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| Date: | Monday 1 January 1996 |
| Time: | 19:53 |
| Type: |  Fokker 70 |
| Owner/operator: | British Midland |
| Registration: | G-BVTE |
| MSN: | 11538 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 74 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Location: | Nottingham-East Midlands Airport (EMA/EGNX) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport (AMS/EHAM) |
| Nottingham-East Midlands Airport (EMA/EGNX) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft was on a scheduled flight from Amsterdam to East Midlands Airport. The airfield forecast for the expected approach time was surface wind 050˚/04 kt, visibility 200 metres in fog and overcast at ground level. Before starting the descent, the commander, who was the handling pilot for this sector, briefed the first officer for a Category IIIa approach and landing on Runway 27. Both pilots had converted to the Fokker 70 in August 1995 from an earlier generation aircraft which did not have an autoland capability. The briefing included the weather minima for the approach, with a decision height (DH) of 50 feet and a runway visual range (RVR) of 200 metres, and that it was to be a fully coupled automatic approach and landing. East Midlands Airport was cleared by the CAA to Category III status in November 1995 and one of the conditions imposed for this status was that the runway exits 'C' and 'D' are not to be used during Category III operations and the lead off lights for these
exits must be switched off (see aerodrome chart at Figure 1). As these two runway exits were not to be used and therefore the aircraft must leave the runway at the upwind end, the commander briefed that reverse thrust would not be used. The Operations Manual (Flying) for this aircraft states that idle reverse thrust must be used for all landings.
The descent and approach that was flown under the instructions of ATC was unhurried and the aircraft became established on the extended localizer at 17 miles and 3,000 feet; shortly afterwards the flight was cleared to 2,000 feet. At 8 miles it was cleared by ATC to descend on the ILS and it proceeded to carry out a fully coupled automatic approach and landing using 42˚ flap at an estimated landing weight of 34,600 kg. Speed control by the auto thrust system was accurate at the planned approach speed of 127 kt and the aircraft touched down abeam the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI), in the correct touchdown zone and approximately one meter to the left of the runway centerline.
Speed-brakes were deployed almost immediately after landing, having been activated by wheel spin-up of the main undercarriage. The aircraft continued along the runway, directional control being maintained by the autopilot rollout mode. The crew's attention at this time became focused on the accuracy with which the aircraft continued to track the runway centerline, to the exclusion of its speed and position relative to the end of the runway. Required calls at 80 kt and 60 kt were omitted during the landing roll. When the airspeed reached 67 kt the commander gently commenced light braking. It was the crew's experience that the carbon brakes had a tendency to snatch on initial application causing the aircraft to deviate from the runway centerline. The aircraft was not fitted with an auto-brake system. The autopilot was then disconnected and directional control assumed by the commander. Seven seconds later both pilots observed that the aircraft was rapidly approaching the end of the runway and moderate braking was applied, however it failed to prevent the aircraft overrunning the paved area and traveling a distance of 35 meters over the grass. Nose-wheel steering was used in an attempt to turn the aircraft during the overrun and, after it had turned through 40˚ from the runway centerline, the nose-wheels sank into the soft ground and the aircraft came to a standstill.
The aircraft was undamaged by the overrun and the engines were shut down with the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) running. As there was no risk of fire, the passengers remained on board until ground transport arrived; they then left the aircraft normally using the forward left cabin door which is an integral airstair.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f5ede5274a13170005d9/Fokker_70__G-BVTE_03-96.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/5881738 (Photo)
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 28-Mar-2025 08:47 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 28-Mar-2025 08:48 | ASN | Updated [Narrative, Accident report, ] |
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