Date:	Sunday 12 May 2019
Time:	08:38 UTC
Type:	Boeing 737-86N (WL)
Owner/operator:	Jet2
Registration:	G-GDFS
MSN:	32243/869
Year of manufacture:	2001
Engine model:	CFMI CFM56-7B
Fatalities:	Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 192
Other fatalities:	0
Aircraft damage:	None
Category:	Serious incident
Location:	nr Reus -   Spain
Phase:	Approach
Nature:	Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:	Manchester International Airport (MAN/EGCC)
Destination airport:	Reus Airport (REU/LERS)
Investigating agency:	CIAIAC
Confidence Rating:	Accident investigation report completed and information captured

Narrative:
On Sunday, 12 May 2019, a Boeing 737-86N aircraft, registration G-GDFS, inbound from Manchester, was on approach to the Reus Airport. It had missed its previous landing maneuver and, at the time of the incident, it was on the outbound leg at 3800 ft in preparation to make a new ILS Y approach to runway 25. (The instrument approach chart published in the AIP states that the outbound leg should be flown descending from an altitude of 5000 ft to 3800 ft at DME mile 13 on the ILS. On the outbound leg, DME mile 13 on the ILS practically coincides with reporting point E).
The Diamond DA20-C1, registration EC-KMH, was preparing to enter the Reus Airport CTR via reporting point E. The visual approach chart published in the AIP states that arrivals via point E of the CTR must be made at a maximum altitude of 2000 ft; however, this aircraft had been instructed by the controller to maintain 3500 ft or higher due to
an aerobatic air show over Tarragona. At the time of the incident, the aircraft was flying at 3800 ft.

The controller in the Reus control tower was receiving on-the-job instruction and was being supervised by the instructor controller. The instructor controller decided to set up the control tower radar to show only the Reus ATZ airspace since the Unit Training Plan states that the approach control service provided is procedural.
Neither the controller under instruction nor the instructor was aware of the potential conflict. The flight paths of both aircraft converged and G-GDFS received a TCAS RA, as a result of which it executed an avoidance maneuver that cleared the conflict.
The minimum horizontal distance between the two aircraft was 0.6 NM, and the vertical distance 200 ft.
There were no injuries and the aircraft were not damaged.

The investigation has determined that this incident occurred because the controller under instruction and the instructor controller lost situational awareness of the traffic under their control.
The following factors contributed to the incident:
• Providing an inadequate clearance to the visual traffic EC-KMH, in terms of the altitude to maintain, as the lower clearance limit (3500 ft) conflicted with the ILS approach maneuver cleared to aircraft G–GDFS.
• Not using the surveillance radar.
• The placement of the strips in the holder, as well as the use of various fixes (runway, pattern, approach), differed from those normally used by the instructor controller.
• AESA’s assignment, in coordination with ENAIRE, of an area very close to the Reus Airport for exhibition flights.

METAR LERS 120830Z 25011KT 210V290 CAVOK 19/05 Q1024=

CIAIAC

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Date/time	Contributor	Updates
08-Jun-2024 17:35	ASN	Added