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| Date: | Monday 23 December 2002 |
| Time: | 00:30 |
| Type: |  Boeing 737-81Q |
| Owner/operator: | Excel Airways |
| Registration: | G-XLAD |
| MSN: | 29052/557 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2000 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-7B |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 8 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Location: | Near London-Gatwick Airport (LGW/EGKK) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Ferry/positioning |
| Departure airport: | Brussel-Zaventem Airport (BRU/EBBR) |
| London-Gatwick Airport (LGW/EGKK) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The flight during which this incident occurred was the last in a series of flights that originated in Manchester on 20 December 2002. On that day the crew had reported for duty at 1855 hrs for a return flight to Tenerife-South. The allocated aircraft, G-XLAD, had just been returned to service after engineering work to investigate an airframe vibration experienced during the previous flight. An inspection had revealed no faults and the aircraft's flight from Manchester was uneventful until the descent into Tenerife. When descending through about FL150 a smell of burning plastic had become apparent on the flight deck. No immediate cause could be found and the crew requested a priority landing at Tenerife-South, which was by now about 30 nm away. The commander decided that the situation did not warrant a distress call. When established on the final approach at about 12 nm, in VMC, the data on the Commander's Primary Flight Display (PFD) became intermittent, shortly followed by that on the First Officer's (FO) and the standby PFDs. The autopilot then disengaged without the aural disconnect warning sounding. The FO, who was the handling pilot for the sector, continued to fly manually for an otherwise uneventful landing.
After shutdown on the allocated stand the Commander checked the electronics and equipment bay for signs of burning, but could find none. He reported the matter to his company who dispatched their own engineer since there was no appropriate engineering support at the airport. The engineer arrived at Tenerife-South on the evening of 21 December 2002. He commenced work on the aircraft the following morning but could find no signs of burning or any obvious cause of the problems encountered during the previous flight. However, during inspection of the recorded in-flight faults it was indicated that both navigation multi-mode receivers had tripped out on the previous approach,
which he thought might have accounted for the loss of ILS information on the PFDs. As he could find no existing faults the engineer cleared the aircraft for flight, believing that it would be positioning empty back to Manchester. On this basis he agreed with the Commander that after departure they should conduct a visual approach back into Tenerife to ensure that the ILS was working properly prior to the onward flight.
However, just before departure the company instructed the Commander to position the aircraft to Las Palmas where a sub-charter had been arranged for 76 passengers to be flown to Brussels. The aircraft left Tenerife-South at 1500 hrs on the afternoon of 22 December 2002 and, after a short and uneventful flight, carried out a successful ILS approach and landing at Las Palmas. After boarding the passengers the aircraft departed for Brussels at 1630 hrs. The flight was uneventful until the burning smell previously encountered on the flight deck became apparent briefly whilst descending through about FL120. There were no other problems indicated and after landing it was agreed with the company that the aircraft should be flown to Gatwick, the company's main engineering base, for further investigation.
The aircraft then departed Brussels at 2300 hrs with only the crew and the engineer on board.
When established in the cruise at FL240 both pilots and the engineer became aware of the aircraft repeatedly yawing gently to one side and then returning quickly to a normal attitude. Descriptions differed between the crew as to the duration of each event, varying from 20 seconds to two minutes.
Their description of how often the events occurred also varied, ranging from continuous to once every four minutes. The Commander recalls the indications during each disturbance in the cruise showing a slip to the right requiring about 2.5 units of right aileron to keep the aircraft straight. There was no asymmetric power and the yaw damper indicator showed a central position. The rudder trim was slightly displaced to the left, which was not considered unusual for this phase of flight. On attempting to apply right rudder the Commander found that his rudder pedals could not be moved, although between each disturbance the pedals could be moved again normally. The pilots and engineer checked the flight deck for any abnormal switch selections or popped circuit breakers but could find none. The engineer then went to the rear of the passenger cabin where he turned to look forward towards the flight deck. He described the aircraft seeming to drift to the right before kicking back abruptly to the left. The kick was pronounced but was such that he was able to stand without support. These deviations, each of which lasted for about 20 seconds, continued throughout the few minutes that the engineer remained in the cabin and were consistent in their direction. He reported this to the Commander who, convinced of the seriousness of the situation, briefed the purser for a possible emergency landing.
The aircraft commenced its descent for Gatwick during which the divergences seemed to be more pronounced. As a result of this, and whilst on a closing heading for the localiser at FL080, the crew transmitted a PAN call to Gatwick approach advising they had problems with the rudder. The Commander described the divergences at this point showing the slip indicator displaced just over half way with the aircraft yawing to the left through about 20°. Gatwick approach acknowledged the PAN call and shortly afterwards asked the aircraft to slow to 230 kt. The commander reported that at this stage he disconnected both the autopilot and auto thrust since the divergences were now more extreme, however, he decided to leave the YAW DAMPER engaged since it appeared to be behaving normally. The non-normal checklist for Uncommanded YAW OR ROLL requires that the autopilot and autothrottle be disengaged (if engaged) and verification that symmetric thrust is applied; the YAW DAMPER should then have been selected to OFF. ATC cleared the aircraft to descend to 3,000 feet where the Commander recalls at one point having to apply 5 units of left aileron to keep it tracking straight. The aircraft was then established on the ILS with the intention of completing a flap 25 landing, in VMC, with a surface wind reported as light. When passing 300 feet AGL the Commander reported that the aircraft progressively yawed left, to the extent that the slip indictor was displaced three-quarters to the right and full right aileron was required to keep the aircraft straight. As on the other occasions his rudder pedals could not be moved despite him now applying full force to the right pedal. Simultaneously with the automated 30 foot radio altimeter call the uncontrolled divergences suddenly stopped. However, the extreme control inputs necessary to control the aircraft up to this point could not be corrected quickly enough to prevent the aircraft yawing and rolling to the right.
The crew reported that the aircraft landed about 30° off the runway track touching down first on its right main gear. The Commander attempted to regain the centre line by use of the rudder, but although he could now move the pedals they appeared to be ineffective. He therefore used the nose wheel steering to control the aircraft. The aircraft cleared the runway and was brought to a halt on the taxiway whilst the crew spoke to the fire service, on their discrete frequency of 121.6 MHz, to confirm their services would not be required. The commander then taxied the aircraft to the allocated parking stand during which time he attempted to move his rudder pedals again, only to find that they would not move. When finally parked and with the engines still running he tried once more and this time found they had become free again. After shutdown an engineer from the maintenance organisation used by the Company was briefed on the control problems that had been encountered.
Accident investigation:
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|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422ed05e5274a1317000161/dft_avsafety_pdf_028722.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/76586 (Photo)
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 08-Mar-2025 16:44 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 08-Mar-2025 16:45 | ASN | Updated [Narrative, Accident report, ] |
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