ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 41180
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| Date: | Saturday 5 March 1983 |
| Time: | 17:58 |
| Type: |  Douglas B-26C Invader |
| Owner/operator: | private |
| Registration: | N4060A |
| MSN: | 44-34102A |
| Total airframe hrs: | 1558 hours |
| Engine model: | P&W R-2800-79 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 1 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Hubbards Fork, KY -
 United States of America
|
| Phase: | Manoeuvring (airshow, firefighting, ag.ops.) |
| Nature: | Fire fighting |
| Departure airport: | Ashville, NC |
| Investigating agency: | NTSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The Douglas B-26 airtanker was dispatched from Asheville, North Carolina at 17:15 EST and arrived on scene at approximately 17:45 EST. The airtanker pilot contacted the Forest Service leadplane who was circling overhead, coordinating firefighting efforts. The airtanker orbited at 3,000 to 3,500 feet mean sea level (MSL) while the leadplane made a dry run on the fire to evaluate the conditions, type of drop to be made, and to identify any safety hazards. The two pilots discussed the fire situation and behavior characteristics and decided what strategy would be used on the retardant drops.
The airtanker’s first retardant drop on this fire was made utilizing two doors in trail configuration and was completed without incident. The second pass was again made in standard airtanker-leadplane configuration (leadplane in front) with a two-door trail drop. According to the leadplane pilot, their strategy had been to save the last two available doors for any hot spots or blowups that might occur on the fire. After the second retardant drop, the airtanker initiated a very wide left hand pattern approximately one and one half miles behind the leadplane.
As the airtanker was flying the left hand pattern, he and the leadplane pilot discussed strategy to be used on the final drop. The airtanker was then about one mile ahead of the leadplane and was flying at minimum terrain clearance level. The wind shifted, the “blown-up” area of the fire was visible, and the fire-line became obvious to both pilots. The last run was to be completed without following the leadplane. The airtanker pilot commented to the leadplane pilot, “Well, I can see it real good from here and I think I can hit it from a left hand turn.” The leadplane pilot assumed the airtanker was gong to make a dry run in order to get a better look at the fire before making the last drop.
Just after the airtanker had leveled his wings from the turn, the leadplane pilot observed what appeared to be pieces of metal coming loose from the airtanker as it impacted tree tops on the ridgeline. After initial impact with the trees, the airtanker continued down a hill approximately 1,600 feet to the final impact area.
The pilot was fatally injured.
Witnesses on the ground reported the airtanker had struck trees near the top of a 1,800-foot ridgeline and plummeted into a ravine 1,600 feet from the initial impact point. They also reported about how low the aircraft had been at the beginning of the run and that the engines were running smoothly and even increased in power just prior to the time of impact.
The investigation team concluded that the mishap of the airtanker was due to an undetermined cause.
After careful review of the facts and circumstances of this mishap, they had two hypotheses.
Hypothesis A: The pilot allowed the aircraft to descend below the authorized drop height of 150 feet, thereby placing the aircraft in a position of insufficient height above the ground, consequently disallowing sufficient altitude to safely maneuver the airtanker.
Hypothesis B: The pilot encountered a wind shear effect or similar phenomenon and could not control the airtanker sink rate or didn’t notice anything unusual until it was too late to recover and lost control of the aircraft. The team was unable to verify the existence or nonexistence of a wind shear phenomenon.
Sources:
NTSB: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001214X42326
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2840945_United_States_Department_of_Agriculture_Forest_Service
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 24-Oct-2008 10:30 | ASN archive | Added |
| 21-Dec-2016 19:23 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency] |
| 27-Jul-2023 12:34 | harro | Updated [[Time, Damage, Category, Investigating agency]] |
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