Airprox Serious incident Cessna 525B Citation CJ3 D-CJAK, Thursday 14 September 2006
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Date:Thursday 14 September 2006
Time:00:05
Type:Silhouette image of generic C25B model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Cessna 525B Citation CJ3
Owner/operator:MAP Executive Flight Service
Registration: D-CJAK
MSN: 525B-0075
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants:
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Serious incident
Location:5 nm from Warsaw -   Poland
Phase: Approach
Nature:Unknown
Departure airport:Genève-Cointrin Airport (GVA/LSGG)
Destination airport:Warszawa-Frédéric Chopin Airport (WAW/EPWA)
Investigating agency: SCAAI
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
White Eagle Aviation flight WEA931, an Antonov An-26 (HA-TCS) and a Cessna 525B Citation CJ3 (D-CJAK) were involved in a serious airprox incident in TMA Warsaw.

On 14/15 September 2006, arrivals flown to runway 11. Take-offs were made from runway 29. Runway 15/33 was closed due to repairs.
The Antonov An-26 (HA-TCS) took off from runway 29, bound for Bydgoszcz (EPBY). After takeoff the aircraft was supposed to turn right to a heading of 330 deg and climb to FL 120.
After approximately 2,25 NM it began a turn to the right to heading 330 deg, as cleared and ordered by EPWA TWR (TWR ATC), and after the following instruction, to a heading of 360 degrees. After the takeoff, the aircraft maintained radio contact with TWR ATC.
On a runway 11 landing direction (i.e. opposite to the AN-26 aircraft taking off) the Cessna 525B aircraft flying from Geneva-Cointrin (LSGG) was coming to land at EPWA. The Cessna aircraft was cleared to land by EPWA APP ATC according to ILS 11 and to descend to 2500 ft without reducing flight speed. APP ATC, as a result of the An-26 not having turned to heading 330 deg immediately after takeoff, which extended it takeoff time on the runway course after takeoff from runway 29, cancelled the Cessna's approach clearance and instructed it to turn left to heading 360 degrees. The Cessna aircraft maintained radio contact with APP ATC, whereas the An-26 aircraft maintained contact with TWR ATC. After carrying out manoeuvres ordered by controllers, both aircraft's passed each other with the smallest altitude difference, approximately 100 ft and horizontal separation equalling zero, about 5 NM from the airport.

Cause of occurrence:
(1) Wrong coordination between TWR and APP controllers of clearing the AN-26 for t/o and the Cessna for approach from the same rwy in the opposite direction without maintaining time separation provided for in the regulations.
(2) ATC TWR cleared the AN-26 for taxiing with the intention to clear it for t/o from the shortened rwy 29 without discussing it with the crew of the a/c.
(3) Wrong evaluation by TWR of the traffic and the possibility of non-conflicted departure of the AN-26 after it taxied to the threshold of rwy 29.
(4) Controlling two a/c located next to each other by two different aerodrome traffic services at different frequencies, i.e. the AN-26 at TWR radio frequency and the Cessna at APP radio frequency.
(5) The lack of correction by APP of flight speed of the Cessna by APP in order to maintain safe separation from the AN-26.
(6) Wrong resolution of conflict situation between the AN-26 and the Cessna by APP consisting of making them zerform turns to the same heading 260 deg without keeping proper separations.
(7) The lack of cooperation between TWR and APP controllers consisting of:
- the lack of transferring information about the delay in the t/o of the AN-26;
- inaccurate transfer of information about the position of AN-26 on the rwy during t/o by ATC TWR;
- the lack of transferring of the information about the Cessna maintaining high speed;
- Introduction tense atmosphere by ATC APP by means of violent and vulgar words instead of constructive actions and information so as to solve the conflict.
(8) The lack of training or brief training fo TWR and APP in restoring safety (after reducing separation) in air traffic.
(9) TWR and APP controllers did not have vocational (refreshing) training on "special and dangerous situations" within time limits provided for by internal regulations.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: SCAAI
Report number: 6X014-0/06
Status: Investigation completed
Duration:
Download report: Final report

Sources:

PKBWL

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
19-Sep-2024 19:33 ASN Added
19-Sep-2024 20:00 ASN Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Operator, Location, Phase, Nature, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative, Accident report, ]
20-Sep-2024 05:44 ASN Updated [Location, Narrative, ]

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