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| Date: | Monday 19 May 2003 |
| Time: | 15:22 LT |
| Type: |  Bombardier CRJ-701ER |
| Owner/operator: | Lufthansa CityLine |
| Registration: | D-ACPE |
| MSN: | 10027 |
| Engine model: | GE CF34-8C5 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Incident |
| Location: | 16 nm ENE of Friedrichshafen -
 Germany
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | München-Franz Josef Strauss Airport (MUC/EDDM) |
| Marseille-Provence Airport (MRS/LFML) | |
| Investigating agency: | STSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Lufthansa CityLine flight LH5746, a CRJ-701ER (D-ACPE) and Lufthansa CityLine flight LH5856, a CRJ-10LR (D-ACLJ) were involved in an airprox incident near Friedrichshafen, Germany.
The two Lufthansa aircraft took off one shortly after the other: LH5856 at 13:04 on a scheduled flight to Madrid and LH5746 a little later, destination Marseilles.
After several course corrections, the crew of DHL5856 was instructed by Munich radar to climb to FL270 and one minute later there followed a request to fly direct to waypoint NEGRA. When asked by the air traffic controller (ATCO) about the current rate of climb, the commander (CMD), who was acting as pilot not flying, replied that their aircraft was climbing at 1000 ft/min at that moment. The ATCO instructed him to maintain this rate of climb until
reaching FL270.
The crew of LH5746 was instructed by the ATCO to climb to FL260 at a rate of climb of 1000 ft/min or less and also to fly direct to waypoint NEGRA.
A short time later, LH5856 received clearance from Munich Radar to continue climbing to FL280 on condition that it reached this altitude 10 NM before flying over waypoint NEGRA.
At 13:19:09, LH5746 was requested to switch to Swiss Radar frequency 133.050 MHz. At this time the aircraft was just about to fly over beacon Kempton (KPT DVOR/DME) and was passing FL240 in a climb.
Approximately one minute later, LH5856, which was just passing FL270 in a climb, was also instructed by Munich radar to contact Swiss Radar on frequency 133.050 MHz.
At 13:19:21 the CMD of LH5746 acting as PNF, made contact with the Radar Executive Sector Upper 1 (RE-U1) in Zurich and informed the latter that they were climbing to FL260, heading direction NEGRA. After the crew had set transponder code 7514 for identification, the RE instructed them to fly via route NEGRA – TRA – BENOT. The ATCO also asked the CMD what was its requested cruising altitude (confirm requested level?). The latter answered FL320 (requested level is er…320, LH5746), on which the RE informed him that FL320 was a non-standard flight level and offered him FL310 or FL330 (okay, that’s non-standard, 31 or -33?). The CMD decided on FL330. To the ATCO’s question as to whether he would also be able to accept a higher FL, the CMD answered in the affirmative.
On completing this radio conversation, the CMD of LH5856 made contact for the first time with RE-U1 and informed him that they were just reaching FL280. The ATCO assigned transponder code 2756 to the aircraft and asked the CMD for the requested cruising level.
The latter answered FL310 and at the same time he informed the RE that they were not able to climb higher than FL310.
At 13:22:22, the CMD of LH5856 made contact again and informed the RE that another aircraft was climbing through their flight level: “we have one climbing through our level at one mile to our left”.
This aircraft was LH5746, which at that time was 1.6 NM to the left of LH 5856 and was climbing through its flight level.
CAUSE
The incident is attributable to the fact that the flight crew of DLH5746, because of the incorrect application of radiocommunication rules (issuing and confirming of instructions), interpreted the desired cruising altitude about which the air traffic controller had enquired as clearance for this level and as a result wanted to continue climbing to FL330 instead of climbing to FL260 as instructed.
Reciprocal surveillance (closed loop) was unable to prevent the incident, because both crew members made this mistake.
The following factors contributed to this:
• the communication (closed loop) on the occasion of the clearance presumed to have been received and its entry into the Flight Control Panel by the FO of DLH5746 took place only in the form of a “nod of the head” by the CMD; this does not correspond to the model of communication currently customary in a multi-person crew,
• during their climb, the flight crew of DLH5746 failed to observe the other air traffic in their immediate vicinity on the TCAS. Such an observation would have enabled them to detect the impending separation violation in good time,
• the air traffic controllers had not noticed either the visual or the acoustic STCA alert.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
BFU 5X003-1/03
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 7 December 2007 | D-ACPE | Lufthansa Regional, opb Lufthansa CityLine | 0 | Göteborg-Landvetter Airport (GOT/ESGG) |  |
non |
| Runway incursion with a/c (no oollision) | ||||||
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 23-Sep-2024 08:15 | ASN | Added |
| 01-Mar-2025 16:46 | ASN | Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Operator, Location, Phase, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative, Accident report, ] |
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