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| Date: | Wednesday 25 June 1997 |
| Time: | 08:43 |
| Type: |  British Aerospace BAe-146-200 |
| Owner/operator: | CityJet |
| Registration: | EI-CMY |
| MSN: | E2039 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 54 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Location: | London-City Airport (LCY/EGLC) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Dublin Airport (DUB/EIDW) |
| London-City Airport (LCY/EGLC) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft was on a scheduled flight from Dublin to London City and was making an approach to Runway 28. The airport had been using Runway 10 and this was the first approach to the westerly runway that morning. At 0820 hrs, the airport 'Automatic Terminal Information Service' had transmitted information 'Hotel'; this had been received by the crew and it included the following weather information: Surface wind 180°/07 kt, varying between 110°and 300°; visibility greater than 10 km; light rain; cloud few at 1,800 feet and broken at 4,800 feet; QNH 1004 mb. With this weather information, the crew had requested, through Thames Radar, if they could use Runway 28 for landing; this was agreed by London City ATC and the crew were informed.
The commander was the handling pilot for the approach and carried out a normal 5.5° glide slope ILS approach to the runway. As part of the approach checks the wheel brake hydraulic system was changed to 'green' and the brake pressure checked at which time it was confirmed that 3,000 psi each side was registered on the gauge. With Flap 33° selected, the aircraft was stabilized at an approach speed of Vref plus 5 kt; this was an indicated airspeed of 115 kt. EI-CMY was cleared to land at approximately 7 miles range and the crew were also advised that the runway was damp and that the surface wind was 170°/09 kt; this equates to a tailwind of 3 kt. At 2 miles, the crew called for a wind check and ATC transmitted that the wind was 160°/08 kt; this equates to a tailwind of 4 kt. The crew considered that touchdown was at the end of the touchdown zone, close to the 'end of
zonelights'. Then, once the nose-wheel was on the ground, the commander activated the spoilers and the first officer confirmed their deployment. However, when the commander commenced wheel braking, she considered that the brakes were 'snatching' and that the retardation was less than normal. She continued to apply foot pressure to the wheel brakes and both crew members confirmed that the brake pressure gauges were indicating normal values. As the aircraft approached the end of the declared runway, the commander changed the operatingwheel brake hydraulic system from 'green' to 'yellow' and asked the first officer if he was on the brakes. The commander had also maintained pressure on her brake pedals and the crew the felt an immediate improvement in the braking performance of EI-CMY. The commander was now confident that the aircraft would
stop within the hard standing and, in consideration of passenger comfort, reduced the brake pressure slightly; the aircraft stopped justshort of the grass. EI-CMY travelled beyond the end of the declared runway, past the 75 meters 'Runway Starter Extension' and into the final 24 meters hard standing surface.
The ATC controller had watched the aircraft land towards the end of the touchdown zone and thought that it appeared faster than normal as it progressed along the runway. As EI-CMY passed the control tower, the controller considered that it could overrun the runway and pressed the crash alarm; there after , she monitored the aircraft and noted that it seemed to 'snake' as it passed into the “Starter Extension” and then saw it come to rest short of the grass; as it stopped, the controller noticed a short “Puff” of smoke from the area of the right gear and asked the crew if they required any assistance. When the crew of EI-CMY transmitted that they were serviceable, the controller gave them permission to taxi to the parking area. Shortly afterwards, when the Airfield Fire Service (AFS) checked in on the radio, the controller advised them of the situation, stood them down from the 'alert' but asked them to attend the aircraft on the stand. The AFS checked the aircraft on stand
and then, after confirming that there was no evidence of excessive heat in the area of the brakes and wheels of EI-CMY, were stood down.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422ec4be5274a13140000f5/dft_avsafety_pdf_500120.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/5994240 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 27 February 1987 | N356PS | Pacific Southwest Airlines - PSA | 0 | Fresno Air Terminal, CA (FAT) |  |
sub |
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 27-Mar-2025 19:07 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 27-Mar-2025 19:09 | ASN | Updated [Narrative, Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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