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| Date: | Sunday 30 July 2023 |
| Time: | 12:29 UTC |
| Type: |  Boeing 737-85N (WL) |
| Owner/operator: | Shandong Airlines |
| Registration: | B-1273 |
| MSN: | 43909/6950 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2018 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-7B |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Jinan Yaoqiang International Airport (TNA/ZSJN) -
 China
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Nanchang Changbei International Airport (KHN/ZSCN) |
| Jinan Airport (TNA/ZSTN) | |
| Investigating agency: | CAAC |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Shandong Airlines flight SC8856, a Boeing 737-85N, suffered a temporary runway excursion during landing on runway 19 at Jinan Airport, China.
On July 30, 2023, Shandong Airlines B-1273,a B737-800 aircraft flew from Nanchang to Jinan with flight number SC8856. When landing Jinan Airport, the crew chose to use runway 19 for ILS approach, with a magnetic heading of 186 degrees. The captain sits in the left seat as the PF (Flight Operator), one co pilot sits in the right seat as the PM (Flight Monitor), and the other co pilot sits in the middle seat as an observer. During the flight, the crew relied on HUD for approach and set the flaps at 30 degrees, landing gear down, and approach speed to 148 knots (Vref 143 knots). When the aircraft descended to the decision altitude, the wind direction and speed changed, but the flight data remained normal, and no significant deviation was found in the heading and glide slope. Before making a decision on altitude, the co pilot reported that the lights were visible, and the captain then shouted "land" and continued to use HUD as a reference for blind approach. When the radio altitude drops to around 100 feet, the aircraft's trajectory remains stable on the blind descent profile, with a left crossing angle maintained at around 3 degrees. However, at a radio altitude of 90 feet, the airspeed suddenly decreased from 150.5 knots to 142.5 knots, while the descent rate increased from 672 feet per minute to 736 feet per minute. Despite an increase in the position of the dual engine throttle lever, the aircraft was unable to successfully go around. As the radio altitude further decreased, the co pilot reminded to go around at an altitude of 64 feet, but the sound was too low and neither the captain nor the observer heard it. At the final moment before grounding, the heading deviation and left slope begin to increase sharply. Finally, the aircraft touched down at a distance of about 500 meters from the runway entrance and about 9 meters to the left of the runway centerline. After grounding, the crew attempted to correct it by fully steering to the right, but failed to stop the aircraft from drifting to the left. Only two seconds later, the left main wheel deviated from the runway at a distance of about 600 meters from the entrance end, and then completely deviated from the shoulder and entered the soil surface area at a distance of about 645 meters from the entrance end of the runway. 20: At 29:56, the left main wheel of the aircraft traveled about 220 meters in the soil area before returning to the shoulder of the road. Three seconds later, the ground speed reached 100.5 knots, and the left main wheel of the aircraft successfully returned to the runway. 20: At 30:01, when the ground speed decreased to 90 knots, the crew began using the reverse thrust device (by which time the aircraft had fully returned to the runway). 20: At 30:02, the automatic braking system is disengaged. 20: At 30:09, the ground speed further dropped to 63.5 knots, and the unit began to retract the thrust reverser. 20: At 30:28, when the ground speed decreased to 27.5 knots, the crew used the C fast lane to depart from the runway. 20: At 42:14, the aircraft slides into the designated parking position and the engine is turned off. At 21:01, the crew reported to the control tower: 'During landing, it seems that one side of runway 19 has been pressed against the edge light. Please check it.' At 21:02, runway 19 at Jinan Airport was discontinued, and the airport immediately began runway repair work. At 22:13, the runway was repaired and resumed normal use. This incident resulted in damage to four runway edge lights. During the period from the plane veering off the runway and damaging the edge lights to the runway being closed, a total of 5 planes landed and 9 planes took off. Fortunately, no damage or other consequences were caused to other aircraft. During the runway closure period, one aircraft chose to go around, eight aircraft diverted to other airports, and eight aircraft waited on the ground. 