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| Date: | Wednesday 28 April 1999 |
| Time: | 16:03 |
| Type: |  British Aerospace BAe-146-300 |
| Owner/operator: | Aer Lingus Commuter |
| Registration: | EI-CLI |
| MSN: | E3159 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 105 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Location: | Birmingham Airport (BHX/EGBB) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Birmingham Airport (BHX/EGBB) |
| Dublin Airport (DUB/EIDW) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The BAe 146 was operating a scheduled service from Birmingham to Dublin. The commander, a line training captain, was seated on the left with a new first officer, who was on the fourth day of his line training, seated on the right. In accordance with company policy a safety pilot was occupying the jump seat.
The aircraft departed the stand and checked in on the tower frequency as it proceeded on taxiway 'D', half way between the 'D3' and 'D4' holds (see diagram). After initial contact the tower controller transmitted "...GOOD AFTERNOON LINE UP RUNWAY THREE THREE THERE'LL BE LANDING TRAFFIC ZERO SIX". The commander replied "ROGER LINE UP AND WAIT THREE THREE..". The crew then completed the take off checklist and held a brief discussion on the use of strobes and the Thrust Management System (TMS).
A Piper PA-38, G-BOZM, crewed by and instructor and student, was using Runway 06 for circuit training. The student pilot, seated on the left, had completed 13 hours of dual instruction and was on his second circuit training detail. The aircraft had been instructed to carry out a left hand visual circuit. The circuit direction is often varied so that circuit traffic using Runway 06 can be coordinated with commercial traffic arriving and departing from the main instrument Runway 15/33. The instructor transmitted "...DOWNWIND TOUCH AND GO" . Immediately after the BAe 146 had read back his line up clearance the PA38 was cleared by the controller to "TOUCH AND GO ZERO SIX RIGHT HAND CIRCUIT SURFACE WIND 040°/11 KT"
As the BAe 146 lined up on Runway 33 the controller transmitted "..(callsign)..ON PASSING ALTITUDE TWO THOUSAND FEET CONTACT BIRMINGHAM RADAR ONE ONE EIGHT DECIMAL ZERO FIVE". The commander replied "OUT OF TWO THOUSAND ONE ONE EIGHT OH FIVE...". The controller responded "AFFIRM STANDBY". The commander reported that he believed the transmission also included a take off clearance, although this was not included in his readback of the departure instruction. Whilst transmitting this the safety pilot tapped him on the shoulder. He (the safety pilot) had been listening on the radio and had not heard the departure instruction or commander's reply and believed, incorrectly, that the commander had inadvertently transmitted over the PA instead of the radio. The commander checked his station box and confirmed that he was selected to transmit on the radio. The safety pilot checked his station box and found it to be intermittent. At the same time the first officer was momentarily distracted checking the selections on the TMS ready for take off. Believing that the aircraft had been cleared for take off the commander commenced the take-off roll. The first officer was to be the Pilot Flying (PF) therefore as the aircraft accelerated and reached 80 kt the commander handed over control to the first officer. The controller, sitting in the tower and facing Runway 06, heard the increase in engine noise from the BAe 146 as it commenced its take-off roll. Realising immediately that the BAe 146 was taking off without clearance he transmitted "... (Callsign) HOLD POSITION!". The commander heard his callsign but reported that the remainder of the transmission was difficult to hear above the cockpit noise. He did however assume there to be a problem and rejected the take off.
The student in the PA 38 had carried out a high and fast approach to Runway 06 causing the aircraft to land just beyond the normal touchdown zone markings. As the aircraft was just about to touchdown the instructor heard the controller's transmission "(callsign of BAe 146) HOLD POSITION!".
The controller's tone of voice alerted the instructor and he looked to his right to see the BAe 146, that he knew had lined up ready for departure, established on its take off roll and approaching the runway intersection ahead. The tower controller continued his transmission instructing the PA38 to "TURN LEFT NOW!".
The instructor took control applied 90% braking, to avoid skidding, and turned the aircraft to the left onto a heading of 330°, stopping next to the runway intersection with the aircraft's right wing over hanging the edge of Runway 33. The commander of the BAe 146 saw the PA38 at the time he rejected the take off. He attempted to stop before the intersection but the left wing of the BAe 146 passed over the right wing of the PA38.
The BAe 146 eventually stopped abeam hold 'K' whereupon the commander transmitted "(callsign) DID WE HIT HIM?". The controller replied "NEGATIVE".
After the incident the PA 38 returned to the threshold of Runway 06, held for 10 minutes and then continued with its circuit detail. The BAe 146 vacated the runway and returned to the stand for a brake check. The aircraft, operated by the same crew, departed for Dublin several hours later
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422fb53e5274a1317000863/dft_avsafety_pdf_502481.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/7701721 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 15 April 1998 | EI-CLI | Aer Lingus Commuter | 0 | Near Dublin |  |
min |
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 02-Apr-2025 07:43 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 02-Apr-2025 07:45 | ASN | Updated [Narrative, Accident report, ] |
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