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| Date: | Thursday 8 May 1997 |
| Time: | 12:30 |
| Type: |  de Havilland Canada DHC-8-311 |
| Owner/operator: | British Airways Express, opb Brymon Airways |
| Registration: | G-BRYR |
| MSN: | 336 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1992 |
| Engine model: | P&W Canada PW123 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 21 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Location: | Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG/LFPG) -
 France
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG/LFPG) |
| Bristol Airport (BRS/EGGD) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
On the day of the incident the crew were scheduled to operate five sectors; from Edinburgh to Bristol and then via Plymouth, Jersey, and Paris back to Bristol. The flight departed Edinburgh at 0600 hrs. On lining-up for take-off from Bristol at the beginning of the second sector, the commander noticed that the rudder pedals seemed stiff to operate, however this did not cause him undue concern and he continued with the take off. The stiffness disappeared during that sector and was not felt again until the aircraft departed from Paris on the final sector of the day.
After a short delay for air traffic clearance, the flight departed from Charles de Gaulle airport at 1220 hrs for Bristol. The wind on departure was 240_/32 kt and Runway 27R was in use, consequently there was a crosswind from the left of approximately 16 kt. After takeoff the commander, who was the handling pilot for the sector, found that he was unable to move the rudder pedals. During the subsequent climb to Flight Level (FL) 100, the landing gear and flaps were retracted with no noticeable effect on the rudder pedals,which remained immovable. Control of the
aircraft was passed to the first officer who confirmed the condition. Rudder trim was applied and movement was confirmed on the trim indicator. The flight deck switch-lights for the two rudder hydraulic actuators were then checked to ensure that they were not illuminated and to confirm filament integrity. Had either switch-light been lit, this would have indicated a failure of the respective rudder power control unit actuator linkage; however neither was illuminated. The autopilot was then selected successfully. In addition to relieving the pilots of the physical control of the aircraft, this also served to confirm that the yaw damper was operating because yaw damper
failure would have prevented autopilot coupling.
After confirming that there was no appropriate emergency drill in the aircraft Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), the crew advised Paris ATC that they had an emergency situation and requested diversion to an airfield which had a suitable into-wind runway. ATC suggested a diversion to Beauvais which is approximately 30 nm north-west of Paris Charles de Gaulle airport, for a landing on Runway 23. The surface wind was given as 240_/12 kt. On approaching Beauvais, the crew decided to delay their landing until the arrival of the full fire service cover. As that day was a public holiday in France, the fire service from the nearby town had to be called out to provide full cover, and this resulted in a 35 minute delay before a landing could be made.
During this delay, the crew were able to check their landing distance requirements. As Runway 23 was wet, they calculated that the landing distance required would be 992 meters. Although Paris ATC had advised that Runway 23 was 1,500 meters long, the flight documents for the runway showed that there was only 1,105 meters available for landing, the remainder being declared unusable. In addition, there was no runway instrument approach aid nor approach lighting available for this runway. As the runway was also slightly narrower than usual at 40 meters, the commander decided to carry out an approach to Runway 31 which was 2,430 meters long, 45 meters wide, with high intensity approach lighting and an instrument landing system (ILS). By this time the surface wind was 240_/12 kt with gusts up to 16 kt.
The crew then found that they were unable to tune the ILS using the frequency promulgated on their approach chart and on checking this with ATC they were informed that the frequency had been changed. It was later ascertained that the company which produced the chart had not promulgated the change in time for the amendment to have been incorporated in the manual prior to this flight. Having set the correct ILS frequency, the crew then carried out an uneventful approach and landing.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f6f9ed915d1374000617/dft_avsafety_pdf_501903.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/9278733 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 15 January 2024 | 5Y-IAI | Aircraft Leasing Services Opf United Nations | 0 | Juba |  |
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| Bird strike | ||||||
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 04-Apr-2025 12:50 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 04-Apr-2025 12:51 | ASN | Updated [Narrative, Accident report, ] |
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