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| Date: | Thursday 15 September 2016 |
| Time: | |
| Type: |  Avro RJ100 |
| Owner/operator: | Swiss International Air Lines |
| Registration: | HB-IYW |
| MSN: | E3359 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1999 |
| Engine model: | Lycoming LF507-1 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 94 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | 2 nm E of Nürnberg Airport -
 Switzerland
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Nürnberg Airport (NUE/EDDN) |
| Zürich-Kloten Airport (ZRH/LSZH) | |
| Investigating agency: | STSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Swiss flight LX1191, an Avro RJ100, was in the initial climb after takeoff when the flight crew noticed an oily smell in the cockpit. They donned their oxygen masks and elected to continue to Zurich.
Analysis and conclusions
As an oily smell developed after turning on the APU bleed air and the air conditioning pack, the crew decided to turn the APU off again. In doing so, they acted in a safety-conscious manner and took precautions to prevent the cabin from being supplied with contaminated air. On the other hand, rapidly switching from PACK 1 to PACK 2 and immediately switching off the APU after the smell of oil developed left no time for a systematic investigation as to the source of the oily smell: from PACK 1, from PACK 2 or the APU.
The flight crew concluded that it was the bleed air from the APU and subsequently no longer used it. However, according to their statements they also had doubts with regards to PACK 1, which is why they decided to only use PACK 2 with engine bleed air for the flight to Zurich.
This decision was arguably based on their experience rather than a systematic analysis.
After the copilot detected the oily odour when activating the engine bleed air and PACK 2, the flight crew immediately put their oxygen masks on. This was a safety-conscious decision and appropriate for the situation. However, the subsequent decision to continue with the flight to Zurich under these conditions can be questioned, as the cockpit and cabin were both supplied with the same air from PACK 2. This decision must have also surprised air traffic control, as they asked twice whether the flight crew really wanted to continue with the flight to Zurich or declare an emergency. According to the flight crew’s statements they made this decision, among other reasons, in order to transport the passengers to Zurich in a timely manner and to guarantee their ability to make connecting flights.
The flight crew’s decision to continue with the flight to Zurich may well have been partly attributable to the fact that an increased number of similar situations had been registered in the AVRO fleet in the past – where an unidentifiable odour occurred during flight, but no cause for the smell could be found after landing. This can lead flight crews into underestimating the dangers of contaminated air.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
STSB
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 25 September 2024 | C-GZRJ | Summit Air | 0 | Yellowknife Airport, NT (YZF/CYZF) |  |
non |
| Runway excursion | ||||||
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 14-Jul-2024 18:01 | ASN | Added |
| 31-Oct-2024 07:47 | ASN | Updated [Operator, Total fatalities, Total occupants, Location, Phase, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Damage, Narrative, ] |
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