Incident Boeing 737-8H4 (WL) N8517F, Tuesday 25 February 2025
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Date:Tuesday 25 February 2025
Time:08:48
Type:Silhouette image of generic B738 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Boeing 737-8H4 (WL)
Owner/operator:Southwest Airlines
Registration: N8517F
MSN: 63594/6207
Year of manufacture:2016
Engine model:CFMI CFM56-7B
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 142
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Incident
Location:Chicago-Midway Airport (MDW/KMDW), Chicago, IL -   United States of America
Phase: Landing
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Omaha-Eppley Airfield, NE (OMA/KOMA)
Destination airport:Chicago-Midway Airport, IL (MDW/KMDW)
Investigating agency: NTSB
Confidence Rating: Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities
Narrative:
On February 25, 2025, about 0848 central standard time (CST), Flexjet flight 560 (LXJ 560), a Bombardier Challenger 350 CL-35, registration N560FX and Southwest Airlines flight 2504 (SWA2504), a Boeing 737-800, registration N8517F, were involved in a runway incursion that resulted in SWA2504 performing a go-around at Chicago Midway International Airport (MDW), Chicago, Illinois.

SWA2504 initiated the go-around while LXJ560 was crossing runway 31C. As LXJ560 cleared the active runway, SWA2504 passed less than 200 ft behind it. SWA2504 subsequently made an uneventful landing a few minutes later. There was no damage to the involved airplanes and none of the 142 occupants aboard the SWA airplane and none of the 3 occupants on the Flexjet airplane were injured. LXJ560 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91K as a flight from MDW to Tyson McGhee Airport (TYS), Alcoa, Tennessee. SWA2504 was operating under Title 14 CFR Part 121 as a regularly scheduled domestic passenger flight from Eppley Airfield (OMA), Omaha, Nebraska to MDW.

According to post incident statements and interviews, the flight crew of SWA2504 reported that they were cleared by approach control for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 31C at MDW in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). Throughout the approach, the captain was the pilot flying (PF) and the first officer (FO) was the pilot monitoring (PM). The crew indicated that they contacted the MDW tower at RUNTS and received a clearance to land on runway 31C. The approach was uneventful, and the autopilot remained engaged until approximately 500 ft AGL. As they continued the approach, both the captain and FO visually surveyed the airport and noted seeing a general aviation (GA) aircraft taxiing on a surface perpendicular to their runway and assumed it would be holding short of runway 31C.

The FO indicated that after hearing the aircraft audible 100 ft call, he realized that the GA aircraft was not stopping and was going to cross onto runway 31C. The FO stated that he called for a go-around and the captain executed it. The flight crew indicted that standard go-around procedures were applied, and the maneuver was executed smoothly and without incident.

According to post incident statements, the flight crew of LXJ560 indicated that their flight was scheduled to depart MDW at 8:46 am local time. Before departure, they stated that they completed all of their pre-flight duties, embarked a passenger, started their engines and had completed all of the pertinent checklists.

They indicated that they called MDW ground control and asked for taxi instructions from the signature ramp at “whiskey”, however, the crew stated the response they received did not make sense to them. They were initially given a clearance to taxi to runway 22L via F taxiway and to hold short of 4L. After the flight crew requested ground control to clarify the taxi instructions, they were given a new taxi route of taxiway A to taxiway F with a hold short of runway 04L/22R. When they were on Taxiway F, ground control instructed them to turn left onto runway 04L, cross runway 31L and then hold short of runway 31C. The flight crew initially read back the instructions incorrectly; however, the ground controller immediately reissued the instructions and received a correct readback.

According to postincident statements, the flight crew of LXJ560 indicated that as they turned left onto runway 4L/22R, the sun was impeding visibility from the right side of the aircraft, however they did not recall seeing any hold short line/pavement markings or any other signs for the 31L intersection as they taxied onto runway 04L/22R. They stated that taxiway F and runway 13R/31L were in close proximity to each other and by the time the nosewheel had straightened out, they were likely halfway across runway 13R/31L. They further stated that runway 13R/31L appeared to have a very similar width to taxiways and that they had not recognized it as a runway. The captain stated that as he approached runway 13C/31C he had thought it was runway 13R/31L. As they approached the runway intersection the crew stated they both looked to the left and to the right and did not observe the SWA airplane on final.

As LXJ560 approached the hold short line for runway 31C the ground controller instructed LXJ560 to hold short, but the transmission was not acknowledged.

As they were crossing/exiting runway 13C/31C, they were contacted by ground informing them to hold position. The captain continued to clear the runway intersection and subsequently stopped the airplane so the tail was not over any part of the runway. Ground control requested they taxi forward to clear the runway safety area and then hold short of taxiway “H.” Once the captain cleared the runway safety area, he stopped the airplane and ground control informed them that they had crossed 31C and provided a number to call for a possible pilot deviation.

After about 5 minutes the crew was issued taxi instructions to continue on runway 4L/22R, turn left on taxiway “N” to “N2,” and hold in the north triangle. The captain once in the triangle set the parking brake, transferred control to the first officer, and contacted the tower via the phone number provided. He subsequently contacted the operator to notify them of the possible pilot deviation, assessed their well being to continue the flight, and subsequently departed about 25 minutes after the runway incursion. The rest of their flight was uneventful.

The SWA flight data recorder (FDR) and data from the Flexjet FDR were sent to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC, for analysis. The cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) from both airplanes were overwritten.

Certified ADS-B data and audio recordings were provided to the NTSB by the FAA. In addition, photos were provided by Midway Airport Operations of the runway environment showing the runway signs (vertical white-on-red signs erected on either side of the runway hold short position markings) and the hold short line for runway 13C/31C.

The weather at the time of the incursion was winds from the northwest at 8 kts, better than 10 statute miles of visibility and clear skies. In addition, the sun was 22.4° above the horizon and from the intersection of runway 4L/22R and runway 13C/31C it was on an azimuth of 126°.

The NTSB’s investigation is ongoing.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: NTSB
Report number: 
Status: Preliminary report
Duration:
Download report: Preliminary report

Sources:

NTSB DCA25LA141

https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/wn2504#39423039
https://globe.adsbexchange.com/?icao=abae62&lat=41.788&lon=-87.757&zoom=15.7&showTrace=2025-02-25&trackLabels
https://globe.adsbexchange.com/?icao=a7277d,abae62&lat=41.785&lon=-87.752&zoom=17.1&showTrace=2025-02-25&trackLabels×tamp=1740496445

Location

Media:

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
25-Feb-2025 18:19 ASN Added
25-Feb-2025 18:28 ASN Updated [Source, Embed code, Narrative, ]
25-Feb-2025 19:03 Captain Adam Updated [Time, Location, Narrative, Category, ]
26-Feb-2025 06:17 The Navigator Updated [Source, Embed code, ]
18-Mar-2025 20:18 Captain Adam Updated [Time, Total occupants, Source, Narrative, Accident report, ]

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