Accident General Atomics MQ-9A Reaper 13-4231, Sunday 11 February 2024
ASN logo
 

Date:Sunday 11 February 2024
Time:
Type:Silhouette image of generic Q9 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
General Atomics MQ-9A Reaper
Owner/operator:USAF
Registration: 13-4231
MSN:
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Destroyed
Category:Accident
Location:Africa -   Unknown country
Phase: Initial climb
Nature:Military
Departure airport:
Destination airport:
Investigating agency: USAF AIB
Narrative:
On 11 February 2024, at approximately 20:32 Zulu time (Zulu), an MQ-9A Reaper, tail number 13-4231 assigned to the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada impacted the ground just beyond the departure end of the runway in an undisclosed location within the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The Mishap Aircraft (MA) was operated by the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) mishap crew (MC) comprised of the mishap pilot (MP) and the mishap sensor operator (MSO) deployed with the 12th Expeditionary Special Operation Squadron (12 ESOS) assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). The mishap resulted in no damage to civilian property, no injuries, and no fatalities.
The MA was destroyed upon impact; the loss of government property was valued at $25,840,037.00.

When launching the MA, the MC employed the Automatic Takeoff and Landing Capability (ATLC) to takeoff under automated control. To begin the takeoff, the MP engaged the ATLC function. The ATLC engaged successfully, commanding engine power to 100%, and the MA began the takeoff roll. The MC did not complete or communicate the next step of the TAKEOFF checklist, “22. [ATLC] Throttle – 100% (P),” which directed the pilot to set the throttle control to 100% to match the power setting commanded by the ATLC. The MP throttle control remained set at 0%. When climbing after takeoff, the MP turned off ATLC via the Head-Down Display (HDD), taking manual control of the aircraft. This action resulted in the engine power reducing to 0%, matching the manually set throttle power level command. The MA initially continued to climb and decelerate and then it began to descend. The MA impacted the ground 23 seconds after the MP turned off the ATLC. One second before impact, the MP increased the throttle command to 100%, too late for the engine to increase power. The MA impacted the ground just past the departure end of the runway.

The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President (BP) found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the causes of the mishap were: (1) the MP failed to comply with the takeoff checklist guidance to move the throttle control to 100% after initiating an ATLC takeoff, causing thrust to decrease to flight idle at the transition from ATLC to manual control; and (2) the MP failed to accurately analyze the cause of the MA deceleration in time, and subsequently increased the throttle control too late to recover from a low altitude thrust-deficient descent, resulting in the aircraft impacting the ground. The BP found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following two factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (1) ineffective crew resource management and (2) low ATLC disengagement altitude.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: USAF AIB
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration:
Download report: Final report

Sources:

USAF
Https://www.podbean.com/ea/dir-4ee43-22bf166e

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
11-Jan-2025 15:59 Aerossurance Updated [Source, ]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:

CONNECT WITH US: FSF on social media FSF Facebook FSF Twitter FSF Youtube FSF LinkedIn FSF Instagram

©2025 Flight Safety Foundation

1920 Ballenger Av, 4th Fl.
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
www.FlightSafety.org