpiaa.gov.pt/wwwbase/wwwinclude/ficheiro.aspx?tipo=0&id=10912&ambiente=WebSiteMenu
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 06-Apr-2024 16:51 | ASN | Added |
| 06-Apr-2024 16:51 | ASN | Updated [Embed code, ] |
| 02-Jan-2025 19:21 | ASN | Updated [Total occupants, Nature, Narrative, Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:
| ASN Home | Send Correction / Feedback |
| FSF Home | Disclaimer | Copyright |
| Contact Us | Privacy Policy |
| Press / Media |
CONNECT WITH US:
©2025 Flight Safety Foundation