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| Date: | Tuesday 11 October 2022 |
| Time: | |
| Type: |  Saab 340B |
| Owner/operator: | EZ Air |
| Registration: | N417XJ |
| MSN: | 340B-417 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 38 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor, repaired |
| Category: | Incident |
| Location: | Bonaire-Flamingo International Airport (BON/TNCB) -
 Caribbean Netherlands
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Curaçao-Hato International Airport (CUR/TNCC) |
| Bonaire-Flamingo International Airport (BON/TNCB) | |
| Investigating agency: | CCAA Curaçao |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
EZ Air flight 7Z571, a Saab 340B, landed with an aft CofG at Bonaire-Flamingo International Airport (BON).
The aircraft, with 38 occupants, was flying from Curaçao International Airport (TNCC) to Bonaire International Airport (TNCB). Just before departure, extra baggage was loaded into the hold that was not included in the aircraft’s weight and balance calculation. After touchdown, the nose of the aircraft would not lower; the pilot then braked hard to get the nose on the ground after all. Once the aircraft has come to a standstill on the apron, the thermal fuses of the tyres melted due to overheating of the brakes, after which the tyres deflated.
Analysis showed that the aircraft had had its centre of gravity located aft, just at the edge of the flight envelope. When
landing at or near the aft centre of gravity limit, no upward movement of the aircraft’s nose is introduced. A simulation showed that when the Beta range is selected with the throttle levers before the nose wheel is on the ground, the nose of the aircraft will pitch up aggressively. This movement requires that the yoke be pushed forward forcefully together with prompt forward power application so as to lower the pitch attitude and bring the nose wheel back to the ground.
Probable Causes
a. As confirmed by SAAB AB, with normal landing procedures, landing at or near the aft CG limit does not introduce a pitch up. As the incident flight was reproduced by the CCAA in the SAAB 340 simulator with the actual data. This showed that in the event Beta is selected with the power levers before the nose wheel is on the ground (WOW), the nose of the aircraft will pitch up aggressively. This nose-up pitch required above normal yoke down force counter action, however
with little effect. Quick forward power application is required to swiftly lower the pitch and the nosewheel back on the ground.
b. The ground handling crews mishandling and incorrect loading of baggage destined for the extra flight 7Z-701 and not for the incident flight 7Z-571.
The acceptance of baggage from another carrier without the proper weighing and handling. This poses the uncertainty that no dangerous goods were loaded.
c. Insufficient awareness and training of ground personnel of correct procedural handling of carry-on and checked baggage.
Contributing Factors
a. Extra baggage/cargo (reported to be 80 kg/176 lbs.) accepted from another carrier was loaded on the incident flight, 7Z-571, in error. This should have been loaded on another flight 7Z-701. This extra luggage was therefore not accounted for in the W&B of the incident flight.
b. One of the contributing factors of this incident is determined to be the AFT CG position at landing of the aircraft augmenting a pitch-up attitude at above MLAW.
c. The average weight of each passenger includes a maximum of 8kg of hand luggage. At check-in, the hand luggage is weighed accordingly. At boarding, the hand luggage of each passenger is collected at the aircraft and stowed in the baggage compartment C1 or C2. This was not accounted for on the computer load sheet.
d. The exact location of the hand luggage is not reflected on the computer load sheet and may have had an adverse effect on the CG as the hand luggage should be located in the cabin together with the passenger, W&B wise. This feature of the computer load sheet should be implemented without delay.
e. Insufficient awareness and training of ground personnel of correct procedural handling of carry-on and checked baggage.
f. Taking into account points 3.3a and 3.3d, this caused some inconsistencies in the Weight & Balance loading weights
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
CCAA
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 18-Mar-2025 18:08 | ASN | Added |
| 18-Mar-2025 18:10 | ASN | Updated [Nature, Narrative, ] |
| 18-Mar-2025 19:05 | Flayer | Updated [Date, ] |
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