You can contribute by submitting additional or updated information.
| Date: | Friday 23 March 1979 |
| Time: | c. 17:25 LT |
| Type: |  McDonnell Douglas DC-9-51 |
| Owner/operator: | Swissair, opb Balair |
| Registration: | HB-IST |
| MSN: | 47662/850 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1977 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 127 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Zürich-Kloten Airport (ZRH/LSZH) -
 Switzerland
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi |
| Departure airport: | Zürich-Kloten Airport (ZRH/LSZH) |
| London-Gatwick Airport (LGW/EGKK) | |
| Investigating agency: | BFU Switz. |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
On Friday, March 23, 1979, at 5:25 PM GMT, the crew of the DC-9-51 HB-IST took off from runway 28 of Zurich Airport for a Balair charter flight (BB 180) to London Gatwick.
At approximately the intersection of taxiway N and runway 28, the commander suddenly spotted a large bird a few meters in front of the aircraft, at eye level. Since he had previously experienced a bird collision with engine damage, he decided: "If there's a bang, there's an aborted takeoff."
Immediately afterwards, the crew heard and felt an impact, whereupon the commander initiated the aborted takeoff, simultaneously with the co-pilot calling out "V1."
The immediate emergency braking with the wheel brakes, together with the thrust reverser, initially resulted in good deceleration. The co-pilot had – as instructed by the commander during the pre-takeoff briefing – adjusted the thrust reverser on both engines to 1.6 EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio).
During braking, the commander radioed the emergency call, prompting the copilot to briefly increase the reverse thrust. At an indicated speed of approximately 100 kt, he reduced it back to 1.6 EPR.
After passing the intersection with runway 16/34, the deceleration seemed to decrease, prompting the commander to request full reverse thrust. At approximately 2.0 EPR, the co-pilot noticed a banging noise from the engines, prompting him to gradually reduce the reverse thrust to approximately 1.4 EPR at the end of the runway.
Approximately 200 meters from the end of the runway, the commander realized that
the aircraft was about to overshoot the runway; the co-pilot also had the impression
that "there was no braking deceleration, so to speak" and therefore attempted to apply the brake pedals, which were already fully engaged.
The commander piloted HB-IST slightly to the right of the runway centerline to avoid a collision with the approach lights. At a speed estimated at 30-40 km/h, the aircraft overshot the end of the runway and came to a stop in the soft ground approximately 12 meters to the right of the runway centerline and 40 meters (aircraft nose) beyond the end of the runway (Appendix 1).
The incident occurred during daylight hours. No one was injured, and HB-IST remained undamaged. Only minor land damage occurred. Passengers were evacuated via the built-in rear passenger stairs.
Probable Cause:
Insufficient deceleration of the aircraft on the still wet runway due to insufficient utilization of the aircraft's braking capacity, especially the reverse thrust.
The lack of appropriate aircraft certification and the partial absence of appropriate operating instructions from the country of manufacture and the airline contributed to the occurrence of the incident.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
BFU Switzerland
https://www.airhistory.net/photo/259153/HB-IST (Photo)
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 15-Jul-2024 06:00 | ASN | Added |
| 19-Oct-2025 00:31 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Time, Operator, Total fatalities, Total occupants, Phase, Nature, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Damage, Narrative, Category, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:
| ASN Home | Send Correction / Feedback |
| FSF Home | Disclaimer | Copyright |
| Contact Us | Privacy Policy |
| Press / Media |
CONNECT WITH US:
©2025 Flight Safety Foundation