2.11.1 Detailed investigation of the aircraft: The outer edge of the left front wheel hub of the aircraft has obvious notches and severe damage, accompanied by glass debris at the wheel axle. Both the left outer and left inner main wheels suffered multiple punctures and falls, and the right outer main wheel also suffered punctures, but the degree of damage did not exceed the standard. The side wall of the right inner main wheel is cut, but it does not exceed the standard. After careful inspection, no signs of overheating caused by sliding friction were found on the left and right main wheels. In addition, multiple small scratches were found on the rear side of the main landing gear and the lower part of the left rear fuselage. There are 5 scratches of varying degrees on the leading edge of the left water surface. In terms of the body, there is a paint peeling and a damage on the second VHF antenna, which affects the normal use of the antenna. The junction box on the left main landing gear has also been found to have dents and requires further inspection and repair. It is worth noting that there are multiple areas of weeds on the exterior surface of the aircraft, including the left engine nacelle, the upper right thrust of the left engine, the left leading edge flaps, the left trailing edge flaps, and the left main landing gear. The amount of weeds in the left main wheel compartment is particularly severe, while no weeds were found in the right main wheel compartment. These details will provide important references for subsequent repair and maintenance work. 3.11.2 Detailed investigation of runway: There are obvious wheel marks left in the soil surface area outside the shoulder on the east side of runway 19. On the east side of the centerline of the runway, the contaminated area extends from 645 meters to 960 meters from the end of runway 19. A large amount of mud, grass, and broken edge lights have accumulated in this area. The track of the left main wheel of the aircraft starts from the landing area, extends to the east side of the runway, crosses the runway edge and shoulder, and finally enters the soil surface area. At a distance of about 600 meters from the entrance of runway 19 and 15 meters south of PB10 edge light, the left main wheel track of the aircraft intersects with the east edge of the runway, indicating that the aircraft has begun to deviate from the runway. When the aircraft reached a position about 865 meters from the entrance of runway 19, its left main wheel track broke away from the soil surface area and re entered the shoulder. At a distance of approximately 645 meters from the entrance of runway 19, the left main wheel of the aircraft once again entered the eastern soil surface area. Subsequently, at a distance of approximately 975 meters from the entrance of runway 19 and 30 meters south of PB16 edge light, the left main wheel track of the aircraft intersects with the east edge of the runway again and enters the runway area. After detailed measurement, the tire tread length in the soil surface area is about 220 meters, with the deepest tread depth reaching 12 centimeters and the farthest point being about 2.5 meters away from the edge of the east shoulder. The main wheelbase of the machine is 5.72 meters, and the shoulder width is 7.5 meters. Therefore, the right main wheel crossed the eastern edge of the runway during the taxiing process and entered the shoulder area. In addition, the spacing between runway edge lights is 60 meters, and the movement distance of the left main wheel of the aircraft outside the east edge of the runway is about 375 meters, resulting in the breakage of four runway edge lights.
The incident was caused by the crew's insufficient risk management capability in heavy rainy weather at night, insufficient preparation for approach and landing, and inadequate implementation of SOPs.
After the aircraft crossed the decision altitude, the captain mainly relied on the HUD instruction to control the flight, and did not resume the flight in time after losing the HUD instruction at 30 feet.
Below 30 feet, the captain's vision was not fully dispersed in time and he did not have a clear understanding of the aircraft's status, which resulted in the aircraft landing (1.55G) on the left side of the centreline of the runway by about 9 metres, with a left slip inertia.
Immediately after the touchdown, the captain was unable to stop the aircraft from veering left and the aircraft veered off the runway to the left, although he continued to make right full rudder corrections.
The investigation also found deficiencies in flight training and technical management, scheduling management and crew dispatch, policy dissemination and training.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
CAAC
Location
Images:
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 01-May-2024 08:18 | ASN | Added |
| 01-May-2024 08:20 | ASN | Updated [Location, ] |
| 01-May-2024 09:13 | blackbox | Updated [Date, ] |
| 02-May-2024 08:18 | Anon. | Updated [Location, ] |
| 15-Jun-2025 13:09 | Anon. | Updated [Location, Narrative, Photo, ] |
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