Incident Boeing 767-3JHFER (WL) VH-EXZ, Saturday 27 July 2019
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Date:Saturday 27 July 2019
Time:11:56
Type:Silhouette image of generic B763 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Boeing 767-3JHFER (WL)
Owner/operator:DHL Aviation, opb Tasman Cargo Airlines
Registration: VH-EXZ
MSN: 37808/1036
Year of manufacture:2012
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Incident
Location:Auckland International Airport (AKL/NZAA) -   New Zealand
Phase: Taxi
Nature:Cargo
Departure airport:Auckland International Airport (AKL/NZAA)
Destination airport:Sydney-Kingsford Smith International Airport, NSW (SYD/YSSY)
Investigating agency: ATSB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
While the Boeing 767, VH-EXZ, was taxiing for departure from Auckland an imbalance in the fuel load between the left and right main tanks developed while the centre tank was providing fuel to both engines. That imbalance triggered the FUEL CONFIG advisory alert message. In response, the flight crew considered whether there was a fuel leak and, having determined this was not the case, decided to depart and correct the out‑of‑balance condition airborne.

Once airborne, the flight crew delayed the procedure to rebalance the fuel until the centre tank fuel had been depleted. As a result, the fuel imbalance increased to 2.6 t, a weight difference in excess of the fuel imbalance limitation published in the operator’s policy and procedures manual. On arrival at Sydney, the flight crew verbally notified the maintenance personnel of the imbalance but did not enter it into the technical log. The return flight was not loaded with centre tank fuel. The operator’s maintenance organisation did not become aware of the fuel imbalance issue until about 3 days after the occurrence.

What the ATSB found:
The ATSB found that the fuel imbalance was the result of abnormal fuel system behaviour, due to a fault within the fuel system, which resulted in fuel being fed into the right main tank from the centre tank. As the imbalance occurred before take‑off, a procedure within the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) required the flight crew to action the relevant non-normal checklist and if discontinuation of the flight was not required, then consult the MEL to determine whether maintenance action was required.

Application of the MEL would have required the aircraft to return for maintenance action.

The flight crew had differing knowledge of the MEL requirements however, they shared a common belief that the risk was low enough for the flight to proceed. Consequently, having consulted only the non‑normal checklist, the aircraft departed Auckland.

Airborne, the flight crew identified that the abnormal fuel system operation was the result of fuel being pumped into the right main tank. Additionally, the flight crew continued to monitor for a fuel leak and noted that the aircraft’s handling did not appear to be affected by the imbalance. Further, as fuel system guidance and the low priority of the FUEL CONFIG advisory alert message indicated minimal risk from a fuel imbalance condition, the flight crew chose to delay rebalancing. Consequently, the flight crew did not determine whether there was full access to the remaining fuel until they had recommenced the FUEL CONFIG non-normal procedure.

The fuel system unserviceability was verbally notified to engineering, however, contrary to the requirements of the operator's policy and procedures manual, it was not entered into the technical fault log. This delayed maintenance corrective action, and likely hampered determination of the cause of the imbalance.

What has been done as a result:
The aircraft’s operator advised the ATSB that an amendment to the MEL has been drafted to include clarification as to crew actions in the event of an Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) message between off‑blocks and take-off. This amendment will be situated in the early part of the MEL Introduction section.

The operator has also stated that it will alert flight crew to the procedural requirement through notification of the MEL amendment.

Safety message:
This occurrence highlights the value of flight crews being fully conversant with operating procedures, particularly those related to aircraft unserviceability. Those procedures are critical to the safety of flight operations.

It is also important that any unserviceability is recorded in the aircraft’s technical log to ensure that it is addressed and to provide future reference in case of further, or related, instances.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: ATSB
Report number: AO-2019-053
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 9 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/5779584/ao-2019-053-final.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/info/767-37808

https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/9609941 (Photo)

Location

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
02-Feb-2025 08:48 Justanormalperson Added

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