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| Date: | Wednesday 1 March 2023 |
| Time: | |
| Type: |  General Atomics MQ-9A Reaper |
| Owner/operator: | USAF |
| Registration: | 13-4230 |
| MSN: | |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | within Africa -
 Unknown country
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Military |
| Departure airport: | |
| Investigating agency: | USAF AIB |
On 01 March 2023, an unmanned MQ-9A, tail number (T/N) 13-4230, experienced a system malfunction during a manually piloted landing attempt resulting in collision with terrain in the United States Africa Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). The mishap aircraft (MA) was operated in the AOR by the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) comprised of the mishap pilot (MP) and the mishap sensor operator. The mishap resulted in no reported damage to civilian property, no injuries, and no fatalities. The loss of government property was valued at $16,711,554.
Prior to the sequence of events leading up to the mishap, the MA had completed an uneventful mission under the control of the Mission Control Element (MCE) with all systems normal. Transfer of control to the LRE for normal recovery and landing was uneventful. The LRE navigated the MA to the airfield traffic pattern, attempted an automatic landing, which was aborted for a known altitude error at this airfield, and reentered the traffic pattern for a normal, manually piloted approach and landing. As the MA initiated a descending right turn from base leg to final, engine indications on the Head-Up-Display (HUD) stagnated and a warning was displayed indicating that the electrical engine control system had transitioned to backup mode. The MA airspeed and altitude decreased significantly as the MA descent rate rapidly increased. While assessing the situation, the MP slowly increased throttle command while continuing the final turn. Thirty seconds passed from initial failure indications to full throttle command and subsequent, near-simultaneous impact with terrain well short of the runway threshold occurred.
The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board President (AAIB BP) found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the cause of the mishap was the ill-timed electrical short in the primary communications bus caused by pre-existing cable connection damage coupled with the MP’s delay in executing an immediate stall recovery, wings level, with maximum power. Further, the AAIB BP found, by a preponderance of the evidence that the following three factors substantially
contributed to the mishap: 1) maintenance technical orders and procedures did not appear to require routine inspection and/or replacement of this particular cable connector; 2) training and procedures regarding the implications of the electrical engine control system backup mode, particularly at low altitude, were insufficient; and 3) training in appropriate stall recovery procedures, primarily while in manual flight mode, was lacking.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
USAF
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 30-Aug-2024 09:55 | ASN | Added |
